robbo203
Forum Replies Created
-
Posts
-
Yes, it is a physical process, because everything is a physical process.
John, you see, this is where the problem lies. Yes the workings of the mind necessarily and absolutely involve a physical process but the real point at issue here is whether it JUST involves a physical process.
I hesitate to ascribe any point of view to you as some of your comments seem the very opposite of the reductionist standpoint I have been criticising. e g “We are all connected. We ARE the universe! Maybe the problem is simply just how one expresses oneself, the particular form of words used. To me saying mind is a “property” of brain/matter IS reductionist. It come across as saying that what we think is entirely a function of the firing of the neurons in our brain.
It is obviously not. It is also influenced by what goes on outside our brains as well Yes the brain processes sensory inputs from outside but our minds are active in the way it retains and selectively organises this data into meaningful structures.
While we cannot think without a brain it is also true that what we think is not necessarily dependent on the brain in the sense that the mind can exert “downward causation” on the brain. Saying that the brain causes us to think what we think is what is called a “type identity” which basically means the mental states are identical to – and hence reducible to – brain states such that if a brain state were to be exactly duplicated, it wold reproduce exactly the same type of mental state. Type identity theories have been largely discredited in the literature. A more realistic approach I think is “token identity” which permits a degree of autonomy for the mind vis a vis the brain while at the same emphasising their connection
This link might be useful in explaining the difference if you are into this sort of stuff
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/
Robbo, you don’t change your mind; your mind is changed.
Yes but what is involved in having your mind changed? Is it a purely physical process? Is it simply driven by the firing of the brain’s neurons? If that is what you are saying then we are back to the fatal flaw of reductive physicalism which reduces any kind of sensible understanding of the world around us to absurdity.
Mind utterly depends on the brain – there is no argument about that. But the mind is not some passive epiphenomenon that dutifully reflects in some sort of mechanical fashion the underlying physical processes going in the brain, It is an active or creative agent in its own development that exerts downward causation on the very thing upon which it depends – the brain – in ways that I have already mentioned and more besides.
Some folk here reading this thread might wonder what relevance it has to changing the world which is what we socialists supposedly want to do. Well actually it has quite a lot of relevance in a background sort of way
We talk about the need for a materialist understanding of the world in order to effect a revolutionary change. The historical materialist approach to changing society posits a distinction between society’s economic base and its superstructure – ideology, religion, politics etc. Marx was at pains to point out that the relationship between base and superstructure was NOT a mechanically determinist one whereby the former determined the latter. There is a two way interaction going on and it is only in the final analysis that the greater weight of economic factors are determinative.
We can see a parallel between that and this discussion on reductive physicalism in the context of mind-brain interactions. Reductive physicalism is the equivalent of the mechanical materialism which Marx explicitly rejected. Indeed our whole approach as a political party to revolutionary change based on education and propaganda would make no sense if we truly believed mind was purely a property of the physical brain. We are after all trying to persuade workers to change their minds about capitalism!
It is no surprise to learn that mechanical materialism played an important role in the early bourgeois revolutions – for example the 18th century school of French Materialists. Its reductionist approach is totally consistent with atomism and individualism. Hence the rise of mythologies at the time concerning the origins of society as a result of a “social contract” drawn up between what were essentially pre-social individuals “living in a state of nature” . As if there ever was such a thing as a “pre-social individual”
This is a foundational myth of individualist thought no better expressed than by the Iron Lady herself: “there is no such thing as a society, only individuals and their families”. This is the ideology we socialists are supposed to be battling against, not apologising for. Our emphasis on the social nature of human beings is something that accords fundamentally with our own outlook as socialists.
In a sense the logic of reductive physicalism is the self same logic that expresses itself in mechanical materialism. Its tendency is relentlessly atomistic in not wanting to see the wood for the trees.
I’ll end here with a quote from David Graeber summing up the broad outlines of Roy Bhaskar’s “critical realist” approach which is one that I strongly endorse and recommend to all here:
Reality can be divided into emergent stratum: just as chemistry presupposes but cannot be reduced to physics so biology presupposes but cannot be reduced to chemistry, or the human sciences to biology. Different sorts of mechanisms are operating on each. Each, furthermore, achieves a certain autonomy from those below: it would be impossible to even talk about human freedom were this not the case, since our actions would simply be determined by chemical and biological processes….the higher the emergent strata one is dealing with, the less predictable things become, the involvement of human beings of course being the most unpredictable factor of all (Towards and Anthropological Theory of Value: The False Coin of Our Own Dreams. 2001).
