Nationalism and capitalism
Pedants like to distinguish between ‘patriotism’ and ‘nationalism’. The former signifies love for one´s country; the latter, while meaning that too, also means not being particularly tolerant of other countries (or cultures). In practice, though, ‘patriots’ can very easily become ‘nationalists’ even without knowing it. These are just two points along the same spectrum.
What that spectrum is based upon is an emotional attachment to the rather fuzzy concept of ‘national identity’. This is supposed to provide a kind of social glue that holds together large-scale, culturally diverse societies and allows them to function reasonably well.
National states
Benedict Anderson´s seminal work, Imagined Communities (1983), discusses the way ‘print capitalism’ and the growth of literacy aided the spread of national consciousness. Other factors, like improvements in transport and increased mobility, also helped to widen the social horizons of what were once relatively isolated communities that characterised a feudal society.
Before the rise of capitalism, nation-states did not really exist. Though there are strong grounds for saying that capitalism originated in England (specifically, in the English countryside, where the practice of wage labour became universalised), the first prominent individual to put nationalism on the map was, arguably, a Frenchman – Napoleon. Napoleon explicitly appealed to the idea of the nation as the basis of legitimate political power, where his predecessors had relied instead on such arcane notions as the ‘divine right of kings’ to govern.
However, we should not infer from this that nationalism is the indispensable precondition for a large-scale society to exist. Long before the nation-state existed, large multi-ethnic empires with extremely porous borders existed in the ancient world.
In Europe in 1500, there were approximately 500 more or less autonomous political units – an intricate patchwork ranging from Italian city states (many of which subsequently fell victim to conquest) to numerous principalities (often themselves the product of dynastic quarrels within aristocratic families) and a scattering of relatively consolidated kingdoms. Some of these were nominally part of one or other, much larger, ramshackle, sprawling entities, such as the Holy Roman Empire, which, as Voltaire once scornfully remarked, was ‘neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire’.
By 1900, however, the political landscape looked very different indeed. The number of self-governing units involved had been drastically whittled down to a mere twenty-odd nation-states having jurisdiction over the entire European landmass. Napoleon´s armies, which conquered much of Europe in the early nineteenth century, contributed to this development in the sense that they helped to create circumstances that eventually led to the rise of nationalist movements later on in that century.
Pseudo-traditions
Then there is the thorny question of nationalism and cultural diversity. Though it is claimed that nationalism enabled the emergence of large-scale culturally diverse societies, the fact of the matter is that cultural or ethnic differentiation has often presented a serious challenge to the nationalist project. If anything, the rise of nationalism has brought about the erosion of local cultures and languages and, in general, has had a flattening effect on the cultural landscape.
What is called the ‘national culture’ is not always what it seems. In The Invention of Tradition (1983), edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, the claim that certain national traditions or institutions have their origins in some mist-enveloped remote past (something that is supposed to invest a tradition with more authenticity) was critically scrutinised and found to be often false. Many of these traditions are pseudo-traditions only recently invented for the express purpose of trying to fashion a national identity – in more concrete terms to facilitate nationalist sentiment.
In short, the basic thrust of nationalist ideology tends towards cultural homogenisation. The more culturally homogenised a population is, the easier it is for the state to manipulate it and elicit its support. Standardisation also enables more effective bureaucratisation.
Taken to an extreme, this homogenising thrust can manifest itself in the form of genocide. As Ernest Gellner points out, where ethnic pluralism exists, ‘a territorial political unit can only become ethnically homogeneous… if it either kills, or expels, or assimilates all non-nationals’ (Nations and Nationalism, 2009).
However, one should note that this is only a tendency within nationalist ideology; in the real world, most nationalisms have had to opt for some kind of pragmatic or more inclusive compromise in the form of ‘multiculturalism’.
Globalisation
Factors curbing nationalism´s tendency towards cultural homogenisation within the confines of a given nation-state include not only the resilience of ethnic subcultures and the inward migration of ‘foreigners’, bringing with them their own cultural beliefs and practices, but also the impact of what might be called ‘global culture’:
Back in 1848, the Communist Manifesto had something to say about that:
‘In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature’.
Big business is, today, a major purveyor of this global culture. One thinks of the role of big tech companies in providing social media platforms or the impact of global chains like McDonald’s in shaping our culinary tastes. Wherever you go in the world, cities are getting more and more alike with the same monotonously predictable selection of High Street stores.
