[LBird]

So, why don't you two cloth-eared idealists go and do something else, and leave this thread to those who are curious?

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

What I still don't get is how an adherence to to realism can be compatible with the strong kind of cognitive relativism that LBird has been putting forward in the various threads.

Because I've been 'putting forward' Marx's 'strong kind of cognitive relativism', and you employ a different ideology, you can't 'get' it.'Knowledge' depends on 'society'. The ideology that 'reality' tells us what it is, and speaks identically to all observers, across time and place (and thus is an ahistorical and asocial ideology), is a bourgeois ideology.I've said this before, many times, but you wouldn't listen then, and you won't listen now.Stick with 'materialism' and 'physicalism' and 'supervenience', DJP. And pretend to yourself that they are asocial and ahistorical concepts. Then you'll 'know' the 'Truth', and be at one with your god, 'matter'.You're an idealist, DJP.

[LBird]

Vin Maratty wrote:

£27 for the ebook!!   Would you recommend any of this free reading? http://www.russellkeat.net/value_free_social_science.php

Keat wrote:

In my discussion of objectivity and value-freedom in Social Theory as Science (co-authored with John Urry; Routledge 1975/1982) a broadly Weberian position was defended…

[my bold]Well, Vin, since you apparently don't think science is ideological, you won't be able to read Keat and Urry's book from an alternative Communist perspective, will you? Y'know, critically.Take my advice, Vin, and ignore me and the book.£27? What price ignorance?

[LBird]

ALB, I've just got hold of a book which seems to cover many of the issues that I've tried to discuss, unsuccessfully.It is Social Theory as Science, by Keat and Urry.http://www.amazon.co.uk/Social-Theory-Science-Routledge-Revivals/dp/0415608783It's a reprint of a book originally published in the '70s, but it's still very useful.Part One, 'Conceptions of science' (chapters 1-3), is very good, I think.Chapter 5, 'Marx and realism' seems to me to be a bit weak, in that it doesn't stress (to me, anyway) the fundamental link between 'realist ontology' and 'Historical Materialism'. That is, HM as an example of 'realism'. This, I think, requires further discussion between Communists.I'm still reading it, but nevertheless, I'd recommend what I've read, so far.Hope this helps, where I clearly haven't.

[LBird]

moderator, please ban me.Please physically prevent me from logging in.I'm going to say something that I regret.

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

Perhaps explain how you think "theory" is different from "knowledge".

I'm now finding it difficult to believe that I'm talking to adults.Are you seriously saying you don't know the difference between having an unproven 'theory', prior to practice, and 'knowledge' produced by 'theory and practice'?Why?Why?Why?What am I bothering for? I'm wasting your time and mine.Perhaps I should just go for the permanent ban, and put us all out of our misery.Because that's what this process is, comrades: not pleasure, not enlightenment, just misery.

[LBird]

Young Master Smeet wrote:

I supose it's arguable that one can know without ideas: dogs know things, and yet have no ideas: but I think that's arguable, since we're still talking about, essentially, mental states, and the property of being a mental state.  Both ideas and knowledge are parts of the mental domain. I can't see "knowledge" being f any other stuff than matter or ideas…

I thought this thread was about 'science and Communism'.How the hell does 'dogs knowing things' play any part in this discussion?I still can't fathom why there is so much resistance.Seriously, what's the point of posting stuff like this?What are you hoping to achieve?Driving me away?

[LBird]

I never thought it would be so difficult to get some agreement on 'theory and practice' produces 'knowledge'.Not 'theory' produces 'knowledge'.Not 'practice' produces 'knowledge'.Not 'matter' produces 'knowledge'.Not 'ideal' produces 'knowledge'.Just good, old fashioned, 'theory and practice produces knowledge'.I simply don't know where to go from here, comrades.

[LBird]

DJP (reflecting YMS), wrote:

Like has been said C=B…

But it doesn't.C=A+B.Unless this is accepted (that 'knowledge'='reality' practiced on by 'ideas'), then we will continue to 'talk past' one another.I can't say it any simpler, comrades.If one wants to argue 'knowledge'='ideas' (ie. C=, then we are not proceeding together.If 'practice' = '+', then the formula C=B leaves out 'practice'.Unless we subscribe to 'knowledge' emerges from human practice (which means human ideas) upon 'reality', then there's no point going any further.This relationship is at the heart of 'theory and practice'.Theory must exist. (B)It must be practiced.(+)Practice must be upon something.(A)Theory and practice produce knowledge (C)A+B=C (or, B+A=C)This disagreement needs to be sorted out, or we'll continue to misunderstand what each other is saying.

[LBird]

I've been trying to think of a explanation for this problem which might work.If we call material A, ideal B and knowledge C, thenA+B=C; orB+A=C, which is the same thing.The fact that A existed for millions of years before B, is neither here nor there.At that point, when there was no B, neither was there C.So, when just A existed there wasA.When B came along, and only then, there was a possibility of C.old A + new B = possible CC is not a copy of A.C requires both A and B; or B and A; this is the sameAs Marx, in the Theses on Feuerbach says, A+B=C. Materialists insist A=C, or C=A.Idealists insist B=C, or C=BRealists insist that C=A+B, or C=B+A.For those interested, A=object, B=subject, C=knowledge,and the plus sign is 'practice'.Hope this helps, comrades.

