[LBird]

ALB wrote:

Actually, I've no objection to DJP's schema as one possibily, even probably, useful way of understanding the passing world of phenomena. What we are arguing about is not the content of the theory (and of theories in general) but their status: are they uncovering "the Truth" and representing the world as it "really is" or are they simply useful ways of describing and understanding the world? You're the one that has described the schema, mentioned by DJP, as purporting to represent "the Truth", not him.

So, you're arguing that DJP shares your 'method', and can similarly 'not object' to a schema that maintains that 'the physical can supervene on the ideal'?I thought that DJP was arguing the opposite, that 'the ideal supervenes on the physical'.Plus, you've returned to a dichotomous model of 'either Truth or Description'. That is, 'objective' or 'subjective'. We've done all this last year, with my discussion based on Schaff. We contine to go in circles.As to 'what I'm arguing', perhaps it might be worth actually reading what I write, as opposed to guessing 'what I'm trying to argue'.I'm not an instrumentalist (and neither was Marx), I'm a realist (and so too, I'd argue, was Marx). Why you keep going over old ground baffles me.Next, you'll return to the accusation that I'm an idealist, who ignores the real world, no matter how many times I stress 'theory and practice'.

ALB wrote:

Actually, Dewey seems to have been an interesting person.

Yes, he was. I bought that book we talked about last year, during our previous discussions: George Novack's Pragmatism versus Marxism: An appraisal of John Dewey's philosophy.Given the amount of books I've bought and read on this subject in the last twelve months, at least I'm learning something from this process. I'm actually more convinced than when I started here, about my ideological positions on 'science'.

[LBird]

YMS wrote:

But then if everything is ideology, then it becomes a banal observation, and it becomes the eternal truth. Why should one ideology matetr any more than any other?

Yeah, I see your point, YMS.Why bother if the ruling ideology is Fascism or Stalinism, or democratic socialism, because 'why should one ideology matter any more than another?'.

YMS wrote:

I'd suggest, in socialism, we wouldn't call these things ideology, just points of view.

So, a Mengele will be able to vivisect pregnant women?I suspect, like ALB, you simply want 'science' to be non-ideological.We're back to:YMS is scientificMengele is ideological…

[LBird]

Young Master Smeet wrote:

In common parlance, ideology is one of those irregular verbs: I am scientific, you are mistaken, he/she/it is an ideologue. of course, ideology 101 tells us that precisely is ideology in action.

You make the same point I've been making, YMS, and the same one Marx and Einstein were making.The correct conjugation is, of course:I am ideologicalYou are ideologicalHe/she/it is ideologicalWe are ideologicalYou(se) are ideologicalThey are ideological

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

LBird wrote:

What about the 'physical' that 'supervenes' upon 'ideas'?

There is no physical that supervenes on ideas, that is not what supervenience means.Third time lucky…. The upper levels supervene on the lower..

LBird wrote:

Humans 'create' their world of knowledge, understanding and explanation, of production, distribution and consumption, much of which is not 'physical' in any meaningful sense, and much of which is the product of 'ideas', rather than the 'physical', so why the emphasis upon the 'physical'?

There is no particular "emphasis on the physical". It depends on what level of explanation is relevant to what you want to explain..

Having now reached the point where ALB seems to agree with me, Marx and Dietzgen that ideas and physical have the same ontological status, we can see that DJP's schema, which insists that ideas 'supervene' on the physical, is an ideological choice.DJP's schema can be reduced to one where the arrow between two boxes points 'one-way' (boxes named 'ideas' and 'physical'), with the arrow pointing to the 'physical' box.The schema employed, on the contrary, by us three, and perhaps now ALB, has 'two-way' arrows between those boxes.DJP's constant posting of 'third' time, 'fourth' time, 'fifth' time of posting, shows that whereas we're reading his posts and criticising his model from another perspective, he isn't actually reading the posts written by both me and ALB.DJP think his 'model' is The Truth, and the only Truth, and won't tell us which ideology stresses this model. He thinks that anyone who disagrees with, and thus ignores, his model, is 'not reading' his posts.If any other readers agree with DJP's model, that's fine, but admit to yourselves that you are making an ideological choice of models, and it's a choice at odds with mine and Marx's.Nature is not telling anyone DJP's model. It's a human construct, and to choose to follow it is a human choice.Plus, it's a conservative choice, of a model that stresses fixity, hierarchy and is ahistorical and asocial,The model described by Dietzgen, of the equivalence of 'ideas' and 'physical', is by contrast dynamic, democratic, social and historical.Change and critical thinking is at its heart, driven by humans.

