March 2003, U.K. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
In a world divided up by private property where are the areas of conflict over apparently diminishing resources likely to be?<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n \n“\u2026war, organised war, is not a human instinct. It is a highly planned \nand co-operative form of theft. And that form of theft began ten \nthousand years ago when the harvesters of wheat accumulated a surplus, \nand the nomads rose out of the desert to rob them of what they \nthemselves could not provide.”\n(Jacob Bronowski: The Ascent of Man<\/em>. (1976) page 88.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n “The decision on whether and when to use force is therefore dictated \nfirst and foremost by our national interests. In those specific areas \nwhere our vital or survival interests are at stake, our use of force \nwill be decisive and, if necessary, unilateral.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (William J. Clinton,\nThe White House, February 1996)<\/p>\n\n\n\n During the Cold War between the two main competing capitalist \nalliances their supposed differences were articulated via their \nrespective ideologies. This period of heightened tension with the \noccasional outbreak of armed conflict sometimes carried out between \nproxies (as in the Third World wars of national liberation) centred \nmainly around geopolitical and strategic concerns. The end of this \nstruggle between contesting versions of how best to organise and run \ncapitalism has brought to the surface again the real underlying \nconflicts between states and their competing national concerns. The \nchief of these is access to and\/or control over the raw materials \nnecessary to the running of a modernised and industrialised economy, and\n of the military machine necessary to defend it. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Ever since it stepped onto the world stage as a major economic and \nmilitary power the USA’s foreign policy has swung between the two poles \nof intervention and isolation. Strong political voices in the latter \nhalf of the 19th century pushed for open access to world markets for \nNorth Americ’s surplus agricultural produce. Other voices argued for a \npolicy of isolation from world affairs and a reliance on the abundant \nresources of the North American continent as a base on which to build a \nfully developed capitalist economy. These isolationist voices \npredominated in the inter-war years. <\/p>\n\n\n\n After 1945 the isolationists were less able to formulate a US foreign\n policy, which was subsequently framed so as to project US power onto \nthe world stage. Since 1986 each US president has to report to Congress \nthe \u201cNational Security Strategy\u201d his administration intends to pursue. \nUnderlying each report is the recognition of a necessity\u2014that US \ndiplomacy has to have as a backing the threat of armed force. And what \nforce! To assure its place in the world and if necessary impose its \npolitical will, the US carries the biggest big stick on the block. \nAccording to the US Center for Defence Information, at $396 billion the \nUS military budget for 2003 is more than six times that of Russia, the \nsecond largest spender. It is more than twenty-six times as large as the\n combined spending of the seven countries usually identified by the \nPentagon as their most likely adversaries, and thirty-nine times that of\n the so-called \u201crogue states\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The reconstruction of a war-torn Europe along lines of economic and \npolitical co-operation (the Marshal Plan, European Economic Community, \nEuropean Union etc.) was in large part an American design to ensure \naccess to stable markets and investment outlets. As Bill Clinton put it \nin his 1996 National Security Strategy report Engagement and Enlargement\n \u201cThe United States seeks to build on vibrant and open-market \neconomies.\u2026 To this end, we strongly support the process of European \nintegration embodied in the European Union and seek to deepen our \npartnership with the EU in support of our economic goals\u201d (emphasis \nadded). The lessons of the Marshall Plan were not lost on Clinton’s \ngovernment. Make-a-buck businessmen were assured that their \u201ctax \ndollars\u201d were not being frittered away overseas. United States strategy \nto help the countries of Central Europe construct new political \ninstitutions and build strong economies would make it \u201cmuch less likely \nthat Americans might have to fight another war on the battlegrounds of \nEurope. By supporting democratic reform and the transition to free \nmarkets in the new independent states of the former Soviet Union and in \nCentral Europe, our strategy promoted stability and prosperity in an \narea that will become a vast market for the United States\u2026\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n The United States had been able to fight both World Wars relying on \noil from the American Southwest, Mexico and Venezuela. But analysts \nbelieved these supplies to be insufficient for the future. Thus was \nformed the long-standing US-Saudi arrangement of military protection \n(including internal \u201csecurity\u201d whereby a democracy propped up an \nautocracy) in exchange for access to oil. The undertaking culminated in \nPresident Jimmy Carter’s \u201cdoctrine\u201d regarding the Persian Gulf region \noutlined in his January 1980 State of the Union Address. This stated \nthat any move by a hostile power to gain control there would be regarded\n \u201c\u2026as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America\u201d\n which would be resisted \u201c\u2026by any means necessary, including military \nforce.