[ALB]

He's just done it again. He accused me of being the sort of materialist which has "'tangible matter'"as its "central concern". I produce chapter and verse to show that I'm not that kind of old-fashioned materialist. And what he does he do? Call me an "Engelsist" which in his mind is someone whose central concern is tangible matter. What's the point of arguing with someone like that?

[ALB]

To return to the theme of the thread:

LBird wrote:

In fact, 'thought' is always a product of societies, not 'genius individuals', so our 'thought' in a democratic society would have to be democratically produced.

Discuss.

[ALB]

LBird wrote:

ALB, I'm just returning your abuse in the same terms

That wasn't abuse. It was contempt, basically for your dishonesty. And here's another example:

LBird wrote:

But you're a 'materialist', which has its roots in bourgeois biological individualism. Hence 'tangible matter' as its central concern.

Yes, I do call myself a materialist but in the general sense of holding that there is a world outside our thoughts. I think you do too. Some materialists (it's a wide definition) make 'tangible matter' their central concern, but not all. And not me. On the other thread I referred you to an article (which I assume you read) which contains this passage:

Quote:

Mind and MatterDietzgen, as we saw, called himself a materialist. There are however various kinds of materialism and Dietzgen was careful to differentiate his dialectical materialism from what he called ‘onesided,’ ‘narrow’ and ‘mechanical’ materialism. This was the view (indeed the traditional materialist view going back to the philosophers of Ancient Greece) that the world is composed of tiny particles of tangible ‘matter’ and that the mind and thinking are simply the effects of the movement of these atoms. Writes Dietzgen:The distinguishing mark between the mechanical materialists of the 18th century and the Social-Democratic materialists trained in German idealism consists in that that the latter have extended the former’s narrow conception of matter as consisting exclusively of the Tangible to all phenomena that occur in the world.13 Every phenomenon, everything that occurs, exists, as part of the entire world of phenomena. Since non-tangible phenomena, e.g. ideas, thoughts etc., also occur, they are just as real or, if you like, just as ‘material’ as tangible phenomena:In the endless Universe matter in the sense of old and antiquated materialists, that is, of tangible matter, does not possess the slightest preferential right to be more substantial, i.e. more immediate, more distinct and more certain than any other phenomena of nature.14Dietzgen had no objection to the classification of the world of phenomena into two general categories, one consisting of tangible phenomena and called ‘matter’ and the other consisting of mental phenomena and called ‘mind.’ He had no objection either to explanations of mental phenomena in terms of tangible phenomena. What he was concerned to point out was that, in this sense, both ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ were abstractions, even if very general ones, from the real world of phenomena. The rigid distinction between ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ was a mental distinction that did not exist in the world of phenomena which, despite this mental operation, remained an undivided whole:The mind is a collective name for the mental phenomena, as matter is a collective name for the material phenomena, and the two together figure under the idea and name of the phenomena of Nature.15 This was the basis of Dietzgen’s statement, which, as we shall see, so upset Lenin, that ‘our materialism is distinguished by its special knowledge of the common nature of mind and matter’.16 By this he simply meant that both mind and matter were parts of the world of observable phenomena.Those Dietzgen called the ‘narrow’ materialists made the mistake of not thinking dialectically, that is, of not realising that the parts of the world of phenomena do not exist independently but only as interconnected parts of that world. In taking one part of the world of phenomena and making it the basis of all the other parts, they were falsely ascribing a real, independent existence to what was in fact only an abstraction:This materialism is so enamoured of mechanics, that it, as it were, idolizes it, does not regard it as part of the world, but as the sole substance of which the universe is made up.17 This was the same mistake as regarding the objects of everyday use as having an independent, separate existence. ‘Matter’ just as much as ‘table’ was a mental abstraction from the real world of phenomena; in reality tangible phenomena do not exist separately from other phenomena, they exist only as an integral part of the entire single world of all phenomena.

I rest my case, but I can't keep on correcting your distortions every time you repeat them. It happens so often.

