[LBird]

I'm afraid this thread is going to have to be taken forward on the basis of DJP's theory of cognition.It's my fault, my lack of stamina, but I just haven't got the heart to continue saying the same things and asking the same (unanswered) questions.Sorry, comrades.

[LBird]

ALB wrote:

So do I, though I'd prefer to say that this is not what "science" does even if some think that it is. To tell the truth, I don't think that this is what science these days claims to be doing either.

Yes, I agree: science 'doesn't do' this, but it's not 'some' who 'think' this, but the vast majority of our society. I think that the length of this thread is testament to that!As to 'science these days', again I think that you're right, if you're referring to philosophers of science, and scientists like Einstein perhaps.But… the vast majority of people (and, I think, the vast majority of Communists) still think that 'science' produces the 'truth', and that the 'scientific method' is a socially-neutral method for accessing 'reality'.That's why so many comrades will prefix a statement with 'science tells us…' or 'according to science…', as if that strengthens their further claims. It assumes a status for 'science' and its 'truths' that don't stand up to examination.We have to ask, 'Whose science?' says things, and 'What method?' they employ, and 'What status?' its truths have.These are all questions that we are taught not to ask in our society. I wonder why. I think it's related to 'respect for authorities', for the concept of TINA.I think a 'fresh' day is required, on my part, at least, before we progress to the 'social subject'.

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

Maybe it's me being thick, or I've missed one of your posts but please then do explain how this fits into your model i.e. what your criteria for evaluating truth is.

But 'criteria' logically follow what we determine 'truth' is (ie, where it lies).If we all accept that 'truth' is an attribute of 'knowledge', we can move to a discussion of 'criteria', and whether that involves relativism, in the senses that you've expressed concerns over, concerns I share.But it's pointless anybody 'pretending', for the sake of an illusory progress, to agree with my model, because that model will form the basis of my further answers, and the disagreement we have now will merely transfer itself to that discussion.We might as well sort it out now!If we disagree, we'll have different opinions about 'relativism', I think.

[LBird]

ALB wrote:

But sticking to your language, you are right: "'Truth' is not a fixed, one-off, reflection of 'reality'". But why add "which science produces by a neutral method"?

Because we're discussing 'Pannekoek's theory of science'.'Science' claims to produce, by a socially-neutral method, the 'truth', by 'discovery'. This 'discovery method' is claimed to produce 'scientific knowledge' which is 'true', once and for all.Pannekoek (and Dietzgen) claim that this can't be done, and I agree with them.One's choice of 'cognitive method' makes clear which 'method' one is using in science.That's why I'm trying to get some agreement behind Schaff's model of 'object/subject/knowledge'.

ALB wrote:

Surely, the sort of "truth" Dietzgen, Pannekoek and we here are talking about is also produced by some agreed method?

Yes, 'some agreed [cognitive] method'. That's what I'm discussing. That's what I'm trying to get some agreement on.The issue of 'relativism' (as I've already said) can only be addressed, I think, once we have some 'agreement', because the form of that agreement will be used to build an answer to the concerns of those (like me!) who don't agree with 'relativism'.

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

With the exception of a priori systems I would like to know how this could be done without refering to the material world, the object.

The model of cognition I am arguing for does refer to the object.I've said this over and over. I don't know how I can say this, without it being any clearer.Why do you keep going back to statements you made earlier? To stop 'going round in circles', we have to build upon what's been said.

[LBird]

twc wrote:

I may be presumptuous but, for me, it’s time to move on to other content.

twc, you can move on to anything you like.I'm not engaging with you, because you are constantly rude, refuse to answer reasonable questions, and talk jibberish.I only thanked you for your support for my position through common manners.Don't bother to ask me any questions.

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

LBird wrote:

I can only ask again, concerning a tripartite theory of cognition (object, subject, knowledge), do you agree that 'truth' pertains to 'knowledge'?

It's actually a relation between all 3.To move things forward …

I'm afraid I can't 'move things forward', DJP.We disagree about 'truth'.'Truth' is not 'a relation'.'Truth' is a 'product' of a relationship between an active social subject and a really existing external object. 'Truth' is an attribute of 'knowledge'.If don't accept that 'truth' is a 'product', we can discuss it. Of course, I'll ask you to explain your view of 'truth' within a theory of cognition.

