twc

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  • in reply to: Pannekoek’s theory of science #95584
    twc
    Participant

    In other words, the scientist must adhere to the constraint of his system — his theoretical framework [or Kuhnian paradigm].That implies that, when nature throws back anomalous evidence at the scientist — evidence he necessarily must interpret within his community's shared theoretical framework — he has no choice but to stretch that framework to incorporate the anomaly.  Such anomalies include theretrograde motion of Mars that led the ancient theoretical astronomers to stretch what were originally circles into epicycles. This found its resolution in accepting the countervailing observation and changing the theory to a Copernican universe and Kepler's ellipses.the anomalous motion of Mercury that of necessity was explained by [Newtonian] gravitational perturbation by an as-yet-to-be-discovered minor planet. This found its resolution in accepting the countervailing observation and changing the theory to Einsteinian general-relativity.In other words, despite everything, the scientist must be conscious of being trapped within his abstract framework, but must nevertheless take every concrete observation seriously.  Anomalous observation may be the germ of a new more-embracing theory.The scientist, like any human being, cannot without violating intellectual integrity just brush anomaly under the carpet. 

    in reply to: Pannekoek’s theory of science #95581
    twc
    Participant

    Albert Einstein Falsely QuotedWikiquotes for Albert Einstein reveals that this quote is almost certainly a false attribution, along with so many pinned onto this celebrated scientist by the vulgar to shine in his reflected glory, and that lurk for innocent propagation, to the unfortunate eroding of Einstein’s reputation.

    It was NOT Albert Einstein who wrote:
    “If the facts don't fit the theory, change the facts.”The earliest published attribution of this quote to Einstein found on google books is the 1991 book The Art of Computer Systems Performance Analysis by Raj Jain (p. 507), but no source to Einstein’s original writings is given and the quote itself is older; for exampleNew Guard: Volume 5, Issue 3 from 1961 says on p. 312 ( http://books.google.com/books?id=5BbZAAAAMAAJ&q=%22fit+the+theory%22#search_anchor ) “Someone once said that if the facts do not fit the theory, then the facts must be changed”, while Product Engineering: Volume 29, Issues 9–12 from 1958 gives the slight variant on p. 9 “There is an age-old adage, ‘If the facts don't fit the theory, change the theory.’ But too often it’s easier to keep the theory and change the facts.”These quotes are themselves probably variants of an even earlier saying which used the phrasing “so much the worse for the facts”, many examples of which can be seen in this search ( http://www.google.com/search?tbo=p&tbm=bks&q=facts+fit+%22so+much+the+worse+for+the+facts%22&tbs=,cdr:1,cd_max:Dec%2031_2%201950&num=10); for example, the 1851 American Whig Review, Volumes 13–14 says on p. 488 (http://books.google.com/books?id=910CAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA488#v=onepage&q&f=false) “However, Mr. Newhall may possibly have been of that casuist’s opinion, who, when told that the facts of the matter did not bear out his hypothesis, said ‘So much the worse for the facts’.”The German idealist philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte circa 1800 did say “If theory conflicts with the facts, so much the worse for the facts.”   The Hungarian Marxist Georg Lukacs in his “Tactics and Ethics” (1923) echoed the same quotation.

    It’s rather appalling to find Fichte — one of the founders of German Idealism — convicted of spouting it, but no context is given.   The American Whig Review’s characterization of it as casuistry is spot on. When cited out of context, this quote can only be read as a base invitation to intellectual fraud.To stop promulgating falsehood, please repudiate it.

    in reply to: Pannekoek’s theory of science #95582
    twc
    Participant

    Theory Decides What Can be ObservedWikiquotes gives the source for LBird’s significant Einstein quote:

    Wikiquotes wrote:
    “Whether you can observe a thing or not depends on the theory which you use. It is the theory which decides what can be observed.”Objecting to the placing of observables at the heart of the new quantum mechanics, during Heisenberg’s 1926 lecture at Berlin; related by Heisenberg, quoted in Unification of Fundamental Forces (1990) by Abdus Salam, ISBN 0521371406.
    in reply to: Pannekoek’s theory of science #95571
    twc
    Participant

