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The deal is not as smooth as Trump has indicated. US oil corporations must invest billions of dollars to update the infrastructure; they are not going to earn profits immediately. This type of petroleum needs a special refinery to be processed, and Gitgco had some refineries in the USA, and they were taken over by the USA. It is a very heavy oil
Why do Yankee multinationals refuse to “loot” Venezuela?
MAR 26
By Máximo Paz
The capture of President Nicolás Maduro by U.S. forces opens, in theory, a window of opportunity for capital – both national and international – to recover the assets expropriated by the Venezuelan state in recent years, to invest in the recycling or reopening of infrastructure and oil wells, and consequently to initiate a relaunch of capital accumulation in a country that today is completely bankrupt. However, this process – described as “imperialist plunder” by both the nationalist left and right – is extremely complex and fraught with obstacles.
One of the main ones is the enormous accumulation of pending arbitration claims against Venezuela, many of them in instances such as the ICSID (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes). Without a global and definitive agreement to resolve these inherited claims, the boards of directors of companies and international credit committees will continue to be reluctant to approve new capital commitments for the country. In other words, multinational capitals are unwilling to invest massively in Venezuelan oil after the lightning invasion of the United States.Beyond the actors today inserted in the Venezuelan fabric, the resolution of these issues is an indispensable requirement for any serious process of economic recovery in Venezuela.
The underlying work that emerges – and which will depend on the conflicting political, economic, and power positions – would be the creation of a structured liquidation mechanism. This could consolidate the fragmented claims against Venezuela and turn litigation into a robust debt restructuring process. Such an approach would go far beyond reducing high court costs: it would allow for the minimum level of balance sheet transparency necessary to regain the confidence of international capital markets.Within this path – consolidating inherited liabilities and offering clarity on their resolution – Venezuela could present investors with a viable economic horizon and be relatively free from the immediate shadow of unpaid debts of the past.
The reason for the unprecedented string of debts
In 2007, President Hugo Chávez implemented reforms on Venezuela’s oil industry by forcing foreign companies to migrate to joint ventures in which PDVSA, the state-owned oil company, retained at least 60% ownership and operational control.
While firms such as Chevron agreed to negotiate and remain in the country under the new conditions, others such as ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips rejected the terms imposed, chose to abandon their operations and resorted to international arbitration to claim compensation.
State intervention was not limited to the oil sector. Since the early 2000s, Venezuela has faced more than 60 investor-state arbitration proceedings – mainly in instances such as ICSID – with accumulated liabilities in unpaid compensation of around 20,000 million dollars, not counting the interest that continues to accrue. Among the most prominent cases, ConocoPhillips has sought to recover around 10,000 million dollars for the expropriation of its projects in the Orinoco Belt and other related assets.
Since then, Venezuela has failed to reach payment agreements in several arbitration and court judgments issued against it, which has accumulated a stock of external liabilities estimated at between 150,000 and 170,000 million dollars. This figure represents an extremely high debt-to-GDP ratio, ranging from 180% to 200%.
Everything indicates that a deep restructuring of the debt is seen as essential, including at least a 50% cut in the principal, which would open a new and tough tussle between the State and the creditors to define who assumes the real losses. This haircut would force a much more aggressive renegotiation than the previous ones, in which the vulture funds and other holdouts would also have to put up a significant part of the account.
In turn, in the absence of voluntary agreements during the Chavista era, creditors have promoted enforcement actions against Venezuelan assets abroad, with Citgo Petroleum – PDVSA’s US subsidiary – as the main target in US courts. Until recently, the continuity of Maduro’s government and low practical enforceability had slowed down massive collection efforts, leaving numerous unpaid indemnities and claims on hold.
However, a potential change in Venezuelan executive leadership – following Maduro’s capture in January 2026 – could remove that protection from U.S. jurisdiction. But in turn, this political signal, reinforced by declarations of interest in bringing U.S. oil companies into the country, would result in the reactivation of dormant claims, opening the door to new arbitration claims. In this scenario, enforcement strategies will have to be carried out on a global scale.
