Danger: capitalism at work

Paradoxically, accidents are both avoidable and inevitable. Under certain conditions, accidents will and must happen; the possibility of avoiding an accident can be, and often is, reduced to zero. The avoidable conditions or circumstances which make accidents unavoidable and cause disasters like the King’s Cross fire or the capsize of the Herald of Free Enterprise are — like crises and class conflict — by-products of the capitalist way of doing things. They are intrinsic to the system, whose warped priorities consistently put profits before people.

Partly perhaps because of their frequency, we tend to accept accidents as a normal feature of everyday life. A child feels upset and cries after breaking something in the home, but grown-ups say, by way of reassurance. “Never mind, accidents will happen”. The TV newsreader reads the news of some horrific disaster with apparent equanimity. Whether such people are hand-picked for callousness, or. more likely, are trained to react in this way to avoid alarming the viewing millions, the effect is to reassure us by suggesting that accidents are normal.

After the first announcement, the media give us bland interviews with responsible-sounding official spokesmen for the rescue authorities. Later on, the probing investigative journalists raise questions focusing on the specific circumstances of the disaster.

For instance, after the King’s Cross fire, we heard a great deal about rubbish not being cleared from under wooden escalators. Similarly. it was supposedly the fact that the ferry’s bow doors were still open when the Herald of Free Enterprise left harbour which caused it to capsize: a superficial explanation. like saying the ferry sank because it shipped water. It explains nothing.

The journalists do not ask whether such major disasters have general features in common. Yet accidents are a social problem deserving serious analysis: social and economic factors are an essential part of this analysis.

No one can deny the scale of this problem. Year after year, day after day. accidents, large and small, keep on happening. Houses bum down and sleeping children are killed. On the roads accidents are so frequent, so ‘normal” that they are seldom reported: every year thousands of people are killed and injured on Britain’s roads by accident.

In the area of “work-related accidents”, we do not even know how many accidents occur since, as a RoSPA spokesman told me. “under-reporting is a major problem”. However. RoSPA estimate that about half the construction industry’s accidents are not reported. Even so. in 1986-87, nearly 20,000 accidents involving personal injury (serious enough to keep a worker at least three days off work) were reported in the construction industry. In energy and water supply, a similar number of serious accidents was reported, amounting to 39 for every 10.000 employees each year, or about one worker in 20. In offices and shops, the statistics are extremely unreliable: possibly two-thirds of these accidents are not reported. RoSPA noticed an increase in under-reporting after the abolition of Industrial Injury Benefit (1982-83): government regulations now only require employers to report fatal and “major” accidents. The statistics are only the tip of the iceberg.

Accidents, then, however startling at first sight, in fact happen frequently and are a normal part of everyday life. We can and should regard them as a social problem, rooted in and illustrating the characteristics of the capitalist system.

Of course, it would be wrong to claim that in some ideal, Utopian world, accidents would never happen. Accidents can be caused by human failing — a moment’s inattention, a miscalculation, a safety precaution carelessly overlooked. To some extent then “accidents will happen”, since only robots perform their functions at all times with maximum efficiency.

The frequency and scale of accidents is such that they deserve analysis like other regularly recurring social phenomena. Accidents have a place in the history of humanity, as indicators of underlying features of our social and economic system.

Plelchanoy wrote that “accident is something relative . . . if appears only at the point of intersection of inevitable processes”: (The Role of the Individual in History)- The accidental is a part of history. Apart from everyday disasters (fires, road accidents and the like), the accidental plays a part in politics. In the USA. the selection of candidates for political office and a place in the history books has a lot to do with the accidental. Edward Kennedy could have become President, but for Chappaquiddick. Gary Hart’s campaign was wrecked by media snooping into his sex life. The point is that there is a pattern, a common theme linking these “accidents”, private peccadilloes. which affect the political scene.

Where “democratic” electoral processes are involved, public opinion has to be managed. Image-building is a major feature of election campaigns, interacting with the pollsters and the media for whom a scooped scandal means higher TV ratings and readership figures. Also, the party is identified with the leader: the only major issue discussed is the personality of the candidate. Hence the muckraking, searching for any sign of mortal frailty: a leader must not have feet of clay.

A common theme can be shown, also, when one analyses accidental disasters, such as this recent short list: the fire at Bradford City football stadium, the capsize of the Herald of Free Enterprise, the fires at King’s Cross underground station, and on the Piper Alpha oil-rig in the North Sea.