\u201d (Walter LaFeber: The American Age: U.S. Foreign Policy . . . \nsince 1750 [1989] p.665.) Parity with the Soviet Union was abandoned. \nFrom then on the policy was to be that \u201cthe United States will remain \nthe strongest of all nations.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n\n At the end of the decade the White House policy remained equally \nbelligerent. A recently declassified document illustrates the line to be\n taken to protect American interests:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cAccess to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states \nin the area are vital to U.S. national security. The United States \nremains committed to defend its vital interests in the region, if \nnecessary and appropriate through the use of U.S. military force, \nagainst the Soviet Union or any other regional power with interests \ninimical to our own\u201d (National Security Directive 26 U.S. Policy Toward \nthe Persian Gulf. – Dated October 2, 1989).<\/p>\n\n\n\n The exercise of American power always has as part of its ideology a \nstated concern for democracy. But it should not be thought that fine \nPresidential words demonstrate a principled commitment to liberal \ndemocracy at all times and everywhere. Such claims are always modified \nby other pressing considerations. To quote Clinton again:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe core of our strategy is to help democracy and free-markets \nexpand and survive in other places where we have the strongest security \nconcerns and where we can make the greatest difference. This is not a \ndemocratic crusade; it is a pragmatic commitment to see freedom take \nhold where that will help us most.\u201d (Emphasis added).\n Engagement and Enlargement<\/em> [1996].<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is a position which has been pursued ever since by both \nDemocratic and Republican administrations, involving the imposition of \nthe interests of American capital on the world \u2013 for its own good. The \nPentagon’s February 1992 draft Defense Planning Guidance for fiscal \nyears 1994-99 called for a concerted US effort to preserve its \nsole-superpower status into the foreseeable future. \u201cOur first \nobjective,\u201d it said \u201cis to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, \neither on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that \nposes a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union.\u201d\n (Quoted by Michael Klare: ‘Endless Military Superiority’ The Nation, 15\n July, 2002). American strategy, it said, should now refocus on \nprecluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor. Even\n though \u201cCommunism\u201d had been out-spent in the arms race and was \ndecidedly beaten there was no time to sit back, relax, and spend the \n\u201cpeace dividend\u201d on socially useful pursuits. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Openly relegated to the back seat, where in fact they had always \nbeen, America’s NATO allies have had no option but to go along with the \nnew pro-active \u201cdefensive attack\u201d policy of George W. Bush. It should be\n noted that this shift, from a threat-based strategy to a \ncapabilities-based approach, concentrates not on what actually was a \nthreat. Instead it is one of preparing to meet what could ever \nconceivably be a threat to US vital interests. One respected academic \nand Cold War historian has called this <\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c\u2026the most sweeping shift in U.S. grand strategy since the beginning \nof the Cold War. [one in which] Pre-emption in turn requires \nhegemony\u2026When there’s only one superpower, there’s no point for anyone \nelse to try to compete\u2026International conflict shifts to trade \nrivalries\u2026\u201d ( John Lewis Gaddis:\nA grand Strategy of Transformation<\/em>, Foreign Policy,<\/em> November\/December 2002). <\/p>\n\n\n\n Eager to go along playing second fiddle with this approach is Foreign Secretary Jack Straw. He told a recent conference for British diplomats what he considered to be the leadership role the UK should be offering in the world. He highlighted the \u201cgrowth in support for militant groups promoting a form of Islam\u201d but assured the gathering that \u201cwhen it comes to the common rights of all peoples there is no ‘clash of civilisations’.\u201d But terrorist groups and authoritarian states \u201care not about to resign themselves to the superiority of liberal democracy\u201d and Britain and her allies were still in need of armed force to meet the post-Cold War challenges his Department had identified. These included uncontrolled migration and extremism in the Islamic world. Among the priorities identified were the need to \u201cpromote UK economic interests in\u2026the world economy\u201d and \u201cto bolster the security of British and global energy supplies.\u201d (Speech: Strategic Priorities for British Foreign Policy<\/em>. Press release at http\/\/:www.fco.gov.uk<\/a> 6 January, 2003).