“Mind, as mental antecedents produce mental effects, does seem to take on an existence of its own. However, each and every thought or feeling that arises is a spark of electrical, and hence material, motion, confirming that it is a property of the cerebral/neural/chemical matter in motion.”
John, I am still not quite clear what you mean by this. If mind produces mental effects – that is, exerts downward causation – then it is somewhat misleading to say thought is a “property” of the cerebral/neural/chemical matter in motion. That suggests thought is a product of cerebral/neural/chemical matter in motion whereas it would be better expressed as thought <b>entailing</b> cerebral/neural/chemical matter in motion.
The discovery of “neuroplasticity” in recent years has conclusively demonstrated that the brain is quite malleable or capable of adaptation in response to various stimuli, meaning that it is indeed receptive to downward causation. Learning a new skill, for instance, can create new synaptic connections within the brain and even induce the growth of new nerve cells.
<b><i>”This of course is further evidence of the resultant and determined nature of the will”</i></b>
I am mindful here of John Horgan’s critique of Sam Harris’ a book, as follows:
“But just because my choices are limited doesn’t mean they don’t exist. Just because I don’t have absolute freedom doesn’t mean I have no freedom at all. Saying that free will doesn’t exist because it isn’t absolutely free is like saying truth doesn’t exist because we can’t achieve absolute, perfect knowledge.
Harris keeps insisting that because all our choices have prior causes, they are not free; they are determined. Of course all our choices are caused. No free-will proponent I know claims otherwise. The question is how are they caused? Harris seems to think that all causes are ultimately physical, and that to hold otherwise puts you in the company of believers in ghosts, souls, gods and other supernatural nonsense.
But the strange and wonderful thing about all organisms, and especially our species, is that mechanistic physical processes somehow give rise to phenomena that are not reducible to or determined by those physical processes. Human brains, in particular, generate human minds, which while subject to physical laws are influenced by non-physical factors, including ideas produced by other minds. These ideas may cause us to change our minds and make decisions that alter the trajectory of our world” (my emphasis in bold)John,
I wouldn’t say emergence theorists are non-materialists. For instance, in the cognitive sciences they would hold that mental states are indeed very much dependent (or “supervene) on the material brain but are nevertheless not “reducible” to, or wholly explicable in terms of, the firing of the brain’s neurons. To say they are is reductionist and this is what emergence theory opposes.
What emergence theory holds is that reality consists of multiple levels in which each level is dependent on the one below but not reducible to it. Mind-brain relations are analogous to the relations between society and individuals. Society depends on the existence of empirical individuals – just as thoughts depend on the brain – but society is more than the sum of its parts. It exerts “downward causation” upon individuals. Meaning individuals are influenced by the kind of society in which we live which is surely something on which all socialists would agree.
If you are going to be a reductionist you might as well go the whole hog and explain EVERYTHING in terms of the movements of subatomic particles. Any other explanation above the level of theoretical physics is essentially redundant. A thief who broke into a jewellers shop to steal some jewellery did not do so because he wanted it for the dosh he could make by selling the stuff. Rather it was because of the quirky behaviour of those quarks operating at the subatomic level that pushed his body into doing certain things over which he had no control. It was all predetermined. Problem is you have no way of showing how this is the case. It just a theory no more or less plausible than any other theory
Thoughts “exist” but according to you “Materialism is the belief that only matter exists.” So are thoughts just “matter” then? I dont think that is a very helpful way of defining matter – i.e. to extend the term to cover everything that “exists” (what is meant by “exists” anyway?) . It makes the term almost meaningless
I take matter to refer to sense data- what is empirically knowable via our senses.. Matter is indeed objective in this sense in that it is independent of, and predates, our existence – even if as LBird suggests , we cannot apprehend matter separately from our consciousness of it which is socially conditioned. Marx seems to hold the same view of matter and made this point in Capital vol 1 about the nature of (exchange) value to distinguish it from the use value of commodities
“the value of commodities is the very opposite of the coarse materiality of their substance, not an atom of matter enters into its composition”
Would you consider that the law of value does not “exist” because value is not composed a single atom of matter?
Mind is a function of matter, and the properties of mind include analytical thought, such as philosophical problems.
I am not a genetic determinist. But I am a determinist in that every effect is preceded by its cause. Hence, social history and the evolution of ideas, none of which would make sense or happen if the mind was a separate entity.Hi John
Nobody is saying the mind is a “separate entity”. You need a brain to think with. But this is not the issue. The issue is whether the mind is therefore a “function of matter”. To say that it is amounts to reductionist physicalism.