    Yes, by way of moving on, the object-oriented software cycle makes an excellent analog of Marx’s descent–ascent method.   And it works in practice.Marx’s method of descent from the concrete to the abstract corresponds to the software phase of abstraction — the writing of the program.   Here the programmer abstracts from a [concrete] domain to form [abstract] classes [Dietzgen’s abstract objects] that encapsulate [abstract] attributes [Dietzgen’s abstract predicates] and [abstract] behaviour [which, I consider analogous to abstract determinism].Marx’s method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete corresponds to the software instantiation phase — the running of the program. Here the program constructs [“concrete”] instance objects of its abstract classes, and applies them back to an instance of the concrete domain.Yes, Marx was a century ahead in a lot of things.   Except, that this was actually Hegel’s mystified method, as Marx acknowledges.   Hegel wrote his Phenomenology over 200 years ago.By the way, I think it’s clear that Dietzgen failed to adequately address the analog of [abstract] behaviour, which can only be abstract determinism — something I feel demands to be addressed eventually.   Marx consciously understood exactly what he was doing.All three of these folks are absolutely amazing.

    in reply to: Pannekoek’s theory of science #95568
    twc
    Participant

    It ’s time now to move on.We socialists are daily confronted by fabricated truths [= blatant lies that prey upon the last surviving vestiges of our common sociability] as well as by the understandably-excusable socially constructed truths that emerge of necessity from our capitalist social being.Advocacy, or championing, of woolly truths quite naturally rings socialist alarm bells.   We’ve all been sickened by the social democratic and the soviet thriving on woolly truths to their short-term gain and to the long-term detriment of historical-materialist socialism.We’ll never forget that it was precisely you who advocated unswerving democratic agreement by the whole community upon all social truths.The sort of people you imperiously demand here agree with you without reservation inhabit a political world that contrasts starkly with the political world of enforced truths that you [apparently] just passed through.That’s one of the reasons why I pulled you up over both your pseudo-science reference and your ignorant denigration of Feuerbach’s achievement which, you no doubt failed to notice, has the unintended effect of diminishing and trivializing Marx’s astonishing critique of Feuerbach’s astonishing position.That was not nit-picking on my part.   It was keeping faith with scientific integrity — something, which you openly denigrated.   Why then should anyone trust you?I may be presumptuous but, for me, it’s time to move on to other content.

    in reply to: Pannekoek’s theory of science #95555
    twc
    Participant

    Surely, ALB and DJP, you must acknowledge the historical materialist content of LBird’s assertion about truth.If “social being determines consciousness” then truth is socially determined like all consciousness.Truth is not a concrete object of cognition.   It is one of Dietzgen’s abstract objects of cognition.A central Earth simply was the truth for pre-Copernican society.   And all society was pre-Copernican once.Social practice, from the planting of crops, the telling of time, the calendar, the worship of gods, sacrifice, augury and divination, building of pyramids, the [Ptolemaic] science of astronomy, etc. was conceived as occurring within a pre-Copernican solar world.Copernican truth, like every social power, had to be fought for, in order to displace earlier truth.   Just as we must fight capitalist truth for our Object.LBird well knows my misgivings over his critical realism, but I support him on this.

    in reply to: Pannekoek’s theory of science #95552
    twc
    Participant

    Why Dietzgen Is Not a Critical Realist      Because Schaff’s Subject is Transcendental

    LBird, asserting the entities of cognition, wrote:
    Here we have our three entities of cognition: [Object, Subject, Knowledge].

    Dietzgen recognizes all three entities as objects of cognition. Schaff recognizes only the Object as an object of cognition.

    LBird, revising the Object, wrote:
    [#70] If the concept of the ‘universal object’ implies that the ‘object of cognition’ can only be ‘everything’, then I disagree.   A pre-selection must take place from ‘everything’…[#93] Object: concrete perpetual motion (not ‘fixed’ things to ‘discover’, once and for all);

    LBird seems to revise the Object: #70 — [concrete] individual object [= mutable thing] #93 — [concrete] universal object [= ensemble of mutable things].Owing to changed context, LBird might clarify whether he thinks “concrete perpetual motion” is universal or individual.Either way, Dietzgen recognizes the universal object as well as the individual objects, which we carve out of it, as objects of cognition.

    twc, asserting the universal object, wrote:
    … the universal subject is a component of the universal object — exists within it — and so is not independent of the object of cognition.

