Critical RealismLBird
November 2026 › Forums › General discussion › Pannekoek’s theory of science › Critical RealismLBird
Critical RealismLBird identifies with critical realism as outlined in Adam Schaff’s History and Truth [Chapter 1].Schaff bases critical realism on a theory of reflection — “precisely such an interpretation of the theory of reflection can be reconstructed from the corresponding statements of Marx, Engels and Lenin [sic].”Schaff’s theory of reflection [reconstructed from Marx, Engels and Lenin] is what rescues critical from naive — or critical realism from naive realism.Critical Realist CognitionCritical realist cognition is separated from naive realist cognition by its subject, which is sensuously-active society [consciousness], and by its method, which is critical realist reflection [practice].Schaff’s critical realist theory of cognition is based on four [positive] prior recognitions:“the objective existence of the object of cognition — its existence outside of any perceiving mind and independently of it.”“the objectively existing object of cognition is the external source of sensual impressions without which the process of cognition would be impossible.”“the process of cognition is … a subjective–objective relationship.”“the object is knowable … in the process of cognition the thing in itself becomes the thing for us” — [Engels: Anti Dühring]For Schaff, 1 and 2 are critical realist materialism, 3 and 4 are critical realist reflection, and 1, 2, 3 and 4 are critical realist cognition — or critical realism itself.Critique of Critical RealismIf critical realism were merely Schaff’s theory of cognition, we could ignore it as one more abstract variant on Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach by a professional soviet philosopher.But Schaff proclaims critical realism to be the marxian theory of cognition, and so we must engage critically with it.Fetishism of the Individual ObjectSchaff explicitly makes the subject of cognition universal [social, in the sense of society] — in line with Thesis VI.Schaff implicitly makes the object of cognition individual [he does so unconsciously, falling for naive practice] — in line with naive realism.Consequently, for Schaff, the universal subject [we] must bring the individual naive realist object [it, the thing in itself] into being [i.e. into our consciousness] in part by prior recognition of the individual object’s external existence.Marx would never base cognition of the individual naive realist external object on Schaff’s prior recognition 1.For Marx, like Hegel, the only object is the universal object — the universe of experience. The universal object is basic for Marx — the individual object is superstructural.Existence Independent of Mind?Schaff, by prior recognizing the existence of individual objects independent of mind — a result rather than a starting point of a theory of cognition — has assumed the objective independent-of-mind existence of the individual object as an article of faith for each and every cognized object out there. Did he consciously intend to do that?The history of human cognition is littered with the corpses of prior recognized individual objects.Universal Subject and ObjectFor Marx [like Hegel], subject and object are identical. We are basically the universe, even if superstructurally we come to cognize ourselves as a part of it.Our consciousness is the universe’s consciousness. We are of it; our thinking is it thinking. [The implications for cognition are enormous.]With Hegel, whose thought was pregnant for Marx just like Feuerbach’s, the Hegelian social subject [consciousness] initially misconceives individual objects [man and nature] as “alien” [just like Schaff’s prior recognition 1] but after its historical journey recognizes them as itself [Phenomenology].With Hegel the historical process is mystical. With Schaff it is, like Popper, iterative reflection.ReflectionSchaff’s reflection relies on prior recognition of external individual objects that are the source of our sensual impressions [1 and 2].Consequently, his reflection process must either superimpose itself upon naive realism in order to extinguish it, or else his reflection process must embrace naive realism, and acknowledge that it perpetually reproduces naive realism anew as a product that is simultaneously the starting point for the next iteration of the reflection process proper to criticize.I imagine that Schaff implies the latter. But where does that leave the individual object’s prior recognized materiality [1 and 2] if criticism extinguishes the object’s external existence independent of mind.How can concrete dependent-on-mind reflection continually spirit away or reconstitute an external object whose existence is already prior recognized as independent-of-mind?But scientific discussion, when carried on at Schaff’s abstract philosophical level of commentary on, and objectification of, Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach spirits materialism away.I will continue discussing Schaffian reflection at the practical level, as exemplified in the mature Marx’s actual scientific practice in Capital, and the comprehension of that practice [Thesis VIII].To be continued…