[LBird]

alanjjohnstone wrote:

I hope someone is going to eventually explain this thread to the rest of us in an easy to understand way so we know what it's all about

Yeah, absolutely!If these issues, complex though they appear, can't be explained to those without the requisite detailed reading to participate in this discussion at present, then we will have failed as Communists.The use of analogies, of situations with which comrades are familiar and already understand, must be employed to make these vital issues understandable and relevant to all Communists.I've had a discussion over the weekend with my son, and we're now of the opinion that computer programming methods might make this easier to understand. Are you familiar with 'programming' in any way ajj? If not, I'll have to get my thinking cap on, again!

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

I suppose I could accept Lbirds use of "truth", as meaning the socially constructed what is "true for" people in a certain period of history, but only so long as it remains in parentheses.Otherwise we're just going to end up going round in circles.

Yeah, 'round in circles'!But to try to get some 'common ground' between us, we have to be sure on what it is we 'agree' on. 'Suppose…could…a certain…so long…parentheses' leaves too much leeway, I'm afraid, in my humble opinion.I can only ask again, concerning a tripartite theory of cognition (object, subject, knowledge), do you agree that 'truth' pertains to 'knowledge'?One other way of conceiving 'truth' is to regard it as pertaining to 'object'. But I've argued that neither Marx, Pannekoek nor Dietzgen (or Einstein!) would agree with this way of understanding 'truth'.In fact, the notion that 'truth' is a fixed, one-off, correct-for-all-time product of a neutral scientific method, as an exact reflection of object, is a central plank of positivism, and furthermore, I would argue, remains a central plank of bourgeois ideology of 'science' as an 'authority' outside of democratic control by the proletariat/future humanity, even though recent bourgeois philosophers have themselves already undermined this outdated, 19th century, concept of 'science' and its 'method'.I've already said that, in my opinion, this shows that Marxist thinkers were up to 150 years ahead of bourgeois thinkers in reaching these conclusions.I've already also said that I share your concerns about 'relativism', 'moral relativism' and 'cultural relativism', but I think that to move onto a discussion of those valid concerns, we have to get some agreement on the process of cognition, which will affect our understanding of, and answers to, those concerns.

[LBird]

ALB wrote:

Scientific knowledge (what you call "truth") is never final. There is, however, an interesting question, which you don't face, of when can a theory be accepted as temporarily "true", i.e. accepted as the best (most adequate) description for the time being of some set of phenomena, and what are the criteria for deciding this.

So, logically flowing from this statement, ALB, you accept that:17th century conceptions/scientific knowledge/truth of 'sun/earth' dynamics were 'true', then;but that 'truth' is not 'true', now, from 21st century conceptions/scientific knowledge/truth of 'sun/earth' dynamics;and that, in the,say, 24th century, our conceptions/scientific knowledge/truth now will potentially be 'untrue' from their conceptions/scientific knowledge/truth?Thus, 'truth' is dynamic, social and has a history.'Truth' is not a fixed, one-off, reflection of 'reality', which science produces by a neutral method.If you can agree with this clarification, ALB, I think that we've come to some point of agreement.

[LBird]

twc wrote:

Surely, ALB and DJP, you must acknowledge the historical materialist content of LBird’s assertion about truth…LBird well knows my misgivings over his critical realism, but I support him on this.

I'd like to thank twc for their expressed support, on this issue of 'truth' being a dynamic social construct, and not a static 'mirror reflection' of reality.

[LBird]

ALB wrote:

I am more Pannekoekian (or just as Pannekoekian) than thou.

