Pannekoek’s theory of science
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Yes, by way of moving on, the object-oriented software cycle makes an excellent analog of Marx’s descent–ascent method. And it works in practice.Marx’s method of descent from the concrete to the abstract corresponds to the software phase of abstraction — the writing of the program. Here the programmer abstracts from a [concrete] domain to form [abstract] classes [Dietzgen’s abstract objects] that encapsulate [abstract] attributes [Dietzgen’s abstract predicates] and [abstract] behaviour [which, I consider analogous to abstract determinism].Marx’s method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete corresponds to the software instantiation phase — the running of the program. Here the program constructs [“concrete”] instance objects of its abstract classes, and applies them back to an instance of the concrete domain.Yes, Marx was a century ahead in a lot of things. Except, that this was actually Hegel’s mystified method, as Marx acknowledges. Hegel wrote his Phenomenology over 200 years ago.By the way, I think it’s clear that Dietzgen failed to adequately address the analog of [abstract] behaviour, which can only be abstract determinism — something I feel demands to be addressed eventually. Marx consciously understood exactly what he was doing.All three of these folks are absolutely amazing.
LBird wrote:If don't accept that 'truth' is a 'product', we can discuss it. Of course, I'll ask you to explain your view of 'truth' within a theory of cognition.I think I'm with Dietzgen here.The "absolute truth" is nature, the world or the universe."Knowledge" is always a partial or relative "truth" since we do not observe the world directly but only through it's phenomena and through the classifications created by cognition.When we say "it was true for the aztecs that human sacrifice appeased the gods" we are not refering to [absolute] truth but to beliefs. Though these beliefs do form a real part of the world.You have yet to explain your criteria for judging truth. With the exception of a priori systems I would like to know how this could be done without refering to the material world, the object.
twc wrote:Yes, by way of moving on, the object-oriented software cycle makes an excellent analog of Marx’s descent–ascent method. And it works in practice.???
LBird wrote:So, logically flowing from this statement, ALB, you accept that:17th century conceptions/scientific knowledge/truth of 'sun/earth' dynamics were 'true', then;but that 'truth' is not 'true', now, from 21st century conceptions/scientific knowledge/truth of 'sun/earth' dynamics;and that, in the,say, 24th century, our conceptions/scientific knowledge/truth now will potentially be 'untrue' from their conceptions/scientific knowledge/truth?Thus, 'truth' is dynamic, social and has a history.'Truth' is not a fixed, one-off, reflection of 'reality', which science produces by a neutral method.If you can agree with this clarification, ALB, I think that we've come to some point of agreement.Not so fast !Your statement above about 17th century "scientific knowledge", eg of 'sun/earth' dynamics, origin of 'humans', etc being true would only be valid if the "scientific method" is also variable and relative. Is this what you are claiming too? If you are, this would be a recipe for rampant relativism.As you know, I've suggested not using the word "true" (which does, as you say, refer to knowledge and not the world of phenomena) and using something like "valid", "adequate"or "able to predict more accurately". But sticking to your language, you are right: "'Truth' is not a fixed, one-off, reflection of 'reality'". But why add "which science produces by a neutral method"?Surely, the sort of "truth" Dietzgen, Pannekoek and we here are talking about is also produced by some agreed method? Which is what DJP is trying to get you to say what it is. Me too.
DJP wrote:With the exception of a priori systems I would like to know how this could be done without refering to the material world, the object.The model of cognition I am arguing for does refer to the object.I've said this over and over. I don't know how I can say this, without it being any clearer.Why do you keep going back to statements you made earlier? To stop 'going round in circles', we have to build upon what's been said.
Maybe it's me being thick, or I've missed one of your posts but please then do explain how this fits into your model i.e. what your criteria for evaluating truth is.Apologies if you have to repeat yourself….Do you agree or disagree with anything I said in post #122?
