DJP
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LBird wrote:I take it Vin now accepts that he's not a 'materialist'? Or a 'physicalist'?
LOL. It's you that should accept that you are an adherent of (non-reductive) physicalism.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy wrote:Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical. The thesis is usually intended as a metaphysical thesis, parallel to the thesis attributed to the ancient Greek philosopher Thales, that everything is water, or the idealism of the 18th Century philosopher Berkeley, that everything is mental. The general idea is that the nature of the actual world (i.e. the universe and everything in it) conforms to a certain condition, the condition of being physical. Of course, physicalists don't deny that the world might contain many items that at first glance don't seem physical — items of a biological, or psychological, or moral, or social nature. But they insist nevertheless that at the end of the day such items are either physical or supervene on the physical.http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/Perhaps now we should talk about monism
LBird wrote:I'm afraid it's the 'materialists' who think 'theory is idealist', DJP!Surreal stuff.Materialism is just the assumuption that all things (including the mental and therefore theory) are physical stuff or supervene on physical stuff in some way.
LBird wrote:You haven't got the hang of Marx's critical realism, yet, have you? His 'idealism-materialism'.There can be no such the as 'idealism-materialism' any more than there can be round squares.Critical realism is a physicalist theory as your said it takes minds as supervening on brains.
LBird Why on earth do you think theory is idealist? Do you think the mental floats about in a different realm to the physical world?Unless you believe in some kind of spirit world or think that everything is in the mind you will be a physicalist or materialist (which is pretty much the same thing)http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/
Yes but to say minds supervene on or emerge from brains doesn't answer the question of how that can be so. What is it about a particular configuration of physical stuff that enables it to be a mind?All aproaches in philosophy of mind have problems and like I said I am holding off making a judgement for the time being. But my preference is to try to go for an explanation that does not involve the kind of property dualism that emergence seems to entail. All that you are doing is pushing the problem one step back rather than explaining it.Emergence seems to work very well when describing the structure of concepts and properties created by minds but not so well as an explanation of how minds can be in the first place…
LBird wrote:Simply, the 'mind' is not the 'brain'. These are differing philosophical positions, DJP, between what we're saying.Yes that is correct. But mind is not independent of brain..However I don't think the case for socialism turns on this question so I'm leaving it for now.
LBird wrote:If one places the 'x' between the ears of the individual, one is 'fetishising' the 'relationship' which exists between the nearest ears of the two individuals.Clattrap. I'm really starting to think you're aff yer head.If I was to aim the cross hairs of my revolver firmly between your ears and pull the trigger your mind would cease to be.Simularly if I was to slip some LSD into your drink the only effect would be in your mind, not in the mind of any others near you.Your mind is firmly placed inside your skull.I think we should change the discussion now to angels and pinheads.
"Naturalism" is the view that most things can and are best described through the framework of the natural sciences. Therefore it is a physicalist position.I think you need to look at the broader literature rather than trying to do a micro-Marxologist job.
Young Master Smeet wrote:DJP wrote:But where then does this "real substance of social relations" exist?Everywhere, and, importantly, historically, during the process of creation: i.e. in the concrete social actions of sensuous human beings,
But what makes that "creating value" rather than people just doing stuff?It seems to me at some point you have to say that concepts are (socially produced) mental states.But mental states are not that easily reduced to physical states since "chocolate trombone" can could be realised via a presumably infinite combination of neural connections.n'est-ce pas?
Young Master Smeet wrote:The value is a substance, and definitely material. That is, not in human minds, not in the mind of God, but in the real substance of social relations.But where then does this "real substance of social relations" exist?
LBird wrote:Could you explain further what you mean, DJP? What are the 'problems of reductionism' to which you refer?And can you tell me which ideological approach you're using to understand these issues? For example, are you a reductionist or a critical realist, or something else?It would take too much of my time to write something myself but have a look at this:http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/#7To be honest I haven't really made my mind up about much of this. It doesn't seem that anyone has the answers yet.
Vin Maratty wrote:Marx refers to 'Value' as a relationship between people expressed as a relationship between things. The relationship is in all our heads and has a material existence within our grey matter.I'd agree. The fact that goods and objects appear as commodities and values is not due to any physical characteristic of the good or object itself. "Value" is not a physical property of objects but a social relationship that exists "in all our heads and has a material existence within our grey matter."As far as I know Marx was a monistic thinker and is not trying to claim that concepts and thoughts exist in some metaphysical realm (along with Plato's "forms" perhaps)
LBird wrote:Only if I was a reductionist, and reduced structures to their components. I'm not a reductionist, DJP.I think structures have emergent properties. I've been through this before, though, so I won't labour the point with you, now.OK that's all well and good. But, as far as theories of mind go, emergence and supervenience inherits rather than supersede the problems of reductionism.
alanjjohnstone wrote:Confirmation of the Labour Theory of Value?No I don't think so. In Marxian parlance new "value" is only created through the use of variable capital eg labour power.
LBird wrote:To hold that opinion, DJP, is fair enough. But it's an individualist explanation, and so is likely to be anathema to Communists.No it's a brief shorthand answer which you've read too much into.
LBird wrote:The opposite viewpoint, that the mind is social, suggests that the mind lies in relationships between 'brains'.That is "the concept 'ghost' or 'father christmas' are just the result of a certain configuration of relationships outside the brain"."Meaning aint all in the head", as Putman said and I agree. Read Wittgenstiens 'private language argument'. This is all pretty much mainstream stuff these days….I'd put it this way though "The meaning of words and concepts like 'ghost' or 'father christmas' are the result of certain relationships between brains"I don't see how meaning or concepts can exist outside brains.
LBird wrote:Whereas, I'd place a single 'x' between our two nearest ears, in the middle of the photo.Wouldn't that entail you having to explain how consciousness could exist free floating in space?
