LBird
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With 6,000 views and a couple of days’ breather, perhaps now is the time to establish a basis for the progression of this clearly interesting topic. There have been various questions throughout this thread, which it might appear I have been ignoring: I haven’t, it’s just that I think that a firm cognitive basis is necessary to even attempt to answers these questions. For example, some recent ones:
ALB wrote:But what would you say are the current criteria by which capitalist society distinguishes between "knowledge" and fantasy or a wrong/inaccurate/inadequate theory?ALB wrote:But wouldn't this just be knowledge about a different part of NHS (standing for the world of reality)? Why would it have to conflict with the first, different knowledge about a different part?….Ah, now we are getting somewhere ! "Better for their new purposes" (or even for their old purposes?). But what purpose? It would have to be something like "surviving better"? In which case, it would fall into the category of "instrumentalism" or "pragmatism" (not that there's necessarily anything wrong with that).And wouldn't you have to say more than "humans" and say something like "human society" to avoid any arbitrary group of humans with some arbitrary purpose creating their own "truths"? Which raises the question of who, in the scheme, is the subject: any group, a class, society as a whole?DJP wrote:OK so let's borrow Deitzgen's terms. So the NHS is the "Absolute Truth" and the IT system the "relative truth". Now we can never fully grasp the whole of the absolute truth, no-one has claimed that (apart from comrade strawman) but what if we are faced with competing designs of IT systems (or relative truths), how do we work out which is the more valid?Or is the truth of a theory solely contained in how well it fits the purposes of those who are using it?Once again, I think, from reading Schaff, I’ve accepted his claim:
Schaff, p. 48, wrote:Let us begin then with the traditional trinity which appears in every analysis of the process of cognition…: the cognitive subject, the object of cognition, and knowledge as the product of the process of cognition.Can everybody agree on an acceptance of this ‘traditional trinity’ as the basis of moving forward to discuss each of the three? Or does anyone still harbour serious doubts about this axiomatic schema? If so, could they outline a different way of conceptualising cognition?I think that ALB’s, DJP’s, and others, questions can only explored and answered through the tripartite schema, so perhaps we need to discuss in more detail those three components: the object (what is ‘real’?), the subject (an isolated individual or a ‘social individual’?), and the production of knowledge (passive reflection of object or active creation based on object?), though the last of the three has already been covered a little.So, if it is agreeable to all, perhaps the first to tackle is the subject: the nature of mind, and the cognitive mechanism, etc.
In my experience of self-employed professionals, they have a strong social tendency to develop cloth-ears.As Hrothgar displays with his genetic purity, here we have an example of concrete determinism.Perhaps Socialist Punk can tell us if 'Hrothgar' is a derivative of the Anglo-Saxon for 'Hessian-horns'.
Brian wrote:OK I'm getting there. I gather from what you are saying that even ' truth' is subject to the social/human/natural dynamics of change depending on what is selected and who constructed the 'knowledge' and 'why' and 'how' a new 'truth' becomes a clearer representation of that change?Yeah, because it all depends upon what 'facts' have been selected in the first place, to construct the 'knowledge'.If you think about the NHS, and someone says 'science can tell us exactly everything about the NHS, the Truth', it soon becomes obvious that this isn't true. It's an impossible, Sisyphean task.One can always think of another pointless question to ask of the NHS:What colour ties do all the consultants wear, each day?Can you give me a list of the distances from the northeast corners of each mainbuilding on each NHS site to each other?How many 3" wood screws have been used in constructing rain shelters?How many nurses are called Brian?Is blue the main colour for counterpanes used on the beds?Are there any rabid dogs hiding in bathrooms?How many relatives do all the band fives have, in total?Which mops came from Taiwan?These meaningless, but 'factual', questions can go on forever.Someone has to decide what we want to know about the NHS, and why. The parameters of this 'selection' from innumerable 'facts' are determined by a human social theory, before the process of selection is even started.The 'Truth' of the NHS exists (as an object of enquiry, as an absolute), but how can we reproduce it in its entirety? Any 'truth' we have before us is a 'truth' constructed by humans from the interaction of their questions and the answers they accept from the object. But it's a never-ending process, not a singular act of discovery.