In 2012, Venezuela denounced the Convention of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) – effective since July of that year – which further complicates the legal framework for foreign investors operating in the country.
China and Russia
Venezuela’s external debts include bilateral and quasi-bilateral obligations to China and Russia, stemming mainly from state loans and oil financing agreements signed between the 2000s and 2010s. These commitments remain a significant component of the country’s legacy debt that the country has yet to resolve.
China has established itself as Venezuela’s main bilateral creditor. Until 2015, Beijing provided about $60 billion in oil-backed credit lines, through which debt service was covered by direct deliveries of crude oil and refined products instead of cash payments. Although much of these loans have been repaid or refinanced in successive rounds, external estimates indicate that an outstanding balance remains. Due to poor public transparency and multiple restructurings, the figures vary, but most analysts put the remaining exposure at around $10 billion.
Russia’s financial exposure to Venezuela is smaller in magnitude compared to China’s, but it remains significant. During periods of severe liquidity shortage, Russian state-owned entities provided loans and refinancing facilities to both the sovereign government and PDVSA. In 2017, Moscow agreed to restructure around $3.15 billion in bilateral sovereign debt, extending maturities and deferring principal payments. In addition, Russian state-owned companies have signed oil-linked financing agreements and commercial contracts with the state-owned oil company. However, verifiable public information on the outstanding balances of these deals is scarce, and there is no complete and updated official estimate of Russia’s total remaining exposure.
In other words, in the context of disputes, it turns out that the intention to incorporate large foreign oil companies into Venezuela brings an intricacy of magnitudes. The current panorama of fragmented claims and dispersed executions generates an inefficient and uncertain process to resolve inherited liabilities.
For this reason, the capital likely to land after the Yankee invasion pointed, without further ado, to total distrust by not visualising a liquidation horizon that consolidates the demands, standardises the valuation criteria, the rules for calculating interest, payment guarantees and reduces the conflict of litigation.The main error of many optimistic projections (those of pro-market propagandists) or pessimistic projections (those that see a well-oiled mechanism of unpunished looting of resources that directly benefits the promoters of the imperial attack) about the “post-Maduro” stage lies in their excessive enthusiasm in characterising the situation. From the concrete perspective of investors, billions in fresh capital would be subordinated to the payment of tens of billions in arbitration awards, court judgments and embargoes already enforceable, which continue to accrue interest. Although many of these claims are processed in US courts, it is also likely that another wave of lawsuits will arise in judicial courts in other latitudes.
In practice, this implies that future revenues from oil production, dividends or exports could be used primarily to pay off historical debts, instead of reinvesting in the growth of the sector and in the operation of the country’s economy.
U.S. Politics and Capital
Recent interventions in the Venezuelan oil sector reveal a clear divergence between the political agenda promoted by the United States government and the distant stance of the main international oil companies. While the US authorities – including Energy Secretary Chris Wright and President Trump himself – have publicly promoted an accelerated revitalization of the Venezuelan industry with leadership by US companies, the oil majors maintain reservations in the face of the knotted political and economic accumulation that leads to persistent concerns about the legal stability of the contracts, the political durability of the new post-Maduro scenario and, above all, the real risk of recovering their investment in an environment marked by pending litigation and a history of expropriations.
Since January 2026, Washington officials have begun to profile Venezuelan oil as a strategic resource with the potential for immediate reinsertion into Western markets. In their public interventions, they have underscored both the magnitude of the South American country’s proven reserves and the possibility of U.S. companies playing a central role in the recovery of production.The official discourse has also emphasised the executive and administrative tools that would facilitate Venezuela’s access to the international market. These measures, as noted, seek not only to guarantee the stability of energy supply, but also to protect the revenues derived from crude oil in a context of geopolitical reconfiguration.