[LBird]

ALB wrote:

LBird wrote:

But 'instrumentalism' is individualist and inductive (ie. individual practice leading to theory). Marx is 'social' and stresses 'theory and practice' (ie. social theory leading to practice). So, Marx is not an instrumentalist.

But why is instrumentalism necessarily "individualist"? (Apart, that is, from you calling any view that differs from yours "individualist"). Why does the usefulness of a theory have to be judged by its usefulness to an individual rather than to society (all individuals) or even to a class? Maybe Marx could be described as a "social" instrumentalist?

I thought that you knew the ideological background to instrumentalism, ALB.It's the liberal Dewey and US individualism. It's the polar opposite of Marx's method, of 'theory and practice'. Your suggested method of 'social instrumentalism' is meaningless, because 'instrumentalism' is based on 'individual practice which pretends society does not exist'.You still seem to think that some form of 'scientific method' is non-ideological, and are desperately searching for it.

[LBird]

ALB wrote:

Of course some physical phenomena can be usefully described as being the product of the non-physical. What do things that human civilisation and culture are if not the outcome of purposeful, i.e idea-driven, human activity?

[my bold]But this is not what DJP argues.That's why I'm asking if you differ in your ideological views.

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

I don't think current usage agrees with the above.

Why won't you reveal the ideological basis to 'current usage'?'Current usage' seems like a synonym for the dominant 'ruling class ideas'

[LBird]

ALB wrote:

Am I an "instrumentalist"? Sounds as if I might be. My position is set out in this article.Was Marx an "instrumentalist"? I don't know but you are the one who is always quoting  the part of his Theses on Feuerbach where he emphasises that the "truth" of thinking has to be shown by practice:

Quote:

The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth — i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice.

So, if he wasn't a "pragmatist" or an "instrumentalist" he was at least a "practicist". I can't see what he has in common with Bashkar's "critical realism".I notice that you are less keen on quoting other parts where he describes himself as a "materialist":

Quote:

IX. The highest point reached by contemplative materialism, that is, materialism which does not comprehend sensuousness as practical activity, is the contemplation of single individuals and of civil society.X. The standpoint of the old materialism is civil society; the standpoint of the new is human society or social humanity.XI. Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.

Marx describes himself as a "new materialiost" to distionguish his view from that of the sort of materialists you are criticising. But he still called himself a "materialist". Another reason why Sayers's definition is not helpful.

But 'instrumentalism' is individualist and inductive (ie. individual practice leading to theory). Marx is 'social' and stresses 'theory and practice' (ie. social theory leading to practice). So, Marx is not an instrumentalist.The other parts that you seem to think that I'm "less keen on quoting" will do just nicely, because they actually reject 'instrumentalism'. Thanks, ALB, for making my point.On the 'Marx calling himself a materialist' point, I've covered this now what seems like dozens of times, so I won't repeat myself, yet again.

[LBird]

ALB wrote:

Sayers wrote:

According to materialism, everything that exists or happens is ultimately material or physical.

That's just the opinion/definition of one writer (who is opposed to "materialism?). I don't think this does help as it is not drawing any distinction between the "material" and the "physical" whereas Dietzgen, for instance, who described himself as a materialist, held that ideas were also part of "matter". As he put it:

Quote:

The distinguishing mark between the mechanical materialists of the 18th century and the Social-Democratic materialists trained in German idealism consists in that that the latter have extended the former’s narrow conception of matter as consisting exclusively of the Tangible to all phenomena that occur in the world.