Brian wrote:ALB wrote:Brian wrote:From my recollection LBird has many times pointed out the distinction between what was 'thought to be true' and the actual 'truth' becoming revealed through further scientific discovery and investigation.I think you've got the wrong end of the stick, Brian. This is precisely the position LBird is arguing against, as I assume he will confirm by return of post. I'm not sure I'd defend it either.
OK so it just goes to show how confusing this thread has gone. Hopefully if LBird does confirm this is not his position he'll also explain in simple terms the reasons why he does'nt defend it.
I'll try, comrade!If I explain it in terms of my 'NHS Computer System', an analogy with which you're familiar.The system is a 'true' representation of the NHS for the purposes for which humans created it.But it's clearly not the whole 'truth' of the NHS, because the NHS consists of innumerable 'facts', the vast majority of which are meaningless for human purposes.But another set of humans could write another system, which focussed on different aspects of the NHS, a second system which we would also regard as 'true', but which is different from the first 'truth'.So, the 'truth' of any scientific knowledge has to be related to the humans who constructed the 'knowledge', and 'why', and 'how', and a later better theorised and executed process could produce another true representation which is then considered by humans to be better for their new purposes, and thus succeeds and replaces an earlier truth.Does this help, Brian? Truth is in an eternal process of human production.Thus, my answer to your question about 'actual truth' being eventually 'revealed' is 'No'.'Actual truth' is the NHS, itself. It is the object, which consists of innumerable entities and relationships, and which it is impossible to 'know' in its entirety.The only way one can maintain that 'true' is the 'object' is to adopt a 19th century theory of cognition, according to which the mind is passive and simply registers sense-impressions (all of them) and the mind acts as a 'mirror' which reflects the 'object'.The bourgeoisie pretend that science still does this, although, as you've read on this thread (posts by YMS, and video by DJP) most scientists who give it any thought acknowledge that this can't be done.Please ask questions if I'm still unclear, and try to picture how knowledge would be created if not by the process I'm suggesting, which is the process I think most modern philosophers of science would accept.
DJP wrote:I didn't reply to those post because I thought they where a bad anology. What you describing is how to fill a design brief. But a theory has to be able to make predictions of the future, an IT of the type you are describing does it system does not do that…If you didn't understand my analogy, why not ask questions, rather than make erroneous assumptions?
LBird wrote:In line with alanjjohnstone’s request for someone to try to ‘explain this thread to the rest of us in an easy to understand way so we know what it's all about’, and my suggestion that the world of computers might help, I’ll make an attempt to use the analogy of ‘building a computer system’. Of course, the problem with analogies is that, if they’re taken too literally, they obscure rather than illuminate the real issue. So, please bear this in mind, and ask questions if something seems to present a problem, rather than take something which is irrelevant to the explanation and erroneously try to follow that wrong turn and completely misunderstand.The 'theory' that you mention, within this analogy, would be the theory that the computer system builders employ to enable them to build a computer system. So, for example, Jackson Structured Progamming might be used to design and write the code.The finished system represents 'knowledge', in this analogy.'Knowledge' is produced by the human social subject, which employs theories to help select and construct, from the pre-existing objective.On a later iteration of this eternal process, previously formed 'knowledge' can form the basis of future 'theory', to once again help to select (what is deemed) relevant from an overwhelming reality.If this still doesn't click, please ask, rather than assume. I'm trying to capture the nature of an interactive process.What's more, even when it 'clicks' (in the sense that posters come to understand the analogy), it still doesn't follow that one has to agree with it.But it's only by comrades getting to grips with this example, that they can hope to elaborate the different theory of cognition that they are, inescapably, employing for themselves.
DJP wrote:I didn't reply to those post because I thought they where a bad anology. What you describing is how to fill a design brief.No, it describes a 'process'. A process of cognition.