<\/p>\n\n\n\n During the long post-war boom years the American economy expanded at \nan unprecedented rate of 3 to 4 per cent per year (representing a \ndoubling every twenty years). As a result levels of economically \nexploitable raw materials appeared to be in danger of falling behind \nperceived requirements. Concern was expressed at the rate at which raw \nmaterials were being consumed and of the adequacy of the resource base \nwithin the US to support continued expansion. Thirty-five years ago a \nmember of the independent Carnegie Institute reported that: <\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe aggregate use of domestic resources is well above even the \naccelerated exploitation during the Second World War [and that] growth \nin the value of the national consumption of resources\u2026has outpaced the \ngrowth in value of domestic resource output for many years. As a result,\n the United States has been moving toward an increasingly marked net \nimport position with respect to many resources, particularly mineral \nresources\u201d (Donald J. Patton:\n The United States and World Resources<\/em> [1968] p.121 Emphasis in the original).<\/p>\n\n\n\n These necessary raw materials often lie in contested areas of the \nglobe or in areas which are politically unstable. Ensuring continuity of\n access to and the economic supply of these raw materials present \npoliticians and policy makers with endless problems. Whereas in the Cold\n War era divisions were created and alliances formed along ideological \nlines it is economic competition which now openly drives international \nrelations and competition over access to vital eco will have severe \neconomic consequences and importing countries consider the protection of\n this flow to be a significant national concern. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The most crucial of these raw materials is oil. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The United States depends on oil for more than 40 percent of its \nprimary energy needs. Roughly half of those oil needs are met by \nimports, a large share of which come from the Persian Gulf area. Over \nthe longer term, the United States’ dependence on access to foreign oil \nsources will be increasingly important as indegenous resources are \ndepleted. The US economy has grown roughly 75 percent since the first \noil shock in 1973 yet during that time US oil production has declined. \nMichael Klare, Professor of Peace and World Security Studies at \nHampshire College Amherst, Boston, quotes the\nU.S. National Security Council in their 1999 report to the White House \nthus:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe US will continue to have a vital interest in ensuring access to \nforeign oil supplies . . . We must continue to be mindful of the need \nfor regional stability and security in key producing areas to ensure our\n access to, and the free flow of, these resources.\u201d\n(The New Geography of Conflict<\/em>, Foreign Affairs. June, 2001)<\/p>\n\n\n\n He also points out that Russia is placing greater foreign policy \nemphasis on the emerging energy producing areas of Central Asia, the \nCaspian Sea, and the Caucasus, areas in which other industrially \nadvanced states have shown an interest. The Chinese military have \nshifted its emphasis from the northern border with the former Soviet \nUnion to Xinjiang province in the west which is a potential source of \noil but has a majority Turkic population some of whom have pretensions \nto independence from Beijing. China has also moved the East and South \nChina Seas, an area in which Japan has recently beefed up it defences. <\/p>\n\n\n\n World demand for oil is increasing rapidly and newly industrialising \ncounties such as Brazil, Malaysia, Thailand and Turkey are expected to \ndouble or triple their energy consumption over the next twenty years. \nThey join a world still in a state of multi-polar flux contesting for \nresources. Pressure on oil resources is likely to prove \u201cespecially \nsevere\u201d. US Department of Energy estimates show a rise in global oil \nconsumption from the current 77 million barrels per day to 110 million \nbpd in 2020, an increase of 40 percent. The world will consume \napproximately 670 billion barrels of oil between now and 2020. This is \nthe equivalent to two-thirds of known reserves. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Future foreign policy decisions regarding oil supplies will undoubtedly be informed by the views of the oil industry itself. Predictions made at an international conference on world oil depletion forecasts held at Uppsala university in May last year should hav peak and although at present far from exhausted oil production would in the future go into decline. Europe’s indigenous North Sea supply for example is set to decline by six per cent a year and will be halved in ten years. All the major frontier regions for conventional oil and gas, apart from the poles, have been explored, and the super-giant and giant fields are dying off. Non-conventional oil resources (e.g. tar sands) are vastly more costly to develop, which makes the remaining relatively easier to develop Iraq fields so much more attractive. Contributing to the proceedings A. M. Samsam Bakhtiari declared that \u201cone can envision a global oil crunch at the horizon\u2014most probably within the present decade\u2026.technical evidence gives a clear picture of depletion\u201d (Abstracts at www.hubbertpeak.com accessed on 6 October, 2002).<\/p>\n\n\n\n In a world divided up by private property where are the areas of \nconflict over apparently diminishing resources likely to be? As far as \noil and gas are concerned Klare identifies them as being the Persian \nGulf, the Caspian Sea basin, the South China Sea, Indonesia, Nigeria and\n Venezuela. He also includes tanker and pipeline routes passing through \nor near to areas of political\/military instability such as Armenia, \nAzerbaijan and Georgia. With the largest economy supporting the largest \nmilitary the United States is clearly prepared to meet any contestants \nfor access to the resources its economy requires.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Back to the Politics Index<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n