It is the same kind of reductionism that says there is “no such thing as society, there is only individuals (and families)”. Now it is clear that you cannot have society without individuals (just as you cannot have thoughts without the brains neurons) but that does not mean society is a mere epiphenomenon that does not really exist or that it cannot exert “downward causation” on individuals – in other words influence individuals.
If something exerts downward causation – acts as cause which induces an effect on that which it supervenes or depends for its existence – then it has a degree of relative autonomy – NOT absolute autonomy, note – with regard to that upon which it supervenes. Society has a degree of relative autonomy vis a vis individuals in that it has its own dynamic, it own laws which influence individuals.
Mind too has a degree of relatively autonomy vis a vis the brain inasmuch as it can exert downward causation. One example of this would be psychosomatic effects. Of course, it is true that direction of causality works the other way too. Consider the influence of hormones. The issue is not whether or not there is cause and effect coming into play but the orgin and direction of causality in particular instances.
Emergence theory is based on the idea that there is a hierarchy of levels of reality which corresponds to the way the world evolved – from inorganic to organic to consciousness itself. Each level is dependent on the one below but is nor reducible to it. Chemistry is nor reducible to physics any more than biology is reducible to chemistry or psychology to biology or sociology to psychology
Matter is not created, and mind is a property of matter. Matter has no beginning and no end. Mind, as one of the properties of matter, is subject to the same physical laws of motion, cause and effect.
John, one can accept that mind is a property of matter but it does not follow that everything that goes on in the mind is reducible to matter – the brain in this case – and “subject to the same physical laws of motion, cause and effect.”
Causation, as the philosopher David Hume said, means that “The cause must be prior to the effect.” A purely physicalist explanation of the mind would have to hold that a particular neurophysical event – the firing of a certain neurons in the brain – must have preceded a particular thought – for example, solving a complex arithmetical problem such as dividing 238 by 13 ( namely 18.3076923). But how?
What “reductive physicalism” implies is that whatever thought we might experience would be literally inconceivable without, as it were, the prior permission of the brain to obligingly accommodate our intention to do so in the form of the appropriate neurophysical event to underpin, or cause this thought to happen. Perhaps the solution to a relatively simply arithmetical problem, such as 2 plus 2, might conceivably have been imprinted on our brain as sensory input in the form of rote learning off a school blackboard which we remember having done as children. But how would this be true of a more complex arithmetical problem such as the one referred to above?
What neural pathway divined the solution to that? What memories are stored in the inner recesses of our brain’s wonderfully capable filing system that would yield such a solution? Presumably none – unless by some remote chance the teacher happened to have chalked it up on the blackboard and we still retain the memory of that as a vague sensory input we once experienced which we can mechanically reproduce on request. More than likely, though, the exact form of this arithmetical problem – 238 divided by 13 – will be completely novel to us and so the solution to it will depend on our cognitive ability to perform a calculation, not on the “memory” of that solution.
And that is the point, isn’t it? To say that the brain provides us with the cognitive ability to solve the problem is not the same as saying that the brain itself, as a neuro-physical entity, literally solves that problem, this solution then just being involuntarily flagged up in our conscious minds. That would presuppose something akin to a memory of the solution stored in, and retrieved by, the brain. But that surely cannot be the case in this example. Something else must intercede which utterly depends upon, and must indeed make use of, the brain, but is not reducible to it – namely, the mind. To deny the existence of a mind, and its capacity to function on its own terms, leaves us totally unable to explain how we could have otherwise arrived at the solution to this problem in the first place.
This is why I have been banging on about Emergence theory which is the only credible form of materialism we can adopt as a socialists. Crude mechanical reductionist materialism is totally against everything we stand for. Sociological explanations would be rendered completely useless and invalid because social phenomena would be turned into mere “epiphenomena”, reflecting a lower order of reality – namely the empirical individuals who make up society which is exactly what bourgeois theorists do when they go on about “human nature”. Society – capitalism – is said to be a reflection of our biological nature as individuals. It has no reality in itself, no autonomy , no social laws pertaining to itself, and no ability to exert “downward causation” as the jargon goes. We cannot possibly be influenced by our social environment because as Margaret Thatcher helpfully pointed out “there is no such thing as society only individuals and their families”
But why stop at the empirical individual if you are going to be a thoroughgoing reductionist? The individual is made of matter so presumably eveyrhing the individual does or thinks is entirely explicable in terms of the movement of atoms or even sub-atomic particles. Its not capitalism that is the cause of mass unemployment. Its those pesky quarks bent on creating problems for us. Bastards.
