1. Is Globalisation avoidable?<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n 2. Keynesianism<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n 3. The ‘East Asian Model’<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n 4. Regulation of the world financial system<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n 5. Trade Zones and Regulations<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n 6. Conclusion<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n <\/p>\n The real impact of this ‘globalisation’ does, of course, extend well beyond The anti-free trade lobby are right to point to the conflict between the In reality, globalisation… represents the final triumph of capital over So what is the alternative to ‘globalisation’? For the World Socialist <\/p>\n <\/p>\n The Keynesian proposed route to economic development is closely tied to Arthur McKewan, in his book Neo-Liberalism and Democracy, <\/i>discusses difficulties appear most clearly with policies directed towards the One form of Keynesian argument that has often been used against the policies This crude form of under-consumptionism has been criticised by David Perrin aggregate demand is not ……. solely determined by the consumption of Indeed, for growth to be achieved over anything approaching the medium term, <\/p>\n <\/p>\n Another anti-globalisation proposal advocates a more protectionist strategy Martin & Schumann describe the policy of the Asian tigers as The Japanese model for economic development saw it make a rapid transition In the post-Second World War era, the Japanese government rejected free trade Japanese policies were to bear an important influence upon the surrounding Malaysia was another country to follow the Japanese lead, as Bello explains:<\/p>\n Malaysia is one of the few Third World countries that escaped stabilization While the ‘Asian’ type of development is proposed as an alternative to the Evidence from Auty.<\/i><\/p>\n Initially, it was through the processing and export of Much of the resource exploitation was carried out by foreign companies, and These Asian economies were able to benefit from trade and the arrival of In response to this suggestion it firstly needs to be noted that many Two examples that Harris explores in depth are the large Latin American Still, an emphasis upon exports did not prove to be necessary during the Brazil increased its gross national product on average by 6.3 per cent It was a similar story in Mexico:<\/p>\n Mexico experienced two decades of annual growth of 6-7 per cent 6 per cent in During the 1970s problems hit both states, as the global economy slowed With regard to Latin America then, it is unfounded to argue that the problems In any case, Harris points Another oversight of those who propose that, within recent years, the South The world of the 1980s is qualitatively different from that of the 1930s. The A protectionist strategy carries fewer benefits in a more integrated global In 1989 Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, were removed from the General Many sectors of the East Asian economies were effected by unilateral U.S. U.S.A. tactics in this trade dispute show a state that was not simply Aggressive trade tactics directed at all comers gave the ‘free-market’ To summarise, although protection of certain industries was an important <\/p>\n <\/p>\n Another suggested way of countering the effects of globalisation is through In a world where the daily turnover of foreign exchange transactions is of Some economists have sought a way of restricting the number of financial if just one major financial centre were free of the tax, the currency trade Not only would there be difficulties in implementing the Tobin tax on a Another suggestion has been made by George Soros – who, ironically, gained Yet the difficulties inherent in achieving financial regulation at the global <\/p>\n <\/p>\n Environmentalists often argue for a ‘fairer’ system of world trade in which Others, such as James Goldsmith (well known businessman, self-styled Trading regions would enter into mutually beneficial bilateral agreements “(To) gain access to our markets,” he continues, “foreign The presentation of this ‘model’ of regional trading areas raises two Even if Goldsmith’s proposals were somehow accepted on a world basis, there <\/p>\n <\/p>\n This brings us to the fundamental problem for all of the proposals that seek The vested interests of the capitalist class in general have consistently It should be acknowledged that it is the economic interests of certain lobby groups such as the Global Coalition, which was set up by a PR firm, While protectionism may suit the interests of certain sections of the The policy of structural adjustment was similarly unavoidable once the South Structural adjustment is clearly more than just the policy choice of certain Author: DG<\/p>\n Sources<\/b><\/p>\n <\/p>\n<\/li>\n See also: No Logo<\/a> a review of Naomi Klein’s
\n<\/a>1. Is Globalisation avoidable?<\/span><\/h3>\n
the negative or positive impact on economic growth. Growth statistics are of no
direct benefit to the working class. Neither can economic growth be the holy
grail that it is so often assumed to be when it is achieved at the expense of
environmental destruction and neglect of the needs of a large proportion of the
global population. (Who Owns the World?<\/a>) (Environment
section<\/a>.)<\/p>\n
drive towards free trade and other environmental and social needs. After all, if
the purpose of free trade is to increase profits, such a conclusion is quite
predictable. As Larry Elliott put it, writing in The Guardian<\/i>:<\/p>\n\n
labour, since the corollary of the deregulation of finance is the shackling of
trade unions . It means the national governments are left powerless in the
face of multinationals who will relocate at the first whiff of interventionist
policies.(9)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
Movement, socialism is the only solution to the problems brought about by
globalisation. (What Socialism Means).<\/u> That socialism is the only
solution becomes even clearer after examining the proposals for combatting the
effect of globalisation within capitalism.<\/p>\n<\/a>2. Keynesianism<\/span><\/h3>\n
Keynes\u2019 suggested approach to alleviating the booms and slumps of capitalism.