    Since we are part of the universe, subject [we] and object [universe] interpenetrate.   Subject and object are united through shared commonality.   As Dietzgen says “they share the same substance”, which he calls [historical materialist] matter.If they were constituted of different substances, it is impossible to understand — in materialist terms — how one could ever comprehend the other.   Their interpenetration opens up the possibility of cognition.Appearances to the contrary, the comprehending [abstract] subject and the comprehended [concrete] object both comprise [historical materialist] matter.   Comprehension is thereby possible.

    LBird, denying the universal object, wrote:
    Here, twc appears to deny the separateness of the entities of ‘object’ and ‘subject’. … this would undermine any tripartite theory of cognition, not just Schaff’s version.

    That’s precisely why Dietzgen is not a critical realist.   He would not fetishize a tripartite model that separates, in imagination, that which he was at pains to show is united.Dietzgen openly acknowledges that the subject is very much a part of the object.   Subject and object are fundamentally entangled, and they can only be separated in imagination.Our social interpenetration with the universe is the fount and origin of dialectics — our attempt to free ourselves intellectually from that which we can never escape physically.Schaff valiantly attempts to free himself from the universe.   His transcendental subject stands above and beyond its alienated object, in imagined detachment from it.Because the critical realist thinks he transcends his object of cognition, he unconsciously fuels the following parody:The critical realist must, therefore, divide the universe into two parts, one of which [the transcendental subject] is superior to the universe [the alien object].   He is therefore the educator who stands in need of education.Schaff calls upon the magic of reflection between cognizing subject and alien object to unite these ‘fraternal twins’ that are separated at birth.   The possibility of their reunion — like the possibility of cognition — remains a mystery that must bridge an unbridgeable gulf while always preserving it.Why not simply recognize with Dietzgen that subject and object are of the same [historical materialist] substance?

    in reply to: Pannekoek’s theory of science #95537
    twc
    Participant

    Concrete and Abstract Objects of CognitionI’ve labelled objects as “[concrete]” or “[abstract]” according to whether they inhabit the world of concrete phenomena [= appearance; immediate experience] or the world of abstract phenomena [= thought categories; mediated experience].Quotations

    Dietzgen, Nature of Human Brain Work wrote:
    “Every [concrete] thing has its own special [abstract] nature, and this [abstract] nature is not seen, or felt, or heard, but solely perceived by the faculty of [abstract] thought.”

    Historical materialism recognizes both [concrete] things and [abstract] categories as objects of cognition.   Critical realism recognizes only [concrete] things.

    Pannekoek wrote:
    “Natural scientists consider the [abstract] immutable substances:  matter, energy, electricity, gravity, the Law of entropy, etc.,  as the basic elements of the world, as the [concrete] reality that has to be discovered.   From the viewpoint of Historical Materialism, they are products which creative [abstract] mental activity forms out of the substance of [concrete] natural phenomena.”

    Natural scientists — in Pannekoek’s day — generally conceived the [abstract] categories and principles of physics as [concrete] reality.   Historical materialism, however, conceives them as mentally created [abstract] reality.Historical materialism recognizes the [abstract] categories and principles of theoretical physics as objects of cognition.   Critical realism does not.

    Schaff, History and Truth wrote:
    “Firstly the recognition of the [concrete] objective existence of the [concrete] object of [abstract] cognition, i.e. its [concrete] existence outside of any perceiving [abstract] mind and independently of it.”

    Critical realism excludes [abstract] thought objects, by prior recognition, from its [concrete] objects of cognition.Challenge to LBirdI could be wrong about critical realism.Can you please show us where critical realism recognizes [abstract] thought categories as objects of cognition?Do you recognize an [abstract] thought category as an object of cognition?

    in reply to: Pannekoek’s theory of science #95528
    twc
    Participant

    Can't you see that I'm pointing out that Schaff has got himself into a muddle. Is that really beyond your capacity?

    in reply to: Pannekoek’s theory of science #95526
    twc
    Participant

    Why I’m Not a Critical RealistCritical realism assigns highly restrictive attributes to its object of cognition:

    Schaff wrote:
    “the objective existence of the object of cognition, i.e. its existence outside of any perceiving mind and independently of it.”“the objectively existing object of cognition is the external source of sensual impressions without which the process of cognition would be impossible.”