Quote:

In the endless Universe matter in the sense of old and antiquated materialists, that is, of tangible matter, does not possess the slightest preferential right to be more substantial, i.e. more immediate, more distinct and more certain than any other phenomena of nature.

He also described himself as a "monist" as he held that only the universe existed and that the physical and non-physical parts into which humans divided it had the same status as part of the universe. This might be a better term to start from, to prevent you criticising a straw man of your creation.

[my bold]So, then, according to this statement, the 'non-physical' can 'supervene' on the 'physical' (DJP's position) but also (because they have 'the same status') it must mean that the 'physical' can 'supervene' on the 'non-physical'.Thus, if you agree with Dietzgen's statement, as you say you do, you must disagree with DJP's position.Am I correct is regarding you and DJP as holding different ideological views on this issue? Up until now, because you keep referencing DJP's posts and stances, it has seemed that you follow DJP uncritically.

[LBird]

I'm unsure of the meaning of your post, ALB.Are you saying your position is 'instrumentalism'?My position isn't, and I don't think Marx's was. I think he was closer to what we'd now call 'Critical Realism'.Could you clarify this, please?

[LBird]

Regarding the 'physicalism' and 'materialism' that DJP refers to, here is a link to an article which might inform our discussion about the meaning of 'physicalism'.http://www.academia.edu/3035461/MAKING_ROOM_FOR_THE_MENTAL

Sayers wrote:

According to materialism, everything that exists or happens is ultimately material or physical. Insome form or other, this philosophy is a fundamental component of modern thought. For, withthe development of modern science, it has become increasingly clear that natural phenomena canbe described and understood in materialistic terms, without recourse to the notions of a divinecreator or an immaterial human mind.However, the general philosophical outlook of materialism can take different forms. In particular,materialism is often put forward as a mechanistic and reductionist philosophy. In the eighteenth century, materialism of this sort was called `mechanical' materialism; nowadays it goes under the title of `physicalism'. Quite standardly, it is treated as if it were the only form of materialism.

[my bold]

[LBird]

ALB wrote:

I do note, though, that in saying that "reality" existed prior to humans, you are conceding DJP's point that the physical part of reality existed before the ideas part.

I'm not 'conceding DJP's point'.'Reality' existed prior to humans, but the 'idea' of it being 'physical' is a human idea.This is part of the problem. DJP's ideology insists that the 'physical' is 'being', whereas it's part of 'human knowledge', as are 'ideas'. After all, is the 'space' between 'electrons and protons' physical in any meaningful sense?To insist that the 'physical' is the 'real', the 'basis' of reality, like DJP's post's diagram showed, is an ideological position, not something that 'reality' told us (or DJP, or told the thinkers he gets his ideas from).

ALB wrote:

And your oft-repeated contention that it was once "reality" that the Sun went round the Earth.

This is not what I keep saying. I keep saying it was 'the truth' that the sun went round the earth, not 'reality'. No-one 'knows' reality in itself. If they claim to 'know reality in itself', why don't these people tell us the 'method' that they use, to get to this truth? They don't, because they can't. Science teaches us this.'Truth' is socially-produced, but your ideology tells you that 'truth' is the same as 'reality'. That's why you interchange the words 'truth' and 'reality' and put words in my mouth, and can't understand my claim, because to your ideology it is meaningless to separate 'truth' from 'reality'.

ALB wrote:

As to Marx, he was clearly a "materialist" in the broad sense of holding that "reality" is external to humans and existed prior to them and also held that the human mind plays an active role in trying to understand "external reality" and does not simply reflect it as a "mechanical materialist" like Lenin did.