[ALB]

Vin wrote:

That would require you to give a definition of 'socialism' which will probably be closer to the SWP than the World Socialist Movement. It is the only explanation for the confusion you display

Actually, judging by his past contributions outside his pet obsession, his definition of socialism is not all that far from ours and not nearer to that of the SWP's state capitalism. He does agree that socialism is a society based on the common ownership and democratic control of the means of production which will make money, wages, profits, banks, etc redundant but –and it's a big but — he adds something rather sinister — that democratic control should extent to what people think, i.e thought control, which of course has never been part of the historical definition of socialism

[ALB]

Here, on cue, is exactly what I meant. Here's distortion:

LBird wrote:

When asked 'who' will control the production of maths and physics under (the SPGB version of) 'socialism', there is massed bafflement at the question. The simple answer by the SPGB is 'the elite that have always controlled maths and physics!'. The implication is that the elite have done such a good job in the last 350 years, so why change a perfectly good working formula, and let those uneducated, lazy, drunken, scruffs in the working class get their grubby hands on the shining edifice of perfection that is 'science'.

And here's abuse:

LBird wrote:

The SPGB seems to consist of uneducated, ill-informed, philosopically-illiterate bluffers, who like the sound of 'democracy' and 'socialism', but haven't got a clue what they're talking about.

That's it.

[ALB]

That's what I once thought. There's nothing wrong with someone defending their own views. What is objectionable, and in the end intolerable, is someone distorting our view and being abusive to those who protest. If they are not going to take into account what we are really saying then the point comes when it's not worth continuing to argue with them. In my view that point was reached some time ago, but I'll give it one more go.

[ALB]

Tim Kilgallon wrote:

Dear ModeratorApologies. On re-reading my post, it may come across that I was trying to be disingenuous with my comments. In retrospect, using words like: low self esteem, friendless and bellend,. could be interpreted in a different way than I intended, if this is the case, please accept my withdrawal of those terms. So just to be clear, it is not my view that L Bird is a friendless, bellend who suffers from problems associated with low self esteem. I hope that clarifies the matter,

Sorry, I apologise too just as effusively.

[ALB]

Tim Kilgallon wrote:

Vin, I think that's an excellent point. Come on then L Bird, we're all waiting.

I'm not. We don't want him contaminating this thread. If we must accommodate him let's try and contain him in a thread devoted to his obession of what is knowlefge. Mind you, I suppose he has his uses as a foil and punchball.

[ALB]

Since you insist, it's this (but it's a theory of science not an "ideology"):http://mailstrom.blogspot.co.uk/2007/04/joseph-dietzgen-workers-philosopher.htmlHere's an extract that's relevant to your recourse to Kant's theory of an unknowable thing-in-itself as a way of trying to avoid coming across as a classical idealist:

Quote:

Dietzgen was a thoroughgoing empiricist and materialist. For him all knowledge was derived from sense-perception and what human beings perceived had a real existence independent of their perception of it.The Nature of Human Brainwork (1869) presents an empiricist theory of knowledge derived from a rejection of Kantian dualism. Kant had claimed that Reason (=science, knowledge) could only deal with the world of experience, but the world of experience, according to him, was only a world of appearances or, to use a word derived from Greek meaning the same, a world of ‘phenomena’. Thus science could never come to understand the world as it really was, the world of what Kant called ‘things-in-themselves’ of which he supposed the world of phenomena to be but appearances. For Kant. there were two worlds: a world of phenomena, which was all the human mind could come to understand, and a world of things-in-themselves beyond human experience and understanding.For Dietzgen, to posit the existence of a second world beyond the world of experience was simply metaphysical nonsense. ‘Phenomena or appearances appear – voilà tout.’ The world of phenomena was the only world; phenomena were themselves real, the substance of the real world. Phenomena, however, says Dietzgen, do not exist as independent entities; they exist only as parts or the entire single world of phenomena. The world of reality is a single entity embracing all observable phenomena, past, present and future. Reality is thus infinite, having no beginning nor end. It is constantly changing. The universe and all things in it consist of transformations of matter, which take place simultaneously and consecutively in space and time.

[ALB]

LBird wrote:

'Inorganic nature' is an unknowable 'in itself' ingredient for active human social theory and practice.

Aha, so it's back to Kantian dualism with the distinction between the phenomena we experience through the senses and an unknowable thing-in-itself behind these phenomena !From the Encyclopaedia Britannica:

Quote:

Noumenon, plural Noumena,  in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, the thing-in-itself (das Ding an sich) as opposed to what Kant called the phenomenon—the thing as it appears to an observer. Though the noumenal holds the contents of the intelligible world, Kant claimed that man’s speculative reason can only know phenomena and can never penetrate to the noumenon.