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

LBird wrote:

Why not call it 'idealism', which by your logic is equally acceptable?

It's not equally acceptable according to "my logic"Idealism means that "reality is predominantly mental or otherwise non-physical".How does that equate with"everything is material or depends on or arises out of the material."?But anyhow how is "Reality is just such a collection of entities endowed with causal powers that come from their inherent nature" any kind of improvement?

You missed out the key part of my quote, DJP.

LBird wrote:

DJP, why call something that gives the 'material' and the 'ideal' an equal status, 'materialism'?Why not call it 'idealism', which by your logic is equally acceptable?

You’d just agreed with the equal status of ‘material’ and ‘ideal’.

DJP wrote:

ALB wrote:

Actually, I agree with the substance of this, i.e (1) that Marx won't have held that everything is material or physical and (2) that material and ideas have the same status. In which case the argument would seem to be about what to call this view, which I'm sure could be eventually settled.

I agree with both points one and two.

Either you agree ‘that material and ideas have the same status’, or you don’t.If you do, you can’t claim either that “that "reality is predominantly mental or otherwise non-physical" (what you call Idealism) or “that "reality is predominantly physical or otherwise non-mental" (what you call Materialism).This is the whole point: ‘real’ means ‘material and ideal’ or ‘ideal and material’.You are trying to agree with ‘real’, but insisting (illogically) on ‘material’.This isn’t just a matter of words, although ALB is right, that ‘realism’ doesn’t have to be what this approach is called, but the use of the term ‘materialism’ must be confronted, because of its history and implied meaning. Its history is Leninism, and its implied meaning is that the ‘material’ takes prominence.I don’t think you would have any time for Leninism, DJP, but I think you are a ‘physicalist/materialist’, because you keep saying so.But ‘realism’ is not ‘materialism’. Realism gives equal weight to the material and the ideal.

Brian wrote:

I have to disagree which is why I've suggested making a distinction between CR and 'Critical Materialism'.

I think Brian is on the right lines, in his response to DJP, but again I have to disagree with his suggestion, because it retains the word ‘Materialism’, for the reasons already outlined. ‘Materialism’ is a dangerous hangover from Engels’ usage, which fed into Lenin’s.Of course, it doesn’t have to be ‘Critical Realism’ (it could just as easily be ‘Critical Whatsit-ism’), but I can guarantee that if the term ‘materialism’ is involved, those physicalists like DJP will agree with the use of the term, but disagree with its meaning.‘Real’ means the ideal and the material have the same status. To agree with this means a rejection of the ‘material’ having a special status.We have to get away from the ‘idea’ that ‘matter’ tells us what it is. That’s why ‘materialism’ is a form of Idealism. It replaces ‘god’ with ‘matter’, and both are outside of human control. The proletariat (and thus post-rev. humanity) can have no external master.

DJP wrote:

Materialism doesn't mean that everything is material but that everything is material or depends on or arises out of the material.

If we go with this definition, we’ll soon find a minority telling us what the ‘material’ is. This formula simply does not give ideal and material the same status, and it is anti-democratic.Marx insisted that our ‘knowledge’ of the world is both ‘ideal’ and ‘material’. It requires a method of ‘theory and practice’, which means the application of the ideal to the material. Perhaps ‘Critical Practicism’ captures this, for Brian?

[LBird]

DJP, why call something that gives the 'material' and the 'ideal' an equal status, 'materialism'?Why not call it 'idealism', which by your logic is equally acceptable?

[LBird]

moderator1 wrote:

My sincere apologies to LBird for any inconvienence the blocking caused and I thank him for bringing this matter to the forums attention. And I appreciate there was no grudge intended on his part.

Thanks for the acknowledgement.

[LBird]

ALB wrote:

LBird wrote:

1) Marx wasn't a 'materialist', in the accepted meaning of that term (everything is 'material' or 'physical'); I've explained this, and think that the term 'idealist-materialist' captures Marx's position far better, if one reads his Theses on Feuerbach.2) The realm of the 'real' includes material and ideas. Rocks and value have the same ontological status.

Actually, I agree with the substance of this, i.e (1) that Marx won't have held that everything is material or physical and (2) that material and ideas have the same status. In which case the argument would seem to be about what to call this view, which I'm sure could be eventually settled.

Yes, the 'name' is neither here nor there. The important thing is to recognise the substance.

ALB wrote:

But what's all this about "non-physical causal powers" and Bhaskar? Where do they fit in?

My advice is to leave Bhaskar out of it, for the moment anyway, and just regard him as one proponent of CR.I'm trying to get us towards an explanation of 'non-physical causal powers', but I think a few more steps of explanation of CR are required.If you can accept that Marx's 'value' is an example of 'non-physical causal powers', then the explanation about CR might be easier to understand and agree with.If one holds to 'materialism' or physicalism, and the suggestion that anything about 'ideas' is 'idealism', then most of what CR holds will be rejected, out of hand, as 'idealism'.

[LBird]

I have to presume that you're taking the piss, now, Vin.The alternatives are too depressing to even contemplate, never mind mention.Anyone else wish to discuss some basics of Critical Realism, that I outlined earlier?

[Author]

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