Not on the issue of ‘truth’, ALB.You (and DJP) argue that ‘truth’ is located in ‘object’.I (and Pannekoek) argue that ‘truth’ is located in ‘knowledge’.For Pannekoek, as we have seen, ‘object’ is “concrete realities, which are a continuous and unbounded stream in perpetual motion”.For Pannekoek, as we have seen, ‘knowledge’ is “immutable substances, matter, energy, electricity, gravity, the Law of entropy, etc., …are products which creative mental activity forms out of the substance of natural phenomena”.Given Pannekoek’s words, how could ‘truth’ be a ‘stream in perpetual motion’? Aren’t ‘matter and electricity’ forms of ‘truth’, a ‘truth’ which is ‘produced by mind’? ‘Knowledge’ can be ‘true’, but to say ‘object’ can be ‘true’ would be meaningless. Unless, that is, one is a naïve realist, and thinks that the ‘object’ can be accessed by a neutral, positivist, scientific method.As to the ‘fixity’ of ‘truth’ (conceived as a one-off ‘discovery’ of the orbits of the planets, for example) Pannekoek says “The mind is a faculty of generalization. It forms …abstract conceptions that are essentially rigid, bounded, stable, and unchangeable. This gives rise to the contradiction that our conceptions must always adapt to new realities without ever succeeding…”.Human views of the ‘orbits of the sun and earth’ are ‘rigid abstract conceptions’ that are ‘contradicted’ by ‘new realities’. This is how we account for changes in ‘truth’.The alternative that you and DJP propose, that ‘truth’ is located in the ‘object’ and thus, once ‘known’, is a final ‘truth’, just doesn’t accord with Pannekoek’s (or indeed Dietzgen’s) expressed views.When I say 17th century views were ‘true’ then and that now they are not, you counter that they were obviously ‘false’ then. But this depends on you believing that what we know as a ‘truth’ now is the datum point for eternity, that ‘truth’ now is the measure of ‘truth’ then. This can’t be done using a Pannekoekian model of cognition. He says that our ‘conceptions’ are ‘products’, not a ‘mirror’ of ‘reality’, which they would have to be, to sustain your view of ‘truth’. He specifically says that, what you identify as ‘truth’, is an ‘unbounded stream in perpetual motion’.'Pannekoekian', ALB? No, I think you are 'DJPian'!

[LBird]

Lenin, M and E, p. 290, wrote:

These perfectly clear materialistic propositions are, however, supplemented by Dietzgen thus: “Nevertheless, the non-sensible idea is also sensible, material, i.e. real…. The mind differs no more from the table, light, or sound than these things differ from each other” (p. 54).  This is obviously false. That both thought and matter are “real,” i.e., exist, is true. But to say that thought is material is to make a false step, a step towards confusing materialism and idealism.

[my bold]Lenin goes on to say that Dietzgen is only ‘inexact’.So, Lenin adopts the same method being adopted here.a) have a preconceived yet unexplained viewpoint;b) quote Dietzgen (or Pannekoek) for support;c) accuse Dietzgen of being ‘inexact’;d) replace Dietzgen’s expressed viewpoint by one’s own so far unexpressed viewpoint;e) continue to claim the now expurgated Dietzgen as an authority for one’s differing viewpoint.If ALB and DJP don’t agree with Pannekoek or Dietzgen, then that’s fine. But then they must say who they do agree with. Lenin, here, on the 'material'?Otherwise, this discussion descends to personal opinion, anecdote, and ‘feelings’ about things being ‘silly’.

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

But anyway, come off it. The use of quotes and references does not imply endorsement and the notion that only communists can say true things is rather silly.

'Rather silly'? That's a defensible opinion, DJP.Why not 'defend' it, then?Or is 'silly' obvious? Is it a mere matter of 'common sense'?Can you give us some other authority for that opinion of yours? Or are you the only one that holds it?'Rather silly'. Hmmm…. not a very scientific term, is it?Where do you get your ideas about science, DJP?

DJP wrote:

Though I guess it would follow from your relativism…

Ahhhh, so you do hold ideas, not of your making! 'Relativism', eh?I've already explained 'relativism' in terms of the tripartite theory of cognition, and then gone on to show how I don't agree with that model, and have outlined the model I do consider to be better.But… none of this from you, no attempt to explain, defend, quote authorities…No, just your 'opinion'. 'Rather silly'. No much of an argument, is it?

[LBird]

ALB wrote:

In Materialism and Empiriocriticism Lenin devotes a two whole chapters to Bogdanov:http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/four5.htm#v14pp72h-226http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/six2.htm#v14pp72h-322Apologies for Lenin's style of arguing, but I see that one of his insults to Bogdanov is to call him a "cognitive socialist".

The SPGB is quoting Lenin as an 'authority', now? Lenin?Well, I've got M & E on the book shelf, so I'll have a look at his opinions on Bogdanov.

[Author]

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