Democracy, Tariffs, and the Limits of Institutional Correction

The recent judicial decision declaring presidential tariff measures unlawful has been interpreted by many as proof that the United States’ institutional system is functioning perfectly and that democracy ultimately corrects political excesses. However, a deeper economic analysis suggests something more complex.
The tariffs imposed during the Trump administration were justified as protecting national industry and restoring manufacturing employment. They targeted steel, aluminum, Chinese manufactured goods, and strategic imports under emergency or national-security arguments. Certain sectors — particularly domestic steel producers and some heavy industries — temporarily benefited from reduced foreign competition. Yet many other sectors paid the cost. U.S. farmers lost export markets after retaliatory tariffs, manufacturers dependent on imported components faced higher production costs, and consumers absorbed price increases through inflationary pressure.
Economic studies show that tariff escalation tends to reduce trade volumes and employment globally, with low-income and less-secure workers bearing the largest burden. In some cases, tariff conflicts contributed to job losses and export contraction rather than industrial revival.
The court ruling therefore does not represent a victory of one social class over another, nor a transition toward a different economic system. Rather, it reflects internal disputes within capitalism itself — between sectors favoring protectionism and those dependent on global supply chains and international markets.
Courts can limit executive authority, but they do not alter the underlying economic relations based on profit, competition, and wage labor. What appears as a constitutional correction is often a rebalancing between competing capitalist interests. Democracy, in this context, regulates how capitalism operates; it does not determine whether it operates.