DJP wrote:But in communism there will be no proletariat LOL.This is always the reply from someone who delights in ignoring the obvious.If I'd have said 'humanity' (clearly relating to classless communism), you (and them) would have said, 'but you're not dealing with the realities of class!'. I've heard it all before – it's a tactic to avoid answering questions, like 'what is your cognitive method?'.
DJP wrote:Well in that case I vote for Father Christmas and levitating slippers; who's with me?And this is your serious opinion of the problems we'll face after a successful communist revolution?Why not just say, 'workers are dickheads who can't be trusted, with property or science, and we'll have to control them, that is, property, science and workers'?
DJP wrote:I think the story about the bees and pesticides highlights the point very well. Society can construct whatever (partial) truths it like, through whatever means it chooses. But if these "truths" are not in tune with the (absolute) truth of nature, there will be a price to pay; bees will die out, building collapse and planes fall out of the sky.What about your 'levitating slippers', that you claim that you'll vote for, to use when the plane falls out of the sky.I suspect workers are brighter than that, and have a good idea of nature and its truths.
DJP wrote:I don't think anyone actually does hold this belief that science produces the eternal truth, none of the physical scientists I have heard speak on the subject and not in the popular science publications.Yet, when you're asked about the sun/earth relationship, you claim it as a universal truth? So, you, at least, do hold to this view?
ALB wrote:But, in turn, I put a question to you: what in your view are the criteria by which to judge whether a theory or view is "knowledge" or just fantasy or wrong/inaccurate/inadequate?Now, we’re getting to the nub of the issue, aren’t we?Before I try to answer that essential question, though, I’d like to sum up where I think we are now about the ‘scientific method’, by the use of analogy.I’ve already posted my ‘NHS Computer System building process’ in an attempt to explain the actual cognitive process that science takes, in my opinion. I’ll post it again, for any readers who have missed (or, indeed, forgotten!) that post:
LBird, post #145, wrote:In line with alanjjohnstone’s request for someone to try to ‘explain this thread to the rest of us in an easy to understand way so we know what it's all about’, and my suggestion that the world of computers might help, I’ll make an attempt to use the analogy of ‘building a computer system’. Of course, the problem with analogies is that, if they’re taken too literally, they obscure rather than illuminate the real issue. So, please bear this in mind, and ask questions if something seems to present a problem, rather than take something which is irrelevant to the explanation and erroneously try to follow that wrong turn and completely misunderstand.If we think of the process of building a computer system, say, for the NHS.The NHS really exists, prior to the attempt to build a computer system for it.The business analysts who ask questions of the doctors, nurses and administrators of the NHS to try to gain an understanding of the workings of the NHS, the system designers who interpret the analysis and produce a paper design of something which should work, the programmers who actively write the code following the design, and the testers who ensure that the code ‘works’ in line with the design, are all humans with pre-existing ideas, both of their own jobs, each others’ jobs, and the NHS itself. These humans have to extract relevant information from the NHS, actively design, write and use a plan reflecting the NHS.The end result of this human active process is a new product, an NHS Computer System, which in some way reflects the workings of the NHS, but is clearly not a ‘carbon copy’ of the NHS, but only a comprehensive attempt to replicate the features regarded as essential and relevant to the computer system.So, in terms of the separate entities of Schaff’s tripartite theory of cognition:the NHS is the ‘object’;the human analysts, designers, coders and testers, are the ‘subject’;the NHS Computer System is the ‘knowledge’.Is the System a ‘true’ reflection of the NHS? Yes, if it works as proposed.Is the System an identical copy of the NHS? Of course not. Another System could be built, produced by different analysts, designers, coders and testers, with different ideas about what the NHS is, and what purposes and interests the System should serve, and this second System can also be regarded as a ‘true reflection’ of the NHS, whilst still being different to the other ‘true reflection’ of the first System.As another example of this tripartite schema, perhaps posters remember DJP’s likening ‘nature’ (object) to ‘evidence’, and my response that ‘evidence’ instead was similar to ‘knowledge’ which had been selected from a ‘crime scene’. In this example, the ‘crime scene’ (object) forms the basis of an active examination by the legal offices (subject) who then build a case of evidence (knowledge).This is the cognitive method of science: scientists (subject) actively interrogate the universe (object) and employ the product (knowledge) to prove itself.Perhaps one could say that ‘knowledge’ is a representation accurate enough for the purposes of the producer. Thus, knowledge is formed by humans from the entity it represents for a reason, and the ability of the knowledge to be used for those reasons proves its accuracy.But… knowledge is not the object; knowledge is not an identical copy of object; knowledge is a selection made by an interested subject.I hope this all helps, comrades. I would appreciate some feedback from those readers who didn’t feel that they properly understood the more arcane parts of this thread, but that now they do (or don’t, as it may be).We have here all the elements of the scientific method, and perhaps we could, too, liken it to a baker making pies.The constituents of the pie exist prior to the attempt to bake the pie, but the pie doesn’t emerge from the baker merely looking at the ingredients. The process requires the interaction of two things: the ingredients and an active human. The pie is created by the human working upon the ingredients. Thus, we have a third entity, which is an admixture of real ingredients and human creativity. The pie is based upon the real ingredients, but is not a mere ‘copy’ of the ingredients.It’s doesn’t take much imagination to realise, though, that the ingredients themselves don’t magically appear on the table: they are also selected, according to the tastes, abilities, training and culture of the baker: the selecting baker is an amalgam of individual and social elements. And furthermore, the process of baking a pie includes some accidental elements, like mood or an oven which had developed a dodgy thermostat. Finally, the same ingredients baked by another baker could result in a very different pie, or a different baker may choose slightly different ingredients for the same type of pie (better cuts of meat, salt, pepper, etc.).This pie-making method, I would argue, is far closer to the knowledge-making method of science than we are lead to believe, by those who would have us just blindly accept ‘science’ as an unquestionable authority for their deeds.Often, those who argue for the authority of the scientific method say that ‘replicability’ is a key element, but this often a gray area. Anyone who has studied the sciences in school will know that often an experiment is followed to the teacher’s precise instructions, but still doesn’t work. The pupil is then blamed, rather than encouraging the belief that science is more variable than the scientific authorities would like society to believe. And what counts as a ‘replica’? Anyway, for info:http://cogprints.org/7691/7/icmlws09.pdfSo, to return to ALB’s essential question:
ALB wrote:But, in turn, I put a question to you: what in your view are the criteria by which to judge whether a theory or view is "knowledge" or just fantasy or wrong/inaccurate/inadequate?Given my beliefs as a Communist and following the outlined theory of cognition of science, I’d argue that the only ‘criteria’ which can ever be acceptable for humans are those arrived at by the society that is doing the human social activity of science. The current ‘criteria’ of the bourgeoisie won’t be the future ‘criteria’ of the proletariat.Thus, I’d argue that, for Communist society, the ‘judgment’ between ‘knowledge’ and ‘fantasy’ should be a democratic one. Of course, this is predicated upon a society where all productive activity, including scientific research and development, is under democratic control, and every member of humanity has open to them a scientific education up to post-PhD research, where to be a ‘scientist’ is to be taught to have the ability to explain their work in terms understandable by those affected by that science, where all scientific research papers are openly available to all, and where all children and taught to think critically about all affairs that affect their society.Or is there an arcane method, beyond the ken of ordinary folk, which can’t be explained by simple analogy, which must remain the concern of a scientific priesthood, which produces ‘Truth’, an eternal and socially-neutral truth?No, science is political, and we Communists must argue for its control by our society, just as we do for our economics and politics, through democratic means.
'Shame' as part of science? Who'd've thought it? How can an allegedly 'neutral method' bring 'shame', which is an all-too-human feeling?