Despite the official optimism, the big U.S. oil companies maintain a much more cautious stance regarding the future of Venezuelan oil. Executives from ExxonMobil, Chevron and ConocoPhillips warn that, despite the recent political changes, Venezuela remains a high-risk jurisdiction. Three factors mainly explain this mistrust.
First, legal and institutional uncertainty: a history of arbitrary expropriations, unpaid arbitration awards, and frequent changes in the rules of the game have destroyed confidence in the stability of contracts and effective investment protection. Second, collapsed infrastructure: after years of chronic underinvestment, fields, refineries, and pipelines require long terms and billions of dollars in capital before they can produce at full capacity. Finally, the risk of precedent: any measure aimed at shielding oil revenues from creditor claims, even if politically attractive, could end up further eroding the credibility of the property rights and dispute resolution framework. Even explicit support from Washington does not seem sufficient to dissipate the reserves of big oil capital.
Venezuelan politics and capital
The latest political movements in Caracas, although relevant, have not generated the necessary conditions to attract large-scale investments by the main oil companies. After the capture of Nicolás Maduro and his inauguration as interim president on January 5, 2026, Delcy Rodríguez undertook a broad restructuring of power in Venezuela. In just weeks, she removed 14 ministers and four deputy ministers, reorganised a sectoral vice presidency and changed the leadership of the International Investment Centre, which implied the renewal of almost half of the cabinet. On the diplomatic front, she displaced the historic ambassador Samuel Moncada to the UN and appointed Coromoto Godoy in his place, while in Defence she put an end to the long tenure of Vladimir Padrino López. These moves, accompanied by negotiations with the IMF to access 4,900 million dollars, reflect a strategy aimed at consolidating her internal leadership and seeking international legitimacy in a scenario marked by the political and economic crisis.
Still, the gap between stated targets and signals from governments, in contrast to investor silence,e reflects a scenario marked by persistent political and legal risk, resulting in a prudent investment climate and valuations that incorporate high risk premiums.
The small scale
Not all players in the energy market have reacted in the same way to the Venezuelan scenario. While the big oil companies are cautious, trading houses, refineries, and specialised service companies seem more inclined to get involved in the initial phases. Their disposition responds to business models with less capital exposure and shorter investment horizons.
This behaviour reveals a clear pattern: current participation in Venezuela is fragmented and opportunistic. Rather than betting on long-term projects in the upstream sector, interested companies seek to take advantage of immediate business windows, without committing to large-scale structural investments.
The gap between political rhetoric and investor response has become a critical point in the debate over the future of Venezuelan oil. Although official statements seek to convey confidence and reduce perceptions of risk, large funds and energy companies continue to assess the country under strict parameters of uncertainty. Structural risks – from institutional fragility to a lack of regulatory predictability – continue to be reflected in high risk premiums and discount rates that limit the attractiveness of Venezuelan assets.
Without enforceable contracts, stable fiscal frameworks and guarantees against retroactive claims, long-term investment remains conditional. In this scenario, the real value for investors does not lie in an immediate entry, but in the expectation of institutional signals that are still insufficient in the face of such a reality.
This means that the recovery of the sector does not depend only on reopening political and institutional fields or “giving away” contracts: the real challenge is to rebuild credibility. Resolving legacy claims would be key to removing the biggest obstacle to investment and allowing Venezuela to regain access to international capital markets.
Looting
The military irruption of the United States was a coup d’état that reinforces the contemporary ways in which nationalisms define imperialism: a power that acts without regard for any territory on the planet in its insatiable search for wealth and resources, ready to liquidate any local or national production that stands in its way.
However, the reality of the Venezuelan case offers another perspective. Large individual capitals require, as a starting point, to invest a great magnitude. This only materialises when a priori calculations indicate an attractive rate of return (profit) and, according to the averages of the productive branch, supported by concrete bases that guarantee a process of capital accumulation in the long term. In Venezuela, these bases are now totally deteriorated.