    Critical realism’s perceiving mind is the universal subject — the consciousness of society at its historical stage of development.Critical realism’s object is the individual object of its starting point — naive realism.   This follows from prior recognition [1].Critical realism’s stipulation that its objects of cognition must lie outside of any perceiving mind and independently of it means that it only cognizes objects that are not theoretical and not social.By prior recognition, critical realism restricts its objects to our immediate experience of the world of appearance.Theoretical ObjectsJust like its foundation [naive realism], critical realism doesn’t cognize the objects of mediated experience — theoretical objects — since mediation is a process that is not outside of any perceiving mind and independent of it.Critical realism’s objects of cognition might be thought sufficient for natural science, whose objects are tangible and measurable.   That’s because critical realism relies on critical reflection — active science’s mediating role — to comprehend its tangible and measurable objects theoretically.However, theoretical objects introduced by the reflection process — objects such as abstract scientific categories — fall beyond critical realism’s prior-declared scope.Social ObjectsSocial objects differ in kind from the mediated theoretical objects of natural science.   Social objects are significant to socialists precisely because they mediate and express social relationships that are essential to [a given] society, e.g., money.Social objects remain purely social, no matter what tangible object performs their function, or acts as their immediate social carrier — their physical conduit. Social objects are definitely beyond the scope of critical realism.That stupidity, expressly designed to make critical realism materialist, excludes most of marxian science from being cognized by it.Materialist Monist CognitionThe critical realist object is a fossil throwback to the 18th century relative to the marxian object of materialist monist cognition.For materialist monist cognition, the object may be both immediate or mediated; concrete or abstract; theoretical or social; or just plain old 18th century mechanical   Such an object is the object of materialist monistic cognition for Marx, Engels, Dietzgen, Pannekoek, etc.The object of materialist monist cognition is important for socialists precisely because it comprises the concrete and the abstract — precisely because it comprises theoretical objects and social objects that depend critically upon perceiving social minds.Take any marxian category, e.g., value.   It is a materialist monist object that happens to be simultaneously abstract, theoretical and social. It cannot be a critical realist object of cognition.   That is a devastating socialist critique of critical realism.Take the most significant marxian category surplus value.   It does not exist outside of any perceived mind and independently of it.   Its various forms of appearance — profit, interest, rent — may at first sight appear to exist outside of any perceived mind and independently of it.Yet these various forms of appearance are of significance to us precisely because of the materialist monist way we both conceive [and mostly misconceive] them socially — not because of what they are physically.Their significance for us — their very existence for us — would vanish if society were to vanish, and they may perish when society changes to socialism.   They will do so even if the objects that bear these forms — that represent the significant social object of our materialist monist cognition — happen to persist after society abolishes the social object.Cognition of social objects of significance to socialists — capital, surplus value, exploitation, capitalism, socialism — depends precisely on the hold these objects have over our minds — the universal subject.   Cognition of their hold over us can only be materialist monist cognition.Critical Realism’s 18th Century ObjectAll social forms of appearance are entirely dependent upon the social mind — the universal subject.   So much for the futility of critical realism.What recommends a “socialist” theory of cognition that precludes the categories of thought that are significant for socialists?Critical realism makes do with the fossilized tangible objects of 18th century mechanistic materialism that are not social.Is this really the best that soviet philosophy could devise in a vain attempt to save Leninist reflection from oblivion?

    in reply to: Pannekoek’s theory of science #95525
    twc
    Participant

    Mixed-up Schaff

    LBird wrote:
    Schaff … makes it very clear … the ‘subject’ is ‘social’

    Schaff proclaims the universal subject but can’t free himself of the individual subject, e.g., as here:

    Schaff wrote:
    “Firstly, the recognition of the objective existence of the object of cognition, i.e. its existence outside of any perceiving mind and independently of it.”