There is a certain irony in all this. Capitalism, which gave birth to the ideology of nationalism, has also unleashed powerful forces that tend towards the erosion of national distinctiveness.
Backlash
In some ways, this contradiction has brought us to the fraught times we are living in today. The unravelling of the Neoliberal project that has been the dominant paradigm since the 1970s has prompted a backlash against globalisation and the resurgence of virulent nationalism. Far-right movements are on the rise in many parts of the world. Their animus is mainly directed at that most emblematic aspect of globalisation – the movement of migrants across those imaginary borders that define the capitalist nation state.
Such migrations are often fuelled by wars and the devastation inflicted by military action undertaken by the very countries which now have some citizens bitterly complaining about the ensuing blowback in the form of desperately impoverished boat people arriving on their shores.
It’s not just war that is to blame; there is also the economic devastation wrought on people´s lives and livelihoods. For instance, the traditional Senegalese fishing industry has been virtually decimated by overfishing and the use of destructive methods, like bottom trawling, by industrial fleets from Europe and China. This has been a major factor in the increase in Senegalese migrants risking their lives to reach the Canary Islands in the hope of being relocated to mainland Spain.
ROBIN COX
10 Replies to “Nationalism and capitalism”
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Excellent article. Thanks for the book references.
Please define: neoliberalism. It’s a tricky concept to understand because there has always been state intervention in the market.
This article goes into the concept of “neo-liberalism” in more depth :
https://www.worldsocialism.org/spgb/socialist-standard/2010s/2019/no-1384-december-2019/neo-liberalism-old-religion-repackaged/
Thanks for the feedback, ALB.
That’s a very insightful article, but, please explain this paragraph:
‘He [Keynes] argued that left to itself – laissez faire – capitalism would not necessarily recover from a slump of its own accord, as economists had preached till then, but that government intervention, in the form of a tax policy to stimulate demand was required. In the event of a boom, this could be prevented from ending in a slump, as booms had previously always done, by the government pursing the opposite policy of using taxes to discourage consumption.’
This is simply stating what Keynes thought. The last sentence is his view not ours. When tested in the big slump of the mid-1970s it didn’t work and governments never tried seriously to stop a boom.
The parts I don’t quite understand are:
– What type of tax policy Keynes thought would stimulate demand.
– What sort of taxes he thought could be used to discourage consumption during a boom (and why he thought discouraging consumption would prevent a boom from becoming a slump).
(Sorry to ask all these questions about an article written 6 years ago)
Like most capitalist economists Keynes believed that capitalist production was driven by meeting paying consumer demand. He noted that the more your income the more you would save rather than spend on consumption, and vice versa.
So, to get out of a slump, he proposed a tax policy that amounted to transferring purchasing power from the rich towards the rest of the population. One measure applied after the war was to make higher purchase easier by reducing the minimum deposit and increasing the maximum repayment period.
To try to stop a boom leading to overproduction, he proposed the opposite in a bid to reduce consumption.
Neither worked because in fact what determines the level of production under capitalism is business investment for profit. If, as in a slump the prospects of profit-making are not good, not enough capitalist firms will invest. In a boom, on the other hand, nothing will stop them investing as long as they think more profits can be made.
Didn’t Keynes also believe that the *less* your income the more you would save rather than spend on consumption? Wouldn’t that mean he believed in a perfect income level that stops people from spending too much, but also saving too much?
I remember there being an article in the ‘Standard written about a party political broadcast – by Corbyn’s Labour Party – that was about what we’re currently discussing, but can’t find it.
‘One measure applied after the war was to make higher purchase easier by reducing the minimum deposit and increasing the maximum repayment period.’
I don’t follow. Are you talking about taxation or mortgage payments?
“MPC is the proportion of additional income that an individual consumes. For example, if a household earns one extra dollar of disposable income, and the marginal propensity to consume is 0.65, then of that dollar, the household will spend 65 cents and save 35 cents. ..According to John Maynard Keynes, marginal propensity to consume is less than one. The MPC is higher in the case of poorer people than in rich.” (Wikipedia). So transferring purchasing power from the rich to the less rich should lead to an increase in consumption. That was the theory.
I meant hire (not higher!) purchase, as for consumer durables, which used to be varied to try to increase or decrease consumption. But we are along way from Nationalism and Capitalism!
Thanks, ALB.
I sort of understand what you’ve posted.*
This is a good place to end the conversation, because we certainly have strayed a long way from the subject of Robin’s article.
*as much as someone who doesn’t have any qualifications in economics can understand.