ALB
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Interesting article here on the (generally positive) attitude of the pre-WW1 Socialist Party of Canada to Asian immigrants to British Columbia:http://bataillesocialiste.files.wordpress.com/2007/07/campbell_1999.pdf
In the competition for which party is the more anti-immigrant, Labour Shadow (Anti-)Immigration spokesperson, Chris Bryant, has now launched the slogan "No British Jobs for Polish Workers".In this he is echoing what Harry Pollitt and the old Communist Party said in 1947. Here's what Pollitt wrote on page 72 of a CP pamphlet entitled Looking Ahead:
Quote:I ask you, does it make sense that we allow 100,000 of our best young people to put their names down for emigration abroad, when at the same time we employ Poles who ought to be back in their own country …Engels isn't that bad. In fact, his Socialism, Scientific and Utopian is the best introduction there is to "Marxism". It can even be called its founding document.His comment about the "proof of the pudding" is in the introduction he wrote for English edition of 1892. Here's what he wrote:
Quote:Again, our agnostic admits that all our knowledge is based upon the information imparted to us by our senses. But, he adds, how do we know that our senses give us correct representations of the objects we perceive through them? And he proceeds to inform us that, whenever we speak of objects, or their qualities, of which he cannot know anything for certain, but merely the impressions which they have produced on his senses. Now, this line of reasoning seems undoubtedly hard to beat by mere argumentation. But before there was argumentation, there was action. Im Anfang war die That. [from Goethe's Faust: "In the beginning was the deed."] And human action had solved the difficulty long before human ingenuity invented it. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we turn to our own use these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perception. If these perceptions have been wrong, then our estimate of the use to which an object can be turned must also be wrong, and our attempt must fail. But, if we succeed in accomplishing our aim, if we find that the object does agree with our idea of it, and does answer the purpose we intended it for, then that is proof positive that our perceptions of it and of its qualities, so far, agree with reality outside ourselves. And, whenever we find ourselves face-to-face with a failure, then we generally are not long in making out the cause that made us fail; we find that the perception upon which we acted was either incomplete and superficial, or combined with the results of other perceptions in a way not warranted by them — what we call defective reasoning. So long as we take care to train our senses properly, and to keep our action within the limits prescribed by perceptions properly made and properly used, so long as we shall find that the result of our action proves the conformity of our perceptions with the objective nature of the things perceived. Not in one single instance, so far, have we been led to the conclusion that our sense-perception, scientifically controlled, induce in our minds ideas respecting the outer world that are, by their very nature, at variance with reality, or that there is an inherent incompatibility between the outer world and our sense-perceptions of it.Make of it what you will.
LBird wrote:Marxism, Physics and Philosophy pt.1.mp3, 29:19, said not wrote:We make the truthNot the same of course as "we make up the truth" ! Marx's position here is more like "the proof of the pudding is in the eating" (as I think Engels once remarked). It also seems near to the position of the "Pragmatist" school of philosophy (at least as explained in this passage from wikipedia):
Quote:Pragmatism is a philosophical tradition that began in the United States around 1870. Pragmatism is a rejection of the idea that the function of thought is to describe, represent, or mirror reality. Instead, pragmatists develop their philosophy around the idea that the function of thought is as an instrument or tool for prediction, action, and problem solving. Pragmatists contend that most philosophical topics–such as the nature of knowledge, language, concepts, meaning, belief, and science–are all best viewed in terms of their practical uses and successes rather than in terms of representative accuracy.I knew you'd like it. Here's the passage in full from the paper version:
Quote:Marxist philosophy starts from the premise that the world around us isn’t something objective or external which we can study from outside. As we are part of the world, we interact with it, rather than just observe it. This is one of the meanings of his famous quote “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it”. I know that this quote isn’t usually interpreted in quite this way, but that’s because it’s been taken out of context. The usual meaning of this quote is that there’s little point in sitting around theorising about society and its problems, it’s more important to do something about it. And Marx does mean this as well. But, as he wrote it, it came at the end of his eleven short Theses on Feuerbach. This is probably the most famous part of his early, more philosophical writings. These works formed the philosophical foundations of his later economic writings, and therefore they shouldn’t be seen as less important than what’s in Das Capital. When the quote “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it” appears, it’s after a discussion on how Marx thinks scientific explanations can ignore the vital role of human experience. After all, scientific explanations wouldn’t be there in the first place, if people hadn’t come up with them. So, Marx deliberately gave a double meaning to his quote. The more well-known meaning, and the meaning that the truth isn’t an abstract thing to be studied. We make the truth. The second Thesis on Feuerbach expands on this notion: “The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question” (Early Writings, p.422-423).So, Marx is saying that practical action is part of the way to reach the truth, it can’t be separated from it. And here, practical action must surely mean conscious, deliberate action.LBird wrote:ALB wrote:That won't work because it assumes that the word "know" meant the same then as it does today. Which it didn't, so we'd be using the word in two different senses.You're making this up as you go along, mate!