    Schaff’s any perceiving mind implies the individual subject — any [= individual] is not the ensemble [= universal].Here Schaff unconsciously slips out of the universal subject and into the solipsism-freed Cartesian individual subject.Where does Schaff’s individual subject come from?   I assume it comes from the individual naive realism he is trying to reconcile with universal critical realism — a task apparently beyond his ability to solve consistently.

    in reply to: Pannekoek’s theory of science #95518
    twc
    Participant
    LBird wrote:
    can you point me to the page where Schaff states the 'object of cognition' is 'individual', rather than 'universal'?

    I needed a return visit to the library in order to respond with page references…Schaff states that the subject of cognition is the universal subject — sensuously-active society.Schaff makes no such statement about the object of cognition, and so his position on the object of cognition must be inferred from the attributes he assigns it.As we know, critical realism relies upon prior recognition of the object of cognition existing “outside of any perceiving mind and independently of it” [1].  [In passing, Schaff’s perceiving mind is none other than the dreaded individual subject, which we had every right to assume critical realism took no prior recognition of.   Schaff is not a consistently systematic thinker.]Prior recognition of the object’s existence outside the individual subject excludes Schaff’s object being the universal object.This is because all individual subjects are objects for each other, and are prior recognized as being dependent components of the universal subject. This is also because the universal subject is a component of the universal object — exists within it — and so is not independent of the object of cognition.That leaves us, as we arrived at previously, with the naive-realist object — refined by critical-realist reflection — as Schaff’s object of cognition.QuotesThe following indicate missed opportunities for Schaff to declare the object universal if he wanted to. He was clearly unconcerned to do so. Consequently we must assume that his object is just any old object of cognition.[p. 63] — objective cognition possesses “general and not only individual value (as opposed to the subjective)”.  Here Schaff describes objectivity, and not the object.Schaff largely ignores the general, and concentrates on the subjective, i.e. he focusses on the subject, not the object. [For Marx, who starts from the universal object, cognition is always universal and individual.][p. 71] — “the cognition of a given object … is composed of many judgements; it is a process.”Here Schaff describes cognition as a process, and not the object.[p. 72] — “The object of cognition is infinite; this assertion pertains to the object, both in the sense of total reality and of its fragments. For total reality, just like its fragments, are infinite when it comes to the quantity of their correlations and also their mutations in time. Therefore, the cognition of such an infinite object must also be infinite, must be an infinite process of accumulating partial truths.” .Here Schaff describes the object of cognition as either individual or general.I wonder if these quotes are as close as Schaff ever approached to acknowledging the centrality of the universal object.[Apologies for earlier mis-posting my library notes — now thankfully expunged — upon my being ejected from the library.]

