[DJP]

SocialistPunk wrote:

So if a Party speaker were asked what the policy regarding sex offenders is, what would be the answer?

I'm surprised an ex member is asking this. We don't have any policies save the democratic replacement of capitalism with socialism. Such issues would be dealt with democratically by society, it is not our place to dictate.

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

Sounds like a rejection of science, and a return to empiricism!

Sounds like a storm in a teacup to me!

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

World revolution? Isn't that what your 'focus' is upon?

Sometimes.About five minutes ago my focus was on "how to make a cup of tea". Das Kapital was of no use to me then…

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

Do you assume that both bourgeois thinkers and socialist thinkers are of equal worth to workers?

Depends on what they are thinking about..

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

what 'bunch of theories' do you use to understand the world?

All of them, but probably not all of them at the same time depending on what it is I'm focusing on…

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

There must be a 'unifying' theory behind the 'bunch'.

Why presume that? There's no good reason to really think there is, look into all the recent work on cognitive biases…www.youarenotsosmart.com

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

So, being a Socialist/Communist plays no part whatsoever in your understanding of the world, both physical and social? You never mentioned it, once.

Of course it does. But I'd call that a theory or a bunch of theories, not an ideology.

[DJP]

I do not have an ideology. To me, and most other people, "ideology" does not mean what you use it to mean. I have many theories however, one being that nobody really knows what "matter" is and that nobody can do.Another theory I have is that we do not experience the world as it is but instead a recreation of it created by our brains.Another theory I have is that this recreation is shaped by the fact that we are not isolated brains but brains living in a sea of other brains..Another theory I have is that a world exists outside of me, existed before me and will exist after I am gone and that this world is material / physical in nature. i.e there is no supernatural spiritual dimension.How long do you want me to go on?…FWIW There's an interesting looking article on Marxism and CR is Capital and Class number 68 which I'm about to go through..

[DJP]

There's a short podcast to do with this book here:http://philosophybites.com/2014/08/jennifer-nagel-on-intuitions-about-knowledge.html

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

They think: 'Surely the material tells us 'what it is'?' and 'Matter precedes ideas' and so they don't have to actively think, critically and creatively about 'what the material is', and that this thinking can change, and so the 'material' changes for us. The 'materialists' believe that they have access to the 'material', which remains fixed, as does 'knowledge' of it.

I don't think anyone has been defending this position, apart from the strawmen created by your own imagination..

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

Why not compare what Archer says about 'criteria of existence' with what stanford says about both these criteria and others that they can think of?

Because all I have read about Critical Realism over the last 18 months or so does not make me think that doing so would be the most productive way to use my time or money right now. If you think that CR is such a good thing, and want to persuade us of it, then this would be something for you to do…

[DJP]

There are no right or wrong definitions only inconsistent uses of them. When I say "realism" and you say "realism" it seems we are referring to different concepts. So like I said if you want to talk about what "realism" means in the context of "critical realism" I suggest starting a new thread, something useful may come out of it who knows 

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

If you want to know what 'realism' means, why not ask comrades their opinion, and then think about it, rather than posting an uncriticised link?

Well if you want to discuss Critical Realism, (which seems to be different from Realism as generally concieved) and it looks like you want to discuss nothing else, perhaps start a new thread. This quote from Bhakshar would be a good starting point..

Bhakshar wrote:

The model of the society/person connection I am proposing could be summarized as follows: people do not create society. For it always pre-exists them and is a necessary condition for their activity. Rather, society must be regarded as an ensemble of structures, practices and conventions which individuals reproduce or transform, but which would not exist unless they did so. Society does not exist independently of human activity (the error of reification). But it is not the product of i.e. (the error of voluntarism).

[DJP]

ALB wrote:

But there are two levels involved here.

Just pulled this from wikipedia…

wikipedia wrote:

One must distinguish "stuff monism" from "thing monism".[3] According to stuff monism there is only one kind of stuff (e.g. matter or mind), although there may be many things made out of this stuff. According to thing-monism there exists strictly speaking only a single thing (e.g. the universe), which can only be artificially and arbitrarily divided into many things.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monism

So Deitzgen would be a "thing monist" I guess.But I'm not sure how well the distinction holds, can't we say that there is one single thing (the universe) and that is made of one kind of stuff (matter)? I guess the distinction mirrors the differences between metaphysical materialism and epistemic materialism…

[DJP]

ALB wrote:

I don't know why Stawson wants to give some credibilty to "panpsychism"(that mind is part of everything). which strikes me not only as a useless theory but as mumbo-jumbo. Or was he being ironic or provocative?

I think he's just trying to formulate a coherent materialist philosophy of mind and how you fit experiential reality into that.Very roughly we have three options.1. Experientail reality does not exist it just seems like it does.2. Experiential reality arrises out of or is an emergent property of non-experiencal matter when organised in the right way.3. Experiental reality "goes all the way down". That is there is little a proto-element of experience in the smallest components of matter, not that there is a "something it is like to be" for rocks, tables and chairs.The problem with number two is demonstrated below: Perhaps number 3 isn't as mad as it first seems. There's a 10 minute podcast here:http://philosophybites.com/2012/05/galen-strawson-on-panpsychism.htmlBut I don't think the question of socialism turns on any of these things…

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