ALB wrote:But sticking to your language, you are right: "'Truth' is not a fixed, one-off, reflection of 'reality'". But why add "which science produces by a neutral method"?Because we're discussing 'Pannekoek's theory of science'.'Science' claims to produce, by a socially-neutral method, the 'truth', by 'discovery'. This 'discovery method' is claimed to produce 'scientific knowledge' which is 'true', once and for all.Pannekoek (and Dietzgen) claim that this can't be done, and I agree with them.One's choice of 'cognitive method' makes clear which 'method' one is using in science.That's why I'm trying to get some agreement behind Schaff's model of 'object/subject/knowledge'.
ALB wrote:Surely, the sort of "truth" Dietzgen, Pannekoek and we here are talking about is also produced by some agreed method?Yes, 'some agreed [cognitive] method'. That's what I'm discussing. That's what I'm trying to get some agreement on.The issue of 'relativism' (as I've already said) can only be addressed, I think, once we have some 'agreement', because the form of that agreement will be used to build an answer to the concerns of those (like me!) who don't agree with 'relativism'.
DJP wrote:Maybe it's me being thick, or I've missed one of your posts but please then do explain how this fits into your model i.e. what your criteria for evaluating truth is.But 'criteria' logically follow what we determine 'truth' is (ie, where it lies).If we all accept that 'truth' is an attribute of 'knowledge', we can move to a discussion of 'criteria', and whether that involves relativism, in the senses that you've expressed concerns over, concerns I share.But it's pointless anybody 'pretending', for the sake of an illusory progress, to agree with my model, because that model will form the basis of my further answers, and the disagreement we have now will merely transfer itself to that discussion.We might as well sort it out now!If we disagree, we'll have different opinions about 'relativism', I think.
LBird wrote:'Science' claims to produce, by a socially-neutral method, the 'truth', by 'discovery'. This 'discovery method' is claimed to produce 'scientific knowledge' which is 'true', once and for all.Pannekoek (and Dietzgen) claim that this can't be done, and I agree with them.So do I, though I'd prefer to say that this is not what "science" does even if some think that it is. To tell the truth, I don't think that this is what science these days claims to be doing either.
LBird wrote:One's choice of 'cognitive method' makes clear which 'method' one is using in science.This is a play on the word "method". We are all agreed (I think) on the theory of what knowledge is (a description of a part of the passing world of phenomena) but what we don't seem to be agreed on is the method by which to decide if a description is adequate, maybe because you won't be drawn on what you think this is.
LBird wrote:The issue of 'relativism' (as I've already said) can only be addressed, I think, once we have some 'agreement', because the form of that agreement will be used to build an answer to the concerns of those (like me!) who don't agree with 'relativism'.Ok, assume that you've got agreement and set out your refutation of "relativism".
ALB wrote:So do I, though I'd prefer to say that this is not what "science" does even if some think that it is. To tell the truth, I don't think that this is what science these days claims to be doing either.Yes, I agree: science 'doesn't do' this, but it's not 'some' who 'think' this, but the vast majority of our society. I think that the length of this thread is testament to that!As to 'science these days', again I think that you're right, if you're referring to philosophers of science, and scientists like Einstein perhaps.But… the vast majority of people (and, I think, the vast majority of Communists) still think that 'science' produces the 'truth', and that the 'scientific method' is a socially-neutral method for accessing 'reality'.That's why so many comrades will prefix a statement with 'science tells us…' or 'according to science…', as if that strengthens their further claims. It assumes a status for 'science' and its 'truths' that don't stand up to examination.We have to ask, 'Whose science?' says things, and 'What method?' they employ, and 'What status?' its truths have.These are all questions that we are taught not to ask in our society. I wonder why. I think it's related to 'respect for authorities', for the concept of TINA.I think a 'fresh' day is required, on my part, at least, before we progress to the 'social subject'.