A Nobel prize winner wrote:“Another problem is that scientists begin to feel ashamed of negative results, which wasn’t the case a few years ago. Negative results are often as important as the positive results. The current system doesn’t tolerate failure."http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/dash-for-cash-is-stopping-science-in-its-tracks-claims-nobel-winner-8539744.htmlThese discoveries by scientists (and I mean the discovery of how shit capitalism is for science, not graphene) opens up the possibility of Communists providing an alternative approach. Only free access Communism can provide the socio-economic basis of anything approaching 'blue-skies research'.
Well, from what I can tell by the quote by Pannekoek you have provided, ALB, as the basis of your theory of cognition, it seems to agree with the one that I’ve put forward, based upon Schaff.I’ve argued that an active social subject interacts with a really-existing object, to produce knowledge, which is based upon, but not identical to, the object.As I think we both agree with a) the premise of the object being real and prior to cognition, and b) the premises that the subject is both social (not an isolated individual) and is active (not a passive registering instrument, but a searching and selective producer), we should clarify some issues about knowledge, to ensure we agree on the nature of this third entity, too.Of course, there is more to be said of both object and subject, where other posters might disagree with us (for example, some might argue that ‘real object’ doesn’t include ideas, but only things that can be ‘touched’ (ie. the ‘material’ or ‘matter’), or argue that the subject is an individual), but I think we agree on these two entities, so far.The part of the process of cognition that I think is worth clarifying is the issue of the ‘production of knowledge’. That is, it is a third entity which differs from the object of which it is knowledge of, and that it is ‘actively produced’, and so must contain elements of the producer.These, then, are my two questions:Do you agree that ‘knowledge’ is a separate entity to ‘object’?Do you agree that ‘knowledge’ is ‘produced’, rather than is an identical copy?Of course, if you think that I’ve posed those two questions in an unclear or unfair way, it’s open to you to discuss a ‘re-formulation’ of them! And if you disagree from the start that Pannekoek’s quote supports Schaff, then we can re-examine the quote in detail.
twc wrote:For you [LBird], the scientific enterprise is riddled with fraud, which the scientific enterprise is powerless to detect, expose and correct.LBird wrote:Sometimes the active social subject can be fallible, thus knowledge is untrue.This can be established by a later attempt at producing knowledge by another active social subject, employing a different theory, interacting with the objective world.twc, you seem to have the strange ability to 'write', but not have the usually concommitant ability to 'read'.As I never tire of saying, I'm attempting to support the 'scientific method', by explaining 'what' it actually is, rather than, as you seem to be trying to do, to defend the indefensible, that the activity of science can't be questioned, and to argue that those who do are trying to destroy science.We Communists have to defend science, on a basis that can be defended against the exposures of fraud, like Kammerer or Burt (and many others), and against the bourgeois authority of 'scientific Truth', which supposedly employs a method that produces a Truth which is final, and to which There Is No Alternative.Science, unlike the other bourgeois authority of The Market, can be saved.But we have to discuss it, and put science on a truly scientific footing which encompasses all scientific activity, from physics to sociology, through chemistry, biology, psychology, etc. Science is a human activity. We have to identify a Communist method, and reject the bourgeois method.The starting point, however, is to realise that science is a social activity, and is thus suffused with human ideology, biases, theories and, sometimes, outright individual or class-systematic fraud.In essense, science is a political activity, not a neutral method of discovery.