Yeah, 'external', 'prior', 'active role', 'understanding' and 'not a reflection'.So, how do you keep saying 'truth' is the same as 'reality'?Marx's method allows us to understand the history of 'truth', and its social origins.But if 'truth' is 'reality', it can only happen once. Thus, one falls into 'discovery science', of uncovering The Truth, the reality of reality, of being, final, absolute, mirror-like knowledge of reality.As I keep asking, if DJP has a method that tells us his schema of placing the 'physical' at the bottom is true, why not tell us it?Or did 'reality' tell him? Or is it 'just obvious', to any 'individual'?Critical Realists have no problem whatsoever in saying that 'structures, components, emergent properties and causal mechanisms' are human ideas, which attempt to make sense of our experience of 'reality'.We don't claim that 'reality' told us this, as DJP must claim for his schema.Because, once he admits it's a human schema, not a reflection of reality, he's plunged into the world of 'human ideology', which is precisely where we are, since Einstein. This is the 'scientific truth' that Rovelli identifies.And behind all this discussion, is the need for the maintenance of 'authority' in human affairs, a non-democratic authority because it is based upon 'physical truth', and thus can't be argued with.Surely the political consequences of this way of thinking is obvious to all Communists?

[LBird]

ALB and DJP, I'm trying to explain our differences.I think you want to know what 'reality' really 'is'.Whereas I (and Marx) want to know what 'humans think reality is'.Or, you're interested in 'reality' outside of any human input; whereas I (and Marx) are interested in 'reality' in its interaction with humans.

Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, 2, wrote:

The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth — i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htmTrying to get to the truth of 'reality' (what 'is') outside of human theory and practice upon that reality, is, to Marx, 'a purely scholastic question'.Perhaps another way of putting it, is that you're interested in 'ontology' ('being') rather than 'epistemology' ('knowledge').19th century Positivism thought it was revealing 'being' with its 'neutral' method.We now know that science is concerned with human understanding, rather than the 'Truth' of 'stuff'.'Knowledge' is always human, rather than 'objective' (that is, the truth about stuff itself).

[LBird]

ALB wrote:

I don't know if this is your position but you seem to be saying that all "reality" is psycho-physical or something along those lines.

I still can't believe, after 12 months and numerous statements to the opposite, that you think I'm arguing that 'all reality is psycho-physical'. I've constantly said 'reality' is external to humans, and existed prior to humans.The only way I can make sense of your continuing belief in that as 'what I'm saying' is your own ideological blinkers.

ALB wrote:

I don't know because you haven't yet defined what you mean by "reality". But from what you have said so far I'm not sure that the "realism" of "critical realism" is the correct word since, as DJP has been pointing out, traditionally in philosophy "realist" theories argue that knowledge is a "true" picture/description of "reality", a position you've been vehementally opposing all along.

I have said what CR means by reality: components, structures, emergent properties, causal mechanisms. I spent a whole long post explaining this, and no-one engaged with my post (as opposed to laughing at Bhaskar).You really must stop taking DJP's opinions as gospel, and start trying to ask yourself: "what ideology is DJP espousing, as compared to the ideology that LBird is espousing?". This will allow you, perhaps, to identify your ideology. If you agree with DJP, that's fine, but then you don't agree with me (or, I'd argue, Marx).

ALB wrote:

But we'll see when you get round to saying what "critical realism" means by "reality". All we've had so far is a mention of some mysterious "non-phyiscal causal powers".

Yes, to a certain ideological perspective in science, Marx's concept of 'value' is merely "some mysterious non-physical causal power", which can't be 'touched', and requires one to embrace a 'theory' to understand it.Once more, I think that you and DJP want to be 'at one with reality'; in other words, you're searching for The Truth of 'what's real'. On the contrary, Marx was engaged in a search to 'understand' reality.But 'understanding' is human (and thus social and historical) and so is not a 'copy' of 'reality'.I think you want to have a final Truth about what is 'real'. That's positivism, not Marxism.

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

There is no physical that supervenes on ideas, that is not what supervenience means.

Yes, if the ideological definition of 'supervenience' is 'ideas on physical', then of course there isn't.But this is what I've been trying to explain about 'ideology' and 'meaning'.The point is, there is another ideology that does not accept the ideological belief that supervenience means ideas on physical.If that's your ideology, why not accept it and say so?And say that you reject 'Critical Realism'?It's pointless pretending that your ideology is 'objective', and claiming Marx's isn't.Humans are ideological. We have to deal with this knowledge produced by science.

[Author]

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