(See Booms and Slumps – What Causes Them? <\/u>for a critique of the Keynesian
view of economic crisis.) Economic slowdown, according to this school of
economic thought, is the result of a lack of demand for the goods that are being
produced. The Keynesian approach involves government intervention in the economy
to try and stimulate demand where possible.<\/p>\n
this Keynesian approach. Two proposed Keynesian methods for stimulating demand
that he considers, include lower interest rates or increased government
expenditure, although he can see problems with both:<\/p>\n
management of aggregate demand: attempts, for example, to stimulate economic
expansion in a country through lower interest rates may drive capital abroad in
search of higher returns; attempts to stimulate through expansion of the
government deficit may raise imports, diverting some of the impact outside the
country.(13; p68)<\/p>\n
of the World Bank\/ I.M.F is known as the under-consumptionist argument. This
brand of Keynesianism is<\/i> proposed by McKewan. He argues that the
inequality resulting from lower welfare payments and higher unemployment, as
well as the undermining of domestic industries, is inherently damaging to
prospects for economic growth. Given that the rich save a higher proportion of
their income, he argues, demand for consumption goods will be lower than if
national income were distributed more evenly. Lower demand, he continues, means
lower potential for economic growth.<\/p>\n
who points out that demand does not solely consist of demand for consumption
goods by individuals to satisfy their direct personal needs. He writes:<\/p>\n
workers and the capitalists, but by their consumption plus the investment of
capitalists.”(p89; 23)<\/p>\n
the right conditions for investment by capitalists, as well as consumption by
workers needs to be ensured. This leaves little scope for governments to
increase the tax burden, as would be required by McEwan’s redistributive policy.
Once many countries of the South had accumulated the large scale of debt built
up during the 1970s, such a policy would in fact have been completely
impossible, in any case.<\/p>\n<\/a>3. The ‘East Asian Model’<\/span><\/h3>\n
for states of the South. It has been widely argued that the protectionist
strategy adopted by East Asian economies such as Japan, South Korea, Thailand
and Malaysia was an important contributory factor in their huge success during
the 1980s and early 1990s. It was this success that led them to become known as
the ‘Asian Tigers.\u2019 The countries of the Asia-Pacific region, for example,
(Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore) registered an average GDP growth
7 per cent a year (1960-82.)<\/p>\n
“Massive state intervention at every level of economic activity.”
“For them,” he continues, “integration into the world market is
not the end but only a means that they use cautiously and after careful
consideration.”(12; p143)<\/p>\n
from an agricultural into an industrial society, by policies described by
McKewan:<\/p>\n
and extensive foreign investment, and instead promoted its national firms. In
the 1950s, for example, the government protected the country’s fledgling auto
firms from foreign competition. At first, quotas limited imports to $500,000 a
year, and then in the 1960s quotas were replaced by prohibitively high tariffs.
Furthermore, foreign investment in Japan was virtually prohibited; allowed only
in so far as it contributed to the development of the domestic industry.