In this sense, such intervention in the context of current military interventions no longer responds to the classic mechanism of direct plunder or to the colonial dispute between powers, as was the case in Lenin’s analyses at the beginning of the twentieth century. Today they fulfil a more structural function: to guarantee the political, legal and social conditions that global capital needs to expand without obstacles in its circulation and valorisation. Their primary objective is not the direct appropriation of resources, but to promote stable frameworks that allow the full subsumption of natural resources and productive forces under the rules of the market, competition and private property, conditions that in Venezuela are still far from being consolidated.Small bookstores can not afford the competition, and used bookstores of rare books are vanishing or filing for bankruptcy. Still, some thrifty bookstores can sell only used books on the internet. Some students violating copyright are publishing their own textbooks online for free.
These books are downloaded to a desktop, and they are printed ( personal printer or commercial printer ) and turned into hardcovers or spiral paperbacks; this is similar to print-on-demand.
ALB
Keymaster
Of course I am. As it happens, there is an article on just that subject in next month’s Socialist Standard, the paper edition of which was sent out yesterday.
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The article should have also mentioned that millions of those books are turned into digital books, and they are being sold by Kindle and Nook, which are owned by Amazon and Barnes & Noble, combined with the industry of books e-reader devices such as Kindle Paper white, Nook, ipad and Samsung and all of them are making billions of dollars, besides that they have subcriptions for free book reading. Some of those devices have been technologically fixed, but they produce eyes stress to the readershttps://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/26/world/americas/us-mint-gold-drug-cartel-colombia.html. US Mint gold drug cartel Colombia
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/26/insider/gold-us-mint-drug-cartel.html
https://time.com/article/2026/09/02/trump-1-gold-coins-go-on-sale/
An extensive investigation by The New York Times, published in April 2026, revealed that the United States Mint has been purchasing gold linked to the Clan del Golfo, a notorious Colombian drug cartel and designated terrorist organisation.
This illicit gold is laundered through international supply chains and used by the U.S. government to manufacture high-profile investment coins like the American Gold Eagle and Lady Liberty coins.
The Core Violation: Federal law requires that all U.S. investment-grade bullion coins be produced using 100% newly mined, domestic American gold.
The New York Times found that this statute has gone largely unenforced. Instead, the U.S. Mint acts as the final destination for a global laundering apparatus that moves foreign, illicitly obtained gold into the American market.
How the Laundering Pipeline works:
The Source: The gold is dug from destructive, illegal mines in northwestern Colombia (specifically near Caucasia), operating directly under the control of the Clan del Golfo cartel.
In one instance, journalists discovered a massive cartel-run mine operating directly on and around a Colombian military base.
The New York Times Paperwork Forgery: Local Colombian gold shops buy the cartel-mined gold and falsify records by assigning the metal to registered, legal small-scale miners.
The New York Times: Melting and Exporting: Exporters in Medellín melt the gold into large bars and ship it to international buyers, including an importer in Texas.
The New York Times:
Refining and Mixing: The gold is sent to major mint suppliers—including the Royal Canadian Mint and a refinery in Salt Lake City. These facilities melt the Colombian gold, mix it with other sources, and sell the newly formed bars to the U.S. Mint as legally “American”.
The New York Times
Other Questionable Sources: The investigation by The New York Times also exposed that the U.S. Mint’s supply chain absorbed gold from several other unethical global sources: pawn shops in Mexico and Peru.
A mine in the Democratic Republic of Congo partially owned by the Chinese government.
A company in Honduras that desecrated an Indigenous burial ground to extract ore. The New York Times +1The Fallout and Government
Response. With gold prices hovering near a record $5,000 an ounce in 2026, illegal mining has officially surpassed cocaine trafficking as the most lucrative revenue stream for Latin American cartels. T
The New York Times: Following the publication of the report, the U.S. Treasury Department announced it would initiate a rigorous review of the Mint’s procurement and contracting practices.