ALB wrote:Anyway, you have conceded the point by saying that the outside world precedes thinking. Which makes you a materialist after all.Well, since from my very first post I've argued that the 'object' exists outside of, and precedes, the process of cognition, your triumphal point about my 'concession' (sic) isn't very productive for a discussion of 288 posts, is it?What's being avoided is discussion of 'the process of cognition'.Why can't you describe your process of cognition, ALB?I accept object, subject and knowledge as separate entities in this process, and argue that the interaction between an active social subject and a pre-existing object produces knowledge.Thus, 'knowledge' can't be identical to 'object', because it's the product of an interaction with a subject which actively searches and selects from object, and with those materials builds a structure of knowledge.Sometimes the active social subject can be fallible, thus knowledge is untrue.This can be established by a later attempt at producing knowledge by another active social subject, employing a different theory, interacting with the objective world.But we can never reach a final, complete, absolute truth, because that would be to duplicate the object of cognition in every way, which is impossible.Finally, I'm not a 'materialist', I'm a 'historical materialist'.That's why I can explain the history of the production of knowledge, unlike those who see science as a discovery of the object, which Pannekoek also warns us against.IF HISTORICAL MATERIALIST GOTO: ENDELSE GOTO: POST1END"I accept Schaff's tripartite theory of cognition, of preexisting object interacting with active social subject to produce knowledge"
lets guess who wrote:I read those sociologists as asserting that natural scientists lack scientific integrity. This is I believe, for the reasons I gave, a quite undeserved charge against scientists of conscious human fraud.Perhaps those still afflicted with 19th century-like awesome respect for, gosh, scientists!, should have a read of, for example, Chapter 7 Scientific Misconduct, in Jonathan Marks’ Why I Am Not a Scientist.[to forestall a certain poster’s apoplexy, Marks does regard himself as a scientist, it’s just rhetoric for a book title, to help sales in our wonderful market-driven society]The ‘midwife toad’ fraud (pp. 171-7) is simply hilarious. The biologist Paul Kammerer experimented on the Alytes obstetricans, the common midwife toad, and produced ‘nuptial pads’ (a feature of water-dwelling species) on the land-dwelling midwife toad and got them to transmit through the generations. He said.
Marks wrote:Then Nature published the results of G. Kingsley Noble’s analysis of the nuptial pads of Kammerer’s midwife toad: there were no nuptial pads; the darkened patches were the result of injections of India ink.There are other examples. Some ‘natural scientists’, being human, are fallible, for any number of reasons, and lie about their experiments, results and ideas.Natural scientists commit ‘conscious human fraud’.
ALB wrote:Actually, this gives me a chance to raise something I've been wanting to but have avoided till now so as not to get into an argument over semantics, i.e your view of what "positivism" is.Positivism is the view that the only source of ideas and knowledge is experience.I disagree with your definition of ‘positivism’, here, ALB. I think positivism goes further than ‘experience’, and claims that ‘experience’ provides ‘positive’ proof of ‘objective reality’. This claim can’t be true, because we know that science both makes mistakes and can only give a ‘partial truth’ of the ‘object’, at best.In its simplest form, it claims that the scientific method can’t be wrong. The twentieth century has put paid to that ideological claim!
ALB wrote:It is a rejection of all "metaphysics", i.e. of the view that there is anything outside or beyond the world of experience. In this sense both Dietzgen and Pannekoek were "positivists".I think most would now call this ‘realism’, rather than ‘positivism’ for the historic reasons given above. I think that perhaps Pannekoek and Dietzgen would now disclaim being called ‘positivists’, given its authoritarian and conservative overtones.
ALB wrote:Positivism is not committed to the view that "'sense impressions' tell us the 'whole truth'", only that knowledge is constructed by the mind by organising sense impressions.Not just ‘organising’ but determining what actually constitutes a ‘sense-impression’ and selecting from the overwhelming number by using a pre-existing theory.Positivism is the antithesis of Critical Realism, which I would argue is the best method for Marxists to employ.
ALB wrote:I can't see how anyone (other than an idealist) can argue that sense-impressions are not primary, but that before they can be experienced the person experiencing them has to have a theory.This is to argue that ‘sense-impressions’ are transmitted purely to the brain/mind. Young Master Smeet has already given an example which seems to contradict this belief, and DJP’s video shows that ‘sense-impressions’ are selected by an active mind, and that the ‘sense-impression’ of the gorilla was ignored.