Japanese companies were encouraged to import foreign technology but they were
required to produce 90 per cent of parts domestically within five years. Success
was also obtained through protecting the Japanese computer industry. In the
early 1990s, as the industry was developing, a foreign machine could bepurchased
only if a suitable Japanese model was not available. I.B.M. (a large, western
computing firm) was allowed to produce within the country, but only when it
licensed basic patents to Japanese firms (and I.B.M. computers produced in Japan
we covered by the restrictions on purchases of foreign machines)(13; p38)<\/p>\n
East Asian countries that followed in the footsteps of Japan. Korea, for
example, closely followed the Japanese precedent, experiencing an
“extremely rapid growth rate over an extended period an average over 9 per
cent per year in the growth of real per capita income between 1965 and
1995.” McKewan explains, “its role in world markets of such goods as
automobiles and electronic equipment attest to a considerable degree of economic
success. A heavy state role in regulating the country’s international commerce,
which led to a rapid transformation of technology, appears to have been a
fundamental part of this success.”(13; p38)<\/p>\n
or structural adjustment by either the World Bank or the I.M.F. in the 1980s. In
fact, it continued to maintain a protectionist trade regime, practised
state-guided industrial targetting in key sectors such as the car industry and
imposed strong controls on the operations of foreign investors. But Malaysia is
now experiencing a 10 per cent growth rate, a development which is largely a
result of the inflow of Japanese capital during the 1980s. Some U.S.$2.2 billion
flowed in between 1985 and 1990, or over $100 per citizen of Malaysia.(10; p34)<\/p>\n
‘free trade’ model, it should be remembered that much of the East Asian growth
was fuelled by exports. <\/p>\n
natural resources such as sugar, milling, coconut oil and tin that growth was
achieved. As Yoshihara Kunion points out in her study of South East Asia:<\/p>\n
the royalties they paid to South-East Asian governments funded industrial
projects and fuelled economic growth.(15; p119)<\/p>\n
foreign capital whilst still imposing some regulation to protect their domestic
industries. The assumption of those who advocate this more protectionist route
to industrialisation for the South is that such a strategy could also have been
adopted by other developing countries in Africa and Latin America.<\/p>\n
countries in Africa and Latin America did<\/i> adopt protectionist policies
during the post-war years. Nigel Harris, in his book \u2018The End of the Third
World\u2019 refers to this strategy as one of \u2018import-substitution,\u2019 involving
as it does the use of protectionist measures to encourage the development of
domestic industries to produce for domestic needs and so reducing dependence
upon imports. He shows that, given the history of industrialising states
(including Britain and the U.S.A.) using import substitution strategies to
foster growth of their manufacturing industries, this was an obvious route for
states of the South to choose to take if they were to achieve a similar kind of
development.<\/p>\n
economies of Brazil and Mexico. He shows that both of these states adopted
strategies that leant more<\/i> towards import substitution than those of the
Asian countries. The exports of Brazil and Mexico peaked in 1980, as compared to
the previous thirty years, when they were 9.6 and 8.2% respectively. This
compares starkly to the figures of \u201c32, 47, 72 and 162 per cent for South
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore\u201d (18; p71.)<\/p>\n
postwar period from the1940s until the early 1970s. Harris highlights the rapid
growth rates achieved by Brazil:<\/p>\n
annually from 1932 to 1979 roughly 7 per cent between 1948 and 1961, and from
1974 to the eighties, with an 11 per cent rate from 1968 to 1974.(18; p72.)<\/p>\n
the fifties, nearly 8 in the sixties, 6-7 in the first half of the seventies,
and 8 per cent from 1977 to 1981.(18; p72.)<\/p>\n
down. Harris shows that Brazil and Mexico were did not significantly alter their
import substitution strategies in the face of declining demand for the goods
produced by their heavy industries. These heavy industries continued to be
heavily subsidised, not least due to an extensive network of vested interests
that were tied into the long established policy. States such as Korea and
Taiwan had also subsidised certain heavy industries which they saw as key to
developing diverse national economies. By contrast, as Harris points out, they
were able to respond much more quickly to the world slump of the 1970s and
reverse this policy. This, he argues, was an important factor in their being
able to avoid the extent of public sector debt that was to plague Mexico and
Brazil during the 1980s which stemmed from their persistence with subsidising
unprofitable industries during the difficult period of the mid-1970s.<\/p>\n
in achieving development that they experienced were due to an absence of
protectionism. Harris shows that, in fact, their policies were less geared
towards exports than those of the Asian countries. Richard Auty in Patterns
of Development <\/i>supports this, showing that the more export-orientated nature
of the economic policy of the Asian countries was a key factor in their success.