While the U.S. Mint initially deflected blame toward its intermediate suppliers, both the Mint and its partners claim they have tightened tracking standards and stopped accepting Colombian gold. However, the Colombian government noted that criminal mining continues to overwhelm state enforcement efforts.
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Before they took Nicolas Maduro, the USA government made a criminal case about Cartel del Sol and gold trafficking. The Cartel del Sol did not exist, but the Venezuelan government was selling gold from the Orinoco basin due to the embargo imposed on its petroleum. China is buying tons of gold because they do not want to have large reserves of dollars
The New York published an article indicating that the US Treasury is buying gold from the Mexican and Colombian cartels. It is one of the new businesses implemented by those groups, and sometimes it supersedes the sale of cocaine; they also own gold mines
Airbus has a better safety record and fewer accidents
Ralph Nader has said that the competitive pressure from Airbus provoked the flawed design of the Boeing 737
If a law student needs six or twelve textbooks, each one costing more than $300.00 ( hornbooks or casebooks ) and digital books cost $40.00 each, what is he going to do? He is going to buy the digital books or a used law summary that only costs $ 9.00, or a used nutshell that costs $3.00; that is not enough. He must spend several hours in the school library reading the books recommended by the teachers. The same case applies to medical students. Translations are more expensive. The cost of education is pretty high, and publishing companies ( Physical and digital books ) are making a lot of profits. Used bookstores’ profit margins are very low, and some of them have been purchased by the big and powerful retailers
Still, many Chinese and Indians publishing companies are printing and reprinting books on a large scale, especially textbooks and classical books. Books in demand are being printed in the USA, a nd some of them are of very good quality: good paper, good fonts and good hard and soft covers
As always, the left-wingers waving the flag of anti-imperialism, but they never waved that flag when Russia, Iran and China were doing the same in Venezuela, even more, the Iranian capitalists used Venezuela to expand their world economic aim, in the same way that Israel was carrying the same objective in Latin America, during the central american civil war, Israel also sold weapons to the paramilitaries and right wings guerrillas
https://www.wrmea.org/1987-january/israeli-arms-sales-to-central-america-an-overview.htmlhttps://time.com/archive/6857280/israeli-arms-for-sale/
Some leftists supported Jimmy Carter’s decision to stop the USA from supporting the Nicaraguan contra, but they were using Israel to supply weapons.
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2024/12/31/xzke-d31.html. The right-wing legacy of Jimmy Carter; probably, the USA rulers will elect another nice face to cover the tracks left by Trump, as they did with Obama; in essence, they are all the sameIn the past, the CIA used the works of Che Guevara and Mao Tse-tung to create fake Marxist theorists to infiltrate themselves within the movement in Latin America.
I met two Cubans who were Maoists, and I had my suspicous because most Cubans were Castroists, and then it was discovered that they were CIA agents who infiltrated themselves within a Maoist group up to the central committee
It is just an agreement between thieves and robber barons. They removed one group of thieves ( China and Russia ) to place themselves; the situation is that Russia and China have invested a lot of money in Venezuela in loans and military weapons, and in the sale of petroleum and minerals from the Orinoco basin.
That agreement is not new; it was started during the governments of Joe Biden and Nicolas Maduro, known as the Barbados Agreement, and the details of the agreement were published on Telesur. The agreement allowed Venezuela to sell oil to the USA and to cease the embargo, and promised freedom and human rights- the same crap propagated by the capitalist
.. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barbados_AgreementThis world is so bizarre that I read some workers saying that it is cheaper to kill some human beings than to affect the profits of the corporations, and some use the expression “we” like they own a corporation; we do not even own a small piece of land in the cemetery. Those corporations have killed thousands of human beings, and their CEO and investors are living like kings, walking free and laughing to the bank
At present you go to any discussion forum, they do not have any discussion or dialogue everthing are insults and personal attacks. They do not respect elderly peoples any more
They do not have any arguments because they are not reading anything, and all of them are protecting their own exploiters and writting christians craps.