ALB wrote:This is not how a child acquires knowledge (nor how the pre-human mind would have evolved into the human mind). For the new-born child, the world is indeed a mass of mere sensations which it eventually learns to make some sense of by learning the names of parts of it.We are discussing the method of science, rather than infants, but even so the child must be taught by society before it can ‘name names’.You show me a new-born child removed from all social influence, and 2 years later, I’ll show you, not a cognising human making sense of the world through their ‘sense-impresssions’ alone, but a corpse. The child is primed with ‘theory’.
ALB wrote:As someone once put it if not in so many words, sensations (or, rather, the outside world that gives rise to them in humans) have to precede thinking about them.No, the ‘outside world’, or object, precedes ‘thinking’, but ‘sensations’ don’t necessarily. Have your ever ‘sensed’ Tasmania (or somewhere you haven’t been, if my example falls down by you actually having been to Tasmania!), or is just a theoretical construct in our minds, but which we can scientifically prove, if we wanted, by flying there? Theory precedes practice.
Brian wrote:And we organise "sense impressions" by filtering those which have no immediate effect on our circumstances. This filtering also avoids overwhelming our mind with too much information.Yes, the ‘filter’ is a ‘theory’, as I have been arguing. Logically, the filter must precede the sense-impression. This is the mistake that ‘positivism’ was making, by arguing that ‘sense-impressions’ are primary (as opposed to arguing that the object pre-exists sensation), and that there is no filter, if the mind remains ‘passive’, just takes in sensations, and ignores ideologies. This can’t be done. The human mind is active, as Marx argued, and we all have ‘social-filters’ to all of our ‘sense-impressions’. The human mind searches through innumerable sense-impressions. This applies to physics, as much as sociology. Hence, we have the makings of a ‘unified method’, which Marx thought possible for humans to construct.Time to stop. I’ll try to come up with an example, later.
Pannekoek wrote:When, however, in consequence of the development of the productive forces, the world is changing, new and different impressions enter the mind which do not fit in with the old image. There then begins a process of rebuilding, out of parts of old ideas and new experiences. Old concepts are replaced by new ones, former roles and judgments are upset, new ideas emerge.http://www.marxists.org/archive/pannekoe/society-mind/ch03.htmobject (new experiences) interacts (process of rebuilding) with subject (old ideas) to produce knowledge (new ideas).
If we can leave the intricacies of Bogdanov side for the moment, ALB, you’ve said something that I don’t agree with.
ALB wrote:They would merely be saying that "sense-impressions" precede thinking about them (a not unreasonable position that we have been trying to convince you of).But ‘sense-impressions’ don’t precede thinking about them. Of course, the external world exists before we think about it, but science is the application of our minds (and their social theories) to the external world, through our sense-impressions. But what we consider ‘sense-impressions’ is determined by our theory. If we started from ‘sense-impressions’, we’d be overwhelmed by infinite sensation, and have to accept the ‘bucket theory of mind’. So, I think it is an entirely ‘unreasonable position’ to take! The notion of the ‘primacy’ of ‘sense-impressions’ is empiricism and inductivism. And the belief that these ‘sense-impressions’ tell us the ‘whole truth’ is positivism.
ALB wrote:Dietzgen and Pannekoek, starting from the same premises as Mach and Bogdanov (that all knowledge is derived from our sense-impressions), did not make this mistake.I’m not sure about this, ALB. We have ‘scientific knowledge’ of many things that we have never had a ‘sense-impression’ of, otherwise how could we account for the ‘scientific knowledge’ of ‘the ether’?The whole point of my argument is that science, being a human fallible method, can be wrong. But if ‘all knowledge is derived from our sense-impressions’, how do we account for false ‘scientific knowledge’, if it can be ‘sensed’?It’s better to regard scientific knowledge as built up from theory and sense-impressions, which leaves us the option of realising that the ‘theory’ was wrong (when confronted by a better theory tested against later sense-impressions). Surely ‘sense-impressionism’ is naïve realism?I’m still basing my ideas on Schaff’s tripartite schema of object and subject interacting, to produce knowledge. I’ll have to have a further look at Pannekoek, on your claim that he thought ‘all knowledge is derived from our sense-impressions’.