Some trade protection was given to these industries initially but not to such an
extent as they became uncompetitive, as was the case in Latin America.(30)<\/p>\n
out, the strategy of import substitution would not have been viable at all in
the many smaller economies of the South (including many African countries),
which were unable to produce the full range of the goods they needed due to their
size. African countries tended to specialise in agricultural production. A
renowned thesis of the development economist Raul Prebisch has shown that, from
the 1930s, a generally large worldwide supply of agricultural products led to
much less favourable terms of trade for producers than those enjoyed within the
manufacturing sector. These circumstances led to difficulties for the countries
of the South. The Asian economies were able to achieve a shift away from
agriculture and towards manufacturing which was an important factor in their
success. Whilst the reasons for this sustained success, driven by their exports,
would require an entirely separate study to be identified, it is clear that they
were not simply an absence of protectionism.<\/p>\n
could have better achieved development through protectionist strategies is the
difference that they miss between the world economy of the 1980s onwards and
that of the 1930s. As Harris puts it:<\/p>\n
division of labour between manufacturing centres and primary-commodity-producing
peripheries, as well as the political sway of multinational empires, enforced
measures of economic isolation on the great economic blocs the dollar, franc,
sterling, mark and yen areas – and particular countries. Today, these simple
divisions have disappeared. The impact of slump has been not to recreate the old
empires, nor regional trading blocks, but rather to increase the integration of
a multitude of independent powers. It is this emergence of a new set of
geographical relationships underlying a new world system of production that has
left the old import-substitution strategy on one side.(18; p130)<\/p>\n
economy, and provokes retaliation from economic rivals. The trade barriers
imposed by the Asian economies did not go unnoticed by the U.S.A. in the 1980s.
In 1988, the U.S. Treasury accused Taiwan and Korea of manipulating their
exchange rates to gain ‘unfair competitive advantage’ in international trade.
This drew a response from the Korean government who had to force an appreciation
of the Korean won. Between 1986 and 1989, the won appreciated by more than 40
per cent and Korean exporters suffered as a result.<\/p>\n
System of Preferences (G.S.P.), which, as Bello explains “extends
preferential tariff treatment to imports from Third World countries in order to
assist their development.” (10; p75) In the U.S.-Korea Super 301 Agreement
of May 1989 Korea agreed to add to the sectors of the economy that were open to
investment and to simplify the procedures for foreign investors.<\/p>\n
decisions to alter trade rules. South Korean agriculture, for example, suffered
due to the flood of U.S. exports, as had numerous other countries in Latin
America and Africa previously. The effect on the South Korean economy as a whole
was, in fact evident in the wiping out of it’s trade surplus with the United
States. The surplus of U.S.$9.5 billion in 1987 turned into a deficit of $335
million by 1991.(10; p80)<\/p>\n
‘upholding the principles of free trade,’ as it’s leaders would like to claim.
Bello writes:<\/p>\n
administrations of Ronald Reagan and George Bush the distinction of being the
most protectionist since the days of Herbert Hoover.(10; p85)<\/p>\n
factor in the remarkable growth rates achieved in East Asia, export-orientated
production should not be overlooked as a key factor in this success. Critics of
globalisation often call for protectionism, ignoring that this can jeopardise
exports. The potential for retaliation to protectionism is shown in the case of
the U.S.A.’s actions in the trade disputes with Japan and Korea. There is
particular dependence upon trade agreements among smaller developing countries,
where self sufficiency is an unrealistic goal. Even in the larger economies of
Brazil and Mexico, the lure of achieving self-sufficiency proved to be their
undoing in the late 1970s when East Asian economies who adapted most effectively
to changing conditions by moving away from protectionism. In so far as certain
East Asian economies still persisted with some level of protectionism, we have
seen that the U.S.A. countered these policies during the 1980s, being fully
prepared to exercise its power through a trade offensive, as the world\u2019s
largest economic power. The success of the East Asian economies was itself
heavily dented by the economic slump that it suffered during the mid 1990s
(Boom goes bust in Asia.<\/a>) As Harris points out, the changing economic
conditions that, have further diminished the potential effectiveness of
protectionism. All of these factors mean that the so-called \u2018Asian model\u2019
should not be viewed as a panacea offering poor countries of the South a
straightforward alternative to the free trade\/ S.A.P. policies they have been
forced to accept.<\/p>\n<\/a>4. Regulation of the world financial system<\/span><\/h3>\n
some kind of regulation of the world financial system. The suggested forms of
regulation are not forwarded as complete solutions to the vast range of problems
arising from global capitalism but are viewed by some economists as a means of
gaining a degree of control over the world economy.<\/p>\n
the order of $1 trillion a day of which only l5 per cent corresponds to actual
commodity trade and capital flows (10; p20), it is not surprising that people
point to the financial system as a cause of instability. The vast majority of
financial transactions in shares, currencies or any financial commodity do not
usually reflect the true value in the real economy that they seek to represent.