This link might help James
https://www.informationphilosopher.com/knowledge/emergence.html
Emergence theory is a kind of intermediate position between atomistic/reductionist theories about the world, on the one hand, and holistic theories on the other.
In very crude sociological terms, the former argues that there is no such thing as society (Margaret Thatcher) while the latter argues that there is no such thing as individuals only society with a capital S.
Both perspectives are questionable which is why I opt for the intermediate one – emergence theory. I think Marx held this view too. He was not a crude reductionist or mechanical materialist but he did not deny the importance of human agency in social affairs either.
The SPGB’s position on “value” is that it is essentially a social relationship. As Marx said “value of commodities is the very opposite of the coarse materiality of their substance, not an atom of matter enters into its composition”
However, this does not imply economic subjectivism or support for the subjective theory of value. There is a tendency to equate objectivism with “coarse materiality” which is wrong. Durkheim spoke of “social facts” as having an external coercive normative power. He demonstrated this in his famous study of suicide by attributing different rates of suicides among different sections of the population – for example Catholics versus Protestants – which he attributed to the existence of different social facts applying to each
Economic subjectivists argue that value is determined by the subjective desires of economic actors. Since subjective desires can only be experienced by individuals – society is not a thing that experiences desires – this fully accords with their own individualistic worldview. From this point of view society is the product of individuals and so we get absurd philosophical ideas being touted in 17th/18th centuries that society was the result of a social contract being drawn up between individuals. The opposite to this holism which is no less absurd is that individuals are purely a product of society. A third position is represented by Emergence theory – that society depends on empirical individuals but cannot be “reduced” to individuals anymore than mental acts be “reduced” to the firing of neurons in the brain. Crude or mechanical materialism in this sense is fundamentally atomistic and hence fully in accord with the individualistic worldview which we Marxists oppose.
This does not mean subjective desires do not enter in the picture as far as economics are concerned. The use value of an object is in a sense subjective. What the subjective theory of value does is to confuse or conflate use value with exchange value – the ratio in which commodities exchange – which is determined by objective factors. But for commodities to exchange they must have use value
As Marx put it:
To begin with, a commodity, in the language of the English economists, is ‘any thing necessary, useful or pleasant in life,’ an object of human wants, a means of existence in the widest sense of the term. Use-value as an aspect of the commodity coincides with the physical palpable existence of the commodity. Wheat, for example, is a distinct use-value differing from the use-values of cotton, glass, paper, etc. A use-value has value only in use, and is realized only in the process of consumption. One and the same use-value can be used in various ways. But the extent of its possible application is limited by its existence as an object with distinct properties. It is, moreover, determined not only qualitatively but also quantitatively. Different use-values have different measures appropriate to their physical characteristics; for example, a bushel of wheat, a quire of paper, a yard of linen. Whatever its social form may be, wealth always consists of use-values, which in the first instance are not affected by this form. From the taste of wheat it is not possible to tell who produced it, a Russian serf, a French peasant or an English capitalist. Although use-values serve social needs and therefore exist within the social framework, they do not express the social relations of production. For instance, let us take as a use-value a commodity such as a diamond. We cannot tell by looking at it that the diamond is a commodity. Where it serves as an aesthetic or mechanical use-value, on the neck of a courtesan or in the hand of a glass-cutter, it is a diamond and not a commodity. To be a use-value is evidently a necessary prerequisite of the commodity, but it is immaterial to the use-value whether it is a commodity. Use-value as such, since it is independent of the determinate economic form, lies outside the sphere of investigation of political economy. It belongs in this sphere only when it is itself a determinate form. Use-value is the immediate physical entity in which a definite economic relationship—exchange-value—is expressed.[Critique of Political Economy]
By the way, the Northite Trots (WSWS/’Socialist Equality Party’) are standing candidates:
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2019/11/18/cand-n18.html
I have made some interventions in the comments section of this article. Perhaps, others here might like to join. Typical Leftist misrepresentation of the postion of the SPGB on such matters as trade unionism etc
Yes I do wonder on what grounds these “renowned linguists and historians” believe that the Basque language can be the “direct descendant of the language spoken by the dwellers of the caves of Altamira, Ekain or Lascaux” But the uniqueness of the language is not in question. It seems to be unrelated to any Indo-European or Romance languages and is considered to be a “language isolate”. No doubt in part a product of the relative physical isolation of the region
I don’t know what the Catalan nationalists are complaining about.