    in reply to: Pannekoek’s theory of science #95514
    twc
    Participant

    Critical RealismLBird identifies with critical realism as outlined in Adam Schaff’s History and Truth [Chapter 1].Schaff bases critical realism on a theory of reflection — “precisely such an interpretation of the theory of reflection can be reconstructed from the corresponding statements of Marx, Engels and Lenin [sic].”Schaff’s theory of reflection [reconstructed from Marx, Engels and Lenin] is what rescues critical from naive — or critical realism from naive realism.Critical Realist CognitionCritical realist cognition is separated from naive realist cognition by its subject, which is sensuously-active society [consciousness], and by its method, which is critical realist reflection [practice].Schaff’s critical realist theory of cognition is based on four [positive] prior recognitions:“the objective existence of the object of cognition — its existence outside of any perceiving mind and independently of it.”“the objectively existing object of cognition is the external source of sensual impressions without which the process of cognition would be impossible.”“the process of cognition is … a subjective–objective relationship.”“the object is knowable … in the process of cognition the thing in itself becomes the thing for us” — [Engels: Anti Dühring]For Schaff, 1 and 2 are critical realist materialism, 3 and 4 are critical realist reflection, and 1, 2, 3 and 4 are critical realist cognition — or critical realism itself.Critique of Critical RealismIf critical realism were merely Schaff’s theory of cognition, we could ignore it as one more abstract variant on Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach by a professional soviet philosopher.But Schaff proclaims critical realism to be the marxian theory of cognition, and so we must engage critically with it.Fetishism of the Individual ObjectSchaff explicitly makes the subject of cognition universal [social, in the sense of society] — in line with Thesis VI.Schaff implicitly makes the object of cognition individual [he does so unconsciously, falling for naive practice] — in line with naive realism.Consequently, for Schaff, the universal subject [we] must bring the individual naive realist object [it, the thing in itself] into being [i.e. into our consciousness] in part by prior recognition of the individual object’s external existence.Marx would never base cognition of the individual naive realist external object on Schaff’s prior recognition 1.For Marx, like Hegel, the only object is the universal object — the universe of experience. The universal object is basic for Marx — the individual object is superstructural.Existence Independent of Mind?Schaff, by prior recognizing the existence of individual objects independent of mind — a result rather than a starting point of a theory of cognition — has assumed the objective independent-of-mind existence of the individual object as an article of faith for each and every cognized object out there. Did he consciously intend to do that?The history of human cognition is littered with the corpses of prior recognized individual objects.Universal Subject and ObjectFor Marx [like Hegel], subject and object are identical. We are basically the universe, even if superstructurally we come to cognize ourselves as a part of it.Our consciousness is the universe’s consciousness. We are of it; our thinking is it thinking. [The implications for cognition are enormous.]With Hegel, whose thought was pregnant for Marx just like Feuerbach’s, the Hegelian social subject [consciousness] initially misconceives individual objects [man and nature] as “alien” [just like Schaff’s prior recognition 1] but after its historical journey recognizes them as itself [Phenomenology].With Hegel the historical process is mystical. With Schaff it is, like Popper, iterative reflection.ReflectionSchaff’s reflection relies on prior recognition of external individual objects that are the source of our sensual impressions [1 and 2].Consequently, his reflection process must either superimpose itself upon naive realism in order to extinguish it, or else his reflection process must embrace naive realism, and acknowledge that it perpetually reproduces naive realism anew as a product that is simultaneously the starting point for the next iteration of the reflection process proper to criticize.I imagine that Schaff implies the latter. But where does that leave the individual object’s prior recognized materiality [1 and 2] if criticism extinguishes the object’s external existence independent of mind.How can concrete dependent-on-mind reflection continually spirit away or reconstitute an external object whose existence is already prior recognized as independent-of-mind?But scientific discussion, when carried on at Schaff’s abstract philosophical level of commentary on, and objectification of, Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach spirits materialism away.I will continue discussing Schaffian reflection at the practical level, as exemplified in the mature Marx’s actual scientific practice in Capital, and the comprehension of that practice [Thesis VIII].To be continued…

    in reply to: Pannekoek’s theory of science #95496
    twc
    Participant

    LBird’s Parallel List Feuerbach sees subject as mentally passive-receptive; Marx sees subject as mentally active;F. sees subject as individual; M. sees subject as social;F. sees subject as contemplative; M. sees subject as actively practical;F. sees knowledge as a faithful copy of object; M. sees knowledge as a process of mental reproduction of the object.Surely Schaff Isn’t ResponsiblePoints 1, 2 and 4 are slanders against Feuerbach.False.   Marx expressly criticizes Feuerbach for seeing the subject as being exclusively mentally active.   A correct formulation is: Feuerbach sees the subject as being mentally active. Marx sees the subject as being both sensuously and mentally active. Marx does not accuse Feuerbach of mental passivity. [That would be falsely accusing Feuerbach of a backwards retreat from Hegel.]False.   Feuerbach, as Young Hegelian, accepted his master’s insight that the subject was social.   Marx’s point is that Feuerbach only saw the social as species being, mere human essence [≅ human nature].Marx rips into human essence in Thesis VI: “human essence is not an abstraction inherent in each single individual. In reality it is the ensemble of our social relations.”  In case you doubt Feuerbach’s social subject, here are some of his pregnant thoughts [Essence of Christianity, Ch. 1] that seeded Marx’s materialist conception of history:

    Feuerbach wrote:
    “Science is the consciousness of species. In life we are concerned with individuals, but in science, with species. Only a being to whom his own species, his characteristic mode of being, is an object of thought can make the essential nature of other things and beings an object of thought.”“Man is in himself both ‘I’ and ‘You’; he can put himself in the place of another precisely because his species, his essential mode of being — not only his individuality — is an object of thought to him.”“What man calls Absolute Being, his God, is his own being. The power of the object over him is therefore the power of his own being.”“Therefore, whatever the object of which we become conscious, we always become conscious of our own being; we cannot set anything in motion without setting ourselves in motion. ”