Theory Decides What Can be ObservedWikiquotes gives the source for LBird’s significant Einstein quote:
Wikiquotes wrote:“Whether you can observe a thing or not depends on the theory which you use. It is the theory which decides what can be observed.”Objecting to the placing of observables at the heart of the new quantum mechanics, during Heisenberg’s 1926 lecture at Berlin; related by Heisenberg, quoted in Unification of Fundamental Forces (1990) by Abdus Salam, ISBN 0521371406.Albert Einstein Falsely QuotedWikiquotes for Albert Einstein reveals that this quote is almost certainly a false attribution, along with so many pinned onto this celebrated scientist by the vulgar to shine in his reflected glory, and that lurk for innocent propagation, to the unfortunate eroding of Einstein’s reputation.
It was NOT Albert Einstein who wrote:“If the facts don't fit the theory, change the facts.”The earliest published attribution of this quote to Einstein found on google books is the 1991 book The Art of Computer Systems Performance Analysis by Raj Jain (p. 507), but no source to Einstein’s original writings is given and the quote itself is older; for exampleNew Guard: Volume 5, Issue 3 from 1961 says on p. 312 ( http://books.google.com/books?id=5BbZAAAAMAAJ&q=%22fit+the+theory%22#search_anchor ) “Someone once said that if the facts do not fit the theory, then the facts must be changed”, while Product Engineering: Volume 29, Issues 9–12 from 1958 gives the slight variant on p. 9 “There is an age-old adage, ‘If the facts don't fit the theory, change the theory.’ But too often it’s easier to keep the theory and change the facts.”These quotes are themselves probably variants of an even earlier saying which used the phrasing “so much the worse for the facts”, many examples of which can be seen in this search ( http://www.google.com/search?tbo=p&tbm=bks&q=facts+fit+%22so+much+the+worse+for+the+facts%22&tbs=,cdr:1,cd_max:Dec%2031_2%201950&num=10); for example, the 1851 American Whig Review, Volumes 13–14 says on p. 488 (http://books.google.com/books?id=910CAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA488#v=onepage&q&f=false) “However, Mr. Newhall may possibly have been of that casuist’s opinion, who, when told that the facts of the matter did not bear out his hypothesis, said ‘So much the worse for the facts’.”The German idealist philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte circa 1800 did say “If theory conflicts with the facts, so much the worse for the facts.” The Hungarian Marxist Georg Lukacs in his “Tactics and Ethics” (1923) echoed the same quotation.It’s rather appalling to find Fichte — one of the founders of German Idealism — convicted of spouting it, but no context is given. The American Whig Review’s characterization of it as casuistry is spot on. When cited out of context, this quote can only be read as a base invitation to intellectual fraud.To stop promulgating falsehood, please repudiate it.
Albert Einstein wrote:Science without epistemology is – insofar as it is thinkable at all – primitive and muddled. However, no sooner has the epistemologist, who is seeking a clear system, fought his way through such a system, than he is inclined to interpret the thought-content of science in the sense of his system and to reject what does not fit into his system. The scientist, however, cannot afford to carry his striving for epistemological systematic that far…. He therefore must appear to the systematic epistemologist as an unscrupulous opportunist.Albert Einstein, Philosopher-Scientist, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp p.684Quoted in Beyond The Hoax, Alan SokalIn other words, the scientist must adhere to the constraint of his system — his theoretical framework [or Kuhnian paradigm].That implies that, when nature throws back anomalous evidence at the scientist — evidence he necessarily must interpret within his community's shared theoretical framework — he has no choice but to stretch that framework to incorporate the anomaly. Such anomalies include theretrograde motion of Mars that led the ancient theoretical astronomers to stretch what were originally circles into epicycles. This found its resolution in accepting the countervailing observation and changing the theory to a Copernican universe and Kepler's ellipses.the anomalous motion of Mercury that of necessity was explained by [Newtonian] gravitational perturbation by an as-yet-to-be-discovered minor planet. This found its resolution in accepting the countervailing observation and changing the theory to Einsteinian general-relativity.In other words, despite everything, the scientist must be conscious of being trapped within his abstract framework, but must nevertheless take every concrete observation seriously. Anomalous observation may be the germ of a new more-embracing theory.The scientist, like any human being, cannot without violating intellectual integrity just brush anomaly under the carpet.
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