See the article (Boom Goes Bust in Asia) for an explanation of this point. A
large proportion of the excessive number of financial transactions are trades in
derivatives which are predictions about the future trends of financial
commodities and therefore more likely to be even more of a distortion of values
within the real economy.<\/p>\n
transactions within the global economy. Fewer financial transactions, it is
suggested, would mean less volatility in the price of financial commodities. One
idea is that of the ‘Tobin tax’ – a one percent levy on all foreign currency
transactions – put forward by the American economist and Nobel prizewinner James
Tobin. As Martin & Schuman acknowledge (in spite of themselves being in
favour of the tax), there would be difficulties in implementing such a policy on
a global basis:<\/p>\n
would gravitate there. And even if the G7 countries all introduced a Tobin tax,
the financial sector could formally switch its business to offshore branches
from the Cayman Islands to Singapore and so undermine the intended restricting
effect. Failure is therefore ‘programmed into’ such a tax on currency
transactions, an economist at the Deutsche Bank cheerfully predicts.(12; p83)<\/p>\n
global level but it is questionable whether such a tax would provide the kind of
stability that is assumed by economists such as Tobin. Price volatility for
financial commodities is symptomatic of the unplanned nature of production
within capitalism rather than simply the volume of transactions in financial
commodities (see Boom and slumps – What causes them?<\/a> and A capitalist criticises
capitalism.)<\/a><\/p>\n
fame through his widely publicised, speculative financial dealings.
(see A capitalist criticises capitalism.<\/a>) He, as well as other writers, have
suggested that the creditors involved in I.M.F. loans should be more liable if
their investment fails. He suggests that if the banks who lent money to
countries to support their drive towards export-orientated production should had
had more at stake themselves, the scale of their loans (and hence current third
world debt) would have been lower. What has happened instead, he points out, is
that I.M.F. packages have bailed out creditors and so encouraged \u201cirresponsible\u201d
levels of lending.<\/p>\n
level, as pointed out above with regard to the proposed Tobin tax, would also
apply to this policy. Soros’ suggestion would certainly need to be implemented
right across the banking system if it were to succeed – it would otherwise
simply mean that developing countries requiring credit would just have to search
a bit harder for it.<\/p>\n<\/a>5. Trade Zones and Regulations<\/span><\/h3>\n
other environmental and social needs are accounted for. For example, L.Wallach
refers to the ‘Group of 250’ non-governmental organisations who wrote a letter
to the U.S. government. They called for sanctions to ensure compliance with
regulations, funding for their enforcement, taxes and duties on environmentally
damaging practices and so on. In other words, they expect that the goal of
increasing profitability can be compromised.<\/p>\n
environmentalist and leading light in the British ‘Referendum Party’
prior to his death in 1999) have called for a still greater compromise. He
advocated that those areas “with economies which are reasonably similar in
terms of development and wage structures” should each form trading regions
with little or no imports or exports of goods between them. He suggested that:<\/p>\n\n
with other regions in the world. Freedom to transfer technology and capital
would be maintained. (However)… commercial organisations wishing to sell
their products in any particular region would have to produce locally,
importing capital and technology, and creating local employment and
development. That is the way to create prosperity and stability in the
developing world without destroying our own.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
corporations would have to build factories, employ our people and contribute to
our economies.”<\/p>\n
questions. First, how could it be brought about? Second, how could it be
maintained? The protectionist measures that Goldsmith called for each region to
enforce would hinder the ability of successful companies to export their goods.
This, in turn, erodes their profits especially since such companies operate on
an increasingly transnational basis. What would possibly make them agree to such
measures? Indeed, the huge influence they currently have upon world trade
negotiations suggests that the proposals would never be implemented for this
reason alone.<\/p>\n
would be a continuous incentive for producers and governments alike to break the
rules. If overseas producers offer goods to a region at a lower price than their
own equivalent, how could a government stop such goods being purchased on the
black economy? The difficulty of establishing restrictions on ozone depleting
chemicals has proved to be a case in point (Ozone
depletion) <ozone.htm><\/span><\/u>. A black market in CFCs has developed,
in spite of many large multinationals now investing in alternative, less
damaging chemicals. In contrast, Goldsmith’s system would lack any such vested
interest to back it. It seems that it would only take one company to infringe
Goldsmith’s rules before the rest also reverted to the task of maximising
profits, through operating on a global basis.<\/p>\n<\/a>6. Conclusion<\/span><\/h3>\n
a solution to the problems brought about by globalisation within capitalism.