    True.   Except that Marx sees the subject as contemplative as well, finding “rational solution in human practice, and the comprehension of this practice” [Thesis VIII.   comprehension of practice ≅ theoretical science.]False.   After Kant’s critical philosophy famously proclaimed the this-sidedness of the synthetic a priori, and it became an article of Kantian faith that the external object was ultimately unknowable in itself [Kant’s Ding an Sich], serious philosophers ran a mile from “knowledge as a copy of object”So initially did politician Lenin, before he plagiarized it as expedient arsenal to attack the Machist theory of knowledge.Feuerbach, as Young Hegelian, was steeped in Hegel’s critique of Kant. He knew better.

    in reply to: Pannekoek’s theory of science #95481
    twc
    Participant
    LBird wrote:
    Science is not the passive discovery of the really existing external world (reality, the object), but the production by society of knowledge, through the active interaction of the human subject with the object. Truth is not identical with, or a reflection of, the object. The ‘truth’ is a social product, based upon human praxis with reality.'Truth' is an attribute of 'knowledge', not the 'object'. If it's an attribute of 'object', then 'truth' can't have a history or be a social product (and thus, humans being fallible, 'true' can be shown to be 'false'). What's 'true scientific knowledge' can change. The history of science is littered with 'truth' changing. This can only be so if 'truth' is a human product.

    These two statements by LBird are correct. They refute the positivism expressed by many participants.LBird, you are right to point out to those who consider truth to be nothing but the identity of our conception of an external object with that actual external object itself because, for us, there is no external object beyond our appearance–reality conception of it that we are able to compare our conception of it with.That’s why [Thesis II] “Man must prove the truth — i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice”.That boils down to why we need science to resolve our immediate and our consciously mediated conceptions of the world. Why we need science so that we may reliably comprehend our consciousness’s [this-sided] immediate appearance in terms of our consciousness’s [this-sided] mediated reality.You see our consciousness has this dual character. The interpenetration of this-sided immediate experience and this-sided mediated reality remains a mystifying dual for a tripartite model of consciousness.That mystery is precisely why I must appear to you to be “rabbiting on” about something extraneous to your tripartite model: base–superstructure determinism. Your tripartite model leaves no room for immediate appearance, but philosophically has only room for knowledge [presumably you mean by knowledge, not facts, but abstract conceptions — our conception of reality].Base–superstructure determinism is our essential mediating mechanism for grasping immediate appearance. And, as you well know, that’s precisely why we need science.You unfortunately mistake scientific determinism for “bourgeois” nonsense. But it’s inescapable if our this-sidedness does not give us immediate reality. Our mediated reality must then have to give us our conceived reality of immediacy. The issue of what comes first — theory or practice — is not as clear cut [or as bourgeois versus proletarian] as you imagine.To now reconsider your quoted post above from the standpoint of young Marx when he still held your current position. In his Dissertation on the Greek Atomists, he famously said against Kant’s distinction between conception and actuality:

    Marx wrote:
    If somebody imagines that he has 100 talers, if this concept is not for him an arbitrary, subjective one, if he believes in it, then these 100 imagined talers have for him the same value as 100 real ones. For instance, he will incur debts on the strength of his imagination, his imagination will work, in the same way as all humanity has incurred debts on its gods.

    I have not been attacking you, personally. But, please check the personal epithets you once flung at members of this forum from a confident bastion of assumed superiority.Now that you’ve survived your baptism of fire, I suggest you marshal your arguments in future not by authority alone, but in a clear reasoned manner. It is the process and not the principle alone that proves anything.Also please answer the objections of those who take the time to follow your own arguments, but are unwilling to be dragooned into dancing to your tune until you prove yourself worthy of the subject.I’ve now tracked your lively discussions on the web, and I do not doubt your genuineness and enthusiasm for what you conceive socialism to be. That indeed is something precious.Consequently, you must comprehend why I swiftly moved to ward off any contamination of your posts by perceived pseudo science. I would expect you to so honour and protect your intellectual heroes [Marx, Dietzgen, Pannekoek].You have chosen not to unequivocally distance yourself from such contamination, and that sadly diminishes your current scientific [or, for you, proletarian] integrity in my estimation. But we all learn.

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