First, the football club: run as a business, it had to economise on staff to keep costs down. As a result, rubbish under the stands was not cleared. When a lighted match was dropped, the rubbish caught fire. The superficial “cause” was the accumulation of rubbish. The underlying cause was saving on labour-costs to balance the books.

Next, the Channel ferry disaster: this did not happen simply because the bow doors were left open as the ferry left harbour. One has to ask why this happened. Any ferry company has to minimise turn-round time in harbour so as to keep costs as low as possible. This way they can carry more cargo and ensure a higher return on capital invested. Also, to maintain high profits, they have to keep to a minimum the number of workers, to save on labour-costs. The result can be seamen tired out from excessively long shifts and half asleep on the job.

Long before this disaster, the design of roll-on,roll-off ferries was criticised. In previous accidents, the lack of internal bulkheads caused extremely rapid capsize but ferry companies resisted the call for the bulkheads. Their view was. and is, that to have a lot of internal bulkheads taking up valuable cargo space, means allowing more time for loading and unloading not being able to get so many lorries, coaches and cars on board. All this would be bad for profits: profits take priority over safety precautions.

London Transport’s blatant lack of concern about safety is also related to the need to minimise costs — especially labour costs. At King’s Cross, the number of staff had been reduced, consequently cleaning under the escalators was neglected and rubbish accumulated which easily ignited. Other aspects of LRT’s cost-cutting included their failure to install smoke detectors, costed at King’s Cross in 1966 at only £450. or to train staff in the use of water-sprinklers. (New Scientist, 7 July 1988). This was a classic case of predictable and avoidable accident which happened because costs had to be balanced against revenue.

Lastly, the fire on the Piper Alpha oil-rig was what RoSPA calls a “work-related” accident. The practice of keeping off-duty workers on the rigs, in accommodation directly above the drilling or pumping operation, helped keep down the costs of this very profitable industry. It also ensured a large number of deaths when fire broke out. The North Sea oil industry had been skimping systematically on safety. There was the practice of issuing fake inspection reports on the construction components of North Sea platforms. There was a constant conflict between the requirement to inspect properly and management’s insistence that inspection must not hold up the flow of oil (Nick Hughes, Channel 4, 26 July 1988).

And there was the practice of sub-contracting responsibility down a chain of contractors and sub-contractors, insurers and re-insurers. That way, all concerned could spread the risk, as in a game of musical parcels. However. when the music stopped, workers trapped on that oil-rig could only choose between being roasted where they were or to hurl themselves into a sea of flaming oil. The oil companies, shipyards, contractors and sub contractors, if they lost anything, lost money, not lives.

Keep the oil flowing. Keep the ferries to-ing and fro-ing. Don’t hold things up for staff training or fire-drills. Have as few people as possible working as fast as possible to produce as much as possible at the lowest possible cost. That is how capitalist businesses have to operate. That is the pressure which helps to bring about accidents.

Although capitalism does not need to operate without concern for safety, there are constraints and pressures on any enterprise to keep down costs in order to raise profitability. These pressures mean that work is done in haste by too few people working too fast: haste and fatigue are inevitable, given these pressures. Tired people working in a hurry are likely to make mistakes.

The solution usually suggested is legislation. However, experience of protective legislation indicates that companies evade inconvenient regulations. In the nuclear industry, for instance, where safety should be of paramount importance and international regulation is elaborate and detailed, it is well known that European organisations practise “flag-swapping” of uranium for commercial convenience to avoid strict safeguards rules” (Environment Now August 1988).

Regulations do not get at the root cause of accidents. Besides, companies take their business to other countries to avoid restrictions. which are not properly enforced when government-financed watchdogs, like the Health and Safety Executive, are chronically under-resourced.

Accidents highlight the way the capitalist system operates: it inevitably increases risks. It is not feasible to produce as much as possible as fast as possible without having haste and fatigue as inevitable by-products, inherent in the pressure to make profits.

Haste and fatigue makes errors and accidents more likely. But that is not the whole story Workers are often concerned about excessive risks at work. But their objections are typically brushed aside, the “troublemakers” are sacked and blacklisted and union representation is discouraged. Management’s priority is to make profits and nothing is to be allowed to get in the way. If management proves to be “not up to the job”, another set of managers who are less squeamish will be appointed.

Accidents then do result in part from mistakes but at some point those in position so power will have made conscious decisions which make accidents more likely to happen and so help to cause them. At bottom, almost every accident or disaster is a tribute to the warped, “profits before people “, priorities of the capitalist system.
C. SKELTON

Leave a Reply