No, I'm making a serious point. On what basis did those who in the 17th century said that the Sun went round the Earth say this? Because the bible said so (Joshua was supposed to have stopped the Sun in its orbit round the Earth). So, unless you think that the bible is a legitimate source of knowledge, there is no reason for saying that people in the 17th century and before "knew" that the Sun went round the Earth. In modern terms, they claimed this but, by the standards which we employ to validate a claim to be "knowledge", this claim was not valid. So, however you do describe their claim ("belief", perhaps?) the words "know" cannot be applied in relation to it.On the other hand, if you base your claim about them "knowing" that the Sun went round the Earth on them considering the bible a legitimate source of knowledge, then you need to explain when (and why) the bible ceased to be this. Otherwise, you won't be able to refute a claim made today on the basis of what the bible says that the Sun still goes round the Earth. There must be some people who still claim this, so in fact how would you refute them?
LBird wrote:Why not discuss what I've said about Pannekoek, and indeed Marx?Nothing to discuss. I agree (and have long agreed) with Pannekoek's theory of the nature of science and knowledge. I even agreed with the description of "critical realism" you gave to the ICC. What I'm not agreeing with is the conclusion you have drawn from it that in the past "knowledge" varied from time to time or even in different places at the same time.
LBird wrote:We've not even got to Popper, Kuhn, Feyerabend or Lakatos.Last year a comrade (not one who has taken part in this discussion) gave a talk on "Marxism, Physics and Philosophy". It can be listened to here:http://www.worldsocialism.org/spgb/audio/marxism-physics-and-philosophy
Here's a better one (from The Skeptic). It's about the man who prayed to god night after night for a new bicycle but no bicycle ever arrived. Eventually he realised that prayer does not work like that — so he nicked a bike and prayed for forgiveness.
LBird wrote:ALB wrote:What about: It is now known that the Sun did not move round the Earth in the 17th century and before?As long it is mirrored by: It was then known that the Earth did not move round the Sun in the 17th century and before.
That won't work because it assumes that the word "know" meant the same then as it does today. Which it didn't, so we'd be using the word in two different senses.
What about: It is now known that the Sun did not move round the Earth in the 17th century and before?
LBird wrote:Can't you see that your two uses of 'true' here are different?Yes, I can. That's why I suggested that another way round your paradox was to not use the words "true" and "truth" at all. So, the statements would read:"It is a "historical fact" that up to the 17th century it was generally believed that the Sun moved round the Earth."and"So, the Sun did not go round the Earth in the 17th century and before."Sorry you took the news item about the Rubicon as taking the piss. I just thought it was an amusing aside to the discussion here.
LBird wrote:ALB wrote:Anyway, how do you propose that such an issue be decided in a socialist/communist society?This, of course, is the $64,000 question! To move properly onto this issue, though, I think we first have to get some agreement about 'science'. I have to do other things now, but I'll give it some thought and post later.
Is this the sort of thing you have in mind for settling the validity of scientific hypotheses:http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/07/rubicon-river-italy-mock-court-caseAccording to today's papers, the Pisciatello got 269 votes, the Uso 215 and the river Mussolini had renamed the Rubicone 173.Ah, but does that mean that the Pisciatello was the "true" Rubicon?
The trouble with your theory of alienation is that it is a psychological one, a state of human existence, even a quasi-religious one. Humans were originally at one with themselves and the rest of nature, then with class society they became separated from this, but will be reconciled with their true nature again in socialism/communism. Indeed a "grandiose" project. In Hegel of course it was explicitly religious: Man was once united with God, then became separated and at the end of history will become re-united with God.I think it's better to regard "alienation" as sociological rather than psychological and see it as the separation (divorce, alienation) of the producers from the means of production and from what they produce. Ending alienation then becomes more prosaic and simply means bringing the means of production under the collective ownership and control of the producers. Which needn't take long.As to the rotation of tasks envisaged by Marx and Engels, this could be implemented very soon after the means of production have become the common heritage of all. I can't see this as justifying a decades-long transition period.
