British capital in Malaysia (Part 2)

The situation in the rubber industry is somewhat different from the others because the small capitalists and peasant producers have not yet been eliminated. Of the 3½ million acres under rubber in Malaya, only about two million are controlled by the large estates (which are nearly all over the 1,000 acre mark). The other 1½ million acres are comprised of small plots whose owners have been in a relatively strong competitive position because of their much lower costs of production. This was especially so after the Japanese occupation in World War II when, because of the inexpensive methods of manufacture on the smallholdings, they were able to resume production at once—unlike the plantations, many of which were damaged. Where the large estates have the advantage is that they have had the resources to embark on costly replanting schemes with high-yielding trees. As these trees mature the systematised production on the plantations is likely to pay off and it is thought that the present trend against the smallholdings will strengthen.

Malayan Rubber Production in thousands of long tons
Year Estates Smallholdings Total
1955 352 285 637
1957 369 269 638
1961 430 307 737
1970 (forecast) 614-750 400-500 1,014-1,250

Despite this, the nagging problems thrown up by the capitalist system remain to haunt the shareholders. In addition to the political uncertainty enveloping the whole of South-East Asia and the growing threat from synthetic rubber, the market has proved even more temperamental than that for tin. The rubber industry, too, can boast of a long list of futile attempts to maintain price levels. These started in 1922 when it was decided that the forced restriction of exports would keep prices hovering around the 30 cents per pound mark. After this step had been taken the price rose to $M1/b. in 1925, stood at 20 cents/lb. in 1928 and finally, between 1931-33, it sunk to 6 cents/lb. and less. Following this outstandingly successful first attempt many other schemes, including an International Rubber Regulation Committee, have been implemented; each was guaranteed in turn to be the elusive “ideal formula”. The table below makes any comment superfluous.

Year Natural Rubber Prices
(cents/lb.)
1951 169.55
1952 96.07
1953 67.44
1954 67.30
1955 114.16
1956 96.76
1957 88.75
1958 80.25
1959 101.56
1960 108.08
1961 83.54
1962 78.20

The British capitalist class has other vital interests at stake in this part of the world. The Singapore military base provides the only major dockyard east of Suez and is the heart of a network of 300 military aircraft, including V-bombers. This base also contains major stockpile facilities and its strategic value in the defence of British capital is thus obvious. To take another example, the tiny state of Brunei measures only 2,000 square miles in area but it is graced the title “British protected state” because of the important Shell oilfield at Seria. Malaysia also represents an important market for British manufacturers, although there is sharp competition with other capitalist rivals.

Imports into Malaysia
(in millions of dollars)
1960 1961 1962
Indonesia 1,226 1,000 1,022
U.K. 681 740 756
Japan 387 431 484
U.S.A. 191 238 274
China 175 172 202

Again it is interesting to note that each of these capitalist countries listed above has resorted to war, to protect its interests in South-East Asia, during the past few decades. It is against this sort of background that Harold Wilson’s statement—“If we had only ourselves to think of, we would be glad to leave there as quickly as possible”—has to be measured. .

That section of the British capitalist class with investments in Malaysia senses that it is in a precarious position. T. H. Silcock (Emeritus Professor of Economics of the University of Malaya) has summed up the outlook for the two major industries: “Even though the tin market recovered in 1961 and 1962, the long-term market prospect is . . . not hopeful, though the threat is probably not as great as for rubber.” Apart from this, the risk of losing capital is high in an area which has been repeatedly fought over by those countries with conflicting economic interests in the region. As a result there has been a great deal of discussions in the press about “our” defence policy east of Suez and about “maintaining stability” in this part of the world. Some of the rising capitalist powers, like China and Indonesia, have called upon the working class in South-East Asia to support them in their attempts to extend their spheres of influence at the expense of their rivals. But, clearly, in these struggles among different sections of the capitalist class, working men and women have nothing at stake; whichever side wins, for the workers victory means continued poverty under the renewed threat of war.
J.C.

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