And a comment from elsewhere as to where this leads (and has led many times on this forum):

Quote:

According to Kant, the problem of philosophy before him had been that objects were confused with things in themselves. That is, the tree outside my window was thought as being the tree-as-it-is-in-itself. This lead to the problem that if this is so, then what I am really seeing is the mere idea of that tree, a representation of it, and the real tree is always left unperceived. That lead to skeptical problems like Hume's, where it was accepted that we can never know whether there really is a tree out there or not, if we are stuck with only the idea in our head. Berkeley also advocated such a view so that he claimed that it makes no sense to begin with, so matter must be dropped – the real tree is also an idea.

If that's your view I agree it would be out of order to call you a "materialist" even by another name. I don't think "Marxist" would be appropriate either as it wasn't Marx view.

[ALB]

Were there any local party members there to run the stall that was offered?

[ALB]

Yes it was. He was an NF member at the time of that strike. What the examples of him and Hill confirm is that you don't have to be a socialist to be a militant trade unionist.

[ALB]

LBird wrote:

ALB wrote:

LB is using it differently to mean some part of his "inorganic nature" that humans have already isolated in their mind and which is thus already a mental construct.

No, I am not arguing that 'inorganic nature' is 'isolated in the mind'.

ALB actually wrote:

The confusion arises over the different usages of the term phenomena. Pannekoek used it in same sense as LB's "inorganic nature", i.e the world out there, the "externality from consciousness" that provides the material out of which the human mind produces "mental constructs".  LB is using it differently to mean some part of his "inorganic nature" that humans have already isolated in their mind and which is thus already a mental construct.

I don't think you realise the huge concession you have made to "materialism" with your concept of "inorganic nature" as an "externality for consciousness" that is not "isolated in the mind". The difference between your "inorganic nature" and "matter" is only a matter of terminology. You too are separating "being" ("inorganic nature") from "consciousness".If you want to call yourself an "inorganic naturist" that's ok as long as the definitions are clear, but personally I still prefer "materialist" despite its range of meanings.

[ALB]

I think that in his confused way he may be trying to say  the same as us, i.e. that there is something out there which exists independently of consciousness and that to survive in it humans, in societies, create 'mental constructs' of it which are not the same nor a mirror image of it. He calls what the human mind works on  "inorganic nature" (and imagines that Marx did, but that's another matter. but it's not what it's called that matters):

Quote:

No-one is arguing that is 'nothing out there independently of consciousness'. There is, according to Marx, 'inorganic nature', from which we actively create 'organic nature'.

Quote:

The 'something that is perhaps beyond description' is Marx's 'inorganic nature', the externality from consciousness that provides a resource for our labour, our theory and practice. Marx argues that we 'metabolise' inorganic nature into organic nature, so 'phenomena' are our creation, and our descriptions of phenomena are thus objective descriptions of our objects.

LBird wrote:

This is Marx's method of 'theory and practice', in which historically-specific social groups actively produce their social knowledge of an 'inorganic' nature: that is, they produce 'organic nature', 'nature-for-us'. Inorganic nature' is not the 'active side', and humans do not passively reflect 'inorganic nature', we create our object, our 'organic nature'. 'Gravitational waves' are a socio-historical construct, they are 'knowledge'. They now form part of current 'organic nature'.

The confusion arises over the different usages of the term phenomena. Pannekoek used it in same sense as LB's "inorganic nature", i.e the world out there, the "externality from consciousness" that provides the material out of which the human mind produces "mental constructs".  LB is using it differently to mean some part of his "inorganic nature" that humans have already isolated in their mind and which is thus already a mental construct.This different linguistic usage leads him to think that we think "mental constructs" are the real world (i. e are crass materialists) and us to think that he is saying that all that exists are mental constructs (i.e is a crass idealist). Or, in relation to theme of this thread, he thinks we think that "gravitational waves" are real rather than mental constructs out of "the world of phenomena" while we think he thinks that the part of the "world of phenomena" out of which the concept of "gravitational waves" has been constructed is itself just a mental construct.

[ALB]

alanjjohnstone wrote:

But if what you say is correct it is really a charge against modern-day Saudi Arabia

That's what it was meant to be.

[Author]

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