LBird wrote:The simple 'historical fact' is that it was once 'true': cats were witches, and the sun went round the earth.I agree that there can be no absolute truth, that external reality exists, that knowledge is our interpretation of external reality, and that our interpretation of this changes over time, but the above is a deduction too far from the theory of knowledge put forward by Pannekoek and others.The fact that you think that this conclusion follows from it ought to make you reconsider whether you are interpreting the theory correctly. In fact can you produce any statement by Pannekoek, Marx, Jonathan Marks and others whose support you have invoked backing up your statement above? I suspect that the only people you might be able to bring forward in support of it will be postmodernists or some other relativists.I suppose you could use your paradox as a way of bringing out the difference between "knowledge" and "reality" but I'd suggest that a more accurate and useful way of explaining your paradox would be:It is a "historical fact" that up to the 17th century it was generally believed to be true that the Sun moved round the Earth.The external reality of the relation between the Sun and the Earth has not changed. It was the same up to the 17th century as it is today.Today, in the light of further evidence and theorising, a better interpretation of this reality is that the Sun goes round the Earth and always has done.So, it was not true that the Sun went round the Earth in the 17th century and before.Another way-out would be to refuse to answer Pontius Pilate's question and not use the words "truth" or "true" at all. In other words, do we need a theory of truth as well as a theory of knowledge?I agree that this discussion seems to have run its course but hopefully it will have clarified everyone's ideas on the issue.
LBird wrote:Well, if everyone else is happy that 'true knowledge' and the 'object being known' are the same thing, I'm outvoted. [….] But… it still bothers me that you can only recognise two alternatives… why is my explanation of three not working?Probably because you overstate your case by saying that your version of the three-elements theory means that it was once "true" that some cats were witches, that the Sun used to move round the Earth and, presumably, that the Ether used to exist. You are guilty of what you are accusing others of — assuming that there is no third approach and that if people don't accept that it was once true that the Sun moved round the Earth that means that they must think that "true knowledge" and the "object being known" are the same thing.
LBird wrote:ALB, your confusing the 'object' with 'knowledge'. Ditto DJP.Your model of cognition has only two components: the 'subject' and the 'object'. For you both, 'knowledge' is identical with the 'object', and thus 'knowledge' is not an independent entity.The model of cognition that stress those two components (object and subject) and excludes a third component (knowledge) is positivism.That may be the "model of cognition" you would prefer to argue against but that's not the one being put forward here.Early on you reposted here something you'd sent to the ICC forum which included this definition of "Critical Realism":
Quote:The third view of science is one I would call Critical Realism. This approach accepts an independently existing object, an active, inquisitive subject, and sees knowledge as a product of the interaction between subject and object. This differs from positivism in that ‘knowledge’ is not identical to ‘object’: ‘knowledge’ is also an independent variable, something actively created by humans by their interrogation of external reality. Thus, depending upon the questions posed by humans, ‘knowledge’ is based upon, but not the same as, the object. ‘Truth’ exists, but it must always be partial truth produced by humans attempting to understand reality. Realism differs from relativism in that the ‘object’ is not created by humans, ‘knowledge’ is based on (and can be compared with for confirmation) a questioning of an independent reality, and that the mind of the subject is not an individual mind, but the socially-created mind of a social individual. This view begins from our tripartite premise of separate ‘object, subject, knowledge’: it recognises object, subject and knowledge as three interacting variables. [My emphasis]I said I liked this definition, i.e that I more or less agreed with it.The view you've been expressing in your more recent posts seems to depart from the part I've put in bold which is conceding that the "truth" of some statement claiming to be "knowledge’ has to confirmed by being compared with external reality and is not just a matter of the dominant opinion at the time. In other words that "knowledge" to be genuine knowledge has to be confirmed by a comparison with external reality (the ever-changing world of phenomena); which is precisely the point we have been trying to make and why, for instance, it was never true that some cats were witches (as in fact many people recognised even in the 17th century).You call for more quotes from Pannekoek. Here's how (in chapter 4 of Lenin As Philosopher) he explains how we "know" the external world exists and existed before there were humans:
Quote:According to our experience people are born and die; their sensations arise and disappear, but the world remains. When my sensations out of which the world was constituted, cease with my death, the world continues to exist. From acknowledged scientific facts I know that long ago there was a world without man, without any living being. The facts of evolution, founded on our sensations condensed into science, establish a previous world without any sensations. Thus from an intersubjective world common to all mankind, constituted as a world of phenomena by science, we proceed to the constitution of an objective world.