I understand that a lot of it has to do with the financial/tax arrangements between the central state and Catalonia which is different from, say, Pais Vasco which has more control over its budget (though it too had/has its separatist movement, with an armed wing ETA, the Basque’s equivalent of the IRA which mercifully hasn’t happened yet in the case of Catalonia), Essentially, Catalonia as one of the richest regions of Spain pays a lot more in Madrid’s coffers than it receives and the Catalan capitalists dont like this, They resent having to, in effect, subsidise other autonomous regions (I think there 17 in all)
Incidentally, talking of languages, Euskara , the Basque language is quite unique. According to this:
Euskera is the oldest living language in Europe. Most linguists, experts and researchers say so. Euskera is a very old language whose origins remain unknown. Renowned linguists and historians believe that it can be the direct descendant of the language spoken by the dwellers of the caves of Altamira, Ekain or Lascaux.
The Basque language’s origins date back to the Neolithic, but there is evidence that it could be even older. In fact, it could be at the seeds of articulate language.Some more statistics provided by James Heartfield:
“To take the US working class as an example, they produce goods to the value of $18 trillion each year, and take home wages of around 44 per cent of that. They are exploited. They are not exploiting anyone else. Until that point that there is a transfer of income in their favour in excess of 54 per cent of $18 trillion that will remain the case. Return on US Foreign investments abroad is around $50 billion (http://www.nber.org/papers/w13313.pdf). That is a lot, but it is not enough to subsidise US workers, whose pay comes out of their own output.” (https://rdln.wordpress.com/2016/11/29/imperialism-study-group-some-discussion-on-the-labour-aristocracy/)
There are people around like Zak Cope, author of Divided World Divided Class: Global Political Economy and the Stratification of Labour Under Capitalism (Kersplebedeb Press: 2012) who is (I think) a Maoist and has indeed gone beyond even Lenin’s idea of the so called Labour aristocracy in declaring that the workers of the developed world are essentially no longer exploited but participate with the capitalists of the developed world in the super exploitation of the Global South. He produces a bunch of statistics to back up his claim relating to prices , wages and profits to back up his thesis that the cost of producing and reproducing the labour power of a worker in the developed world has in effect fallen below the wages he or she receives. Hence this worker is no longer exploited and has a vested interest in the maintenance of capitalism
Its been a while since I checked out the book so I am a bit hazy on the details (so the above interpretation might not be exactly correct) but, as I recall, it is a work that is held in quite high esteem by the “anti-imperialist” movement. It would certainly need to be referenced in any proposed pamphlet/article as would Charlie Post I referred to earlier on this thread who has done some sterling work in refuting the labour aristocracy thesis
The idea that workers are no longer exploited in the developed countries is bunkum on both theoretical and empirical grounds. As far as the latter is concerned I have come across some interesting figures – for example comparing the hourly wages of US manufacturing workers with their value added contribution to output per hour. It seems that the latter is about 3 times the magnitude of the former, demonstrating quite emphatically that two thirds of their labour is effectively unpaid labour. Meaning they are exploited. Indeed the gap between wages and productivity in the developed world has been steadily widening since the 1970s and the onset of neoliberal capitalism and in the opposite direction to which people like Cope would have use believe.
The argument comes across as a bit more nuanced if we take into account Marx’s distinction between productive and unproductive labour (only the latter actually produce commodities for sale on the market). We know there has been quite a significant shift in manufacturing to developing countries centred on export processing zones (EPZs). Many large corporations like Nike for example no longer produce the things they sell – in this case shoes. Rather they market them through a process of branding. Production is increasingly outsourced and contracted out to contractors based in the developing world in places like Vietnam and Cambodia. China used to the place to go for cheap labour but it has been eclipsed by some other countries in the race to the bottom (another reason why China is increasingly turning to robotics – the dirt cheap labour force has been drying for demographic and other reasons) .
I have only just recovered the WSM website and if the companion parties agree, perhaps we can make better use of the Forum on it called Community for all of what you say.
What is this WSM website, Matt. I have never seen it before. Are the companion parties actively involved? What plans do you have for it?. Will it include a discussion forum and a link to the archives on the SPGB forum.
I like the look of it but it maybe needs a padding out a bit I think. Perhaps it could serve as an umbrella website for all the companion parties websites with links to the growing number of official and unofficial WSM FB sites….