Given the globalised nature of the economic system that they seek to hold in
check, such solutions must be implemented at the international level. Yet
proposed global reforms of capitalism overlook the built-in conflict of
interests within the system, both between the capitalist class minority and the
working class majority and within the different sections of the capitalist class
itself. As described in sections 2 and 3 of this study on trade and structural
adjustment, the prominence of the sectional interests of the
capitalist class of the industrial states of the North has been crucial in
shaping the kind of globalisation that has led to so much outrage amongst
protestors. These interests have pushed the globalised economy towards trade
liberalisation since World War II (though this trend has been interrupted by
reversions to protectionism, most significantly during the 1980s). These
interests have also pushed for huge cuts in state expenditure and economic
intervention in the South, when faced with a danger of these states being
unable to meet their debt repayments. These interests (or, perhaps, the
interests of another section of the capitalist class) could puncture any
agreement to regulate the market for social ends. More likely, they will
punctuate any attempt to reach such an agreement in the first place.<\/p>\n
undermined progress in the attempts of the United Nations to initiate
international environmental agreements (see Environment section.) As it happens,
there is little political will to achieve some kind of modification of the
global market, even when compared to the small amount of hope among some
politicians to make progrees on global environmental issues. The imperative for
politicians is, rather, to push for trade agreements that best represent the
interests of capitalism within the state they represent.<\/p>\n
sections of the global capitalist class that brought about the rise of free
trade since the war. The pressure on (not to mention involvement in) various
political processes by transnational corporations demonstrates this. The power
of lobby groups representing industrial interests in the U.S.A. over government
is well documented. Douthewaite, for example writes:<\/p>\n
Burson-Marsteller, and which represents the American Forest & Paper
Association, the American Petroleum Institute, Texaco, Chevron, Chrysler, the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Exxon, General Motors, Ford and more than forty other
corporations and trade associations are a formidable force.. Lobbyists spent
millions of dollars in the run-up to Kyoto (the summit on global warming) on
advertisements saying that the treaty would mean a ’50 per cent per gallon
gasoline tax’ and higher prices on food and clothing, claims which could well be
right.(14; p216)<\/p>\n
capitalist class at certain times, there is a general need among all capitalists
across the globe to avoid such regulation on their business of profit-making
that has given rise to free trade agreements such as G.A.T.T. This is why the
agreement came about and has expanded in scope.<\/p>\n
had taken out loans during the 1970s. An illustration of this inevitability is
provided by Bello. What he describes as “the dismantling of the economic
role of the state” has, he continues, “taken place under leaders as
politically diverse as the Peronist Carlos Menem in Argentina, the social
democrat Michael Maniey in Jamaica, the socialist Jerry Rawlings in Ghana, the
Nasserite Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, and the technocrat Carlos Salinas de Gortari
in Mexico.” (10; p70)<\/p>\n
individual staff at the I.M.F. Equally, the G.A.T.T. agreements were more than
just the policy choices of the particular politicians who held power at the
time. Economic pressure within capitalism gave rise to these agreements and
institutions. The absence of an I.M.F. would have meant less assurance of debt
being repaid which could have led to the states of the North resorting to
military force to preserve their interests. The absence of a G.A.T.T. agreement
would make a more protectionist world more likely. Given that states use
protectionism to serve their own interests rather than for the moral imperative
urged by the anti-globalisation lobby, there would be no clear benefit to be
gained from a more protectionist world economy. The problems of capitalism such
as poverty and alienation would still be present (as indeed they were in the
pre-war years when protectionism was the norm.) In any case, the globalised
economy was an inevitable outcome of the need for capitalism to expand profits
and cannot be simply reversed through reforms of capitalism. Globalisation must
be understood as a product of the global division of ownership – a division that
must strive to perpetuate itself as long as capitalism exists.<\/p>\n\n
Jeffrey Sachs & Andrew Warner, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,
1995.<\/li>\n
R.Nader<\/li>\n
der Mensbrugghe<\/li>\n
of the Uruguay Round – The Guardian<\/i> 27\/5\/96.<\/li>\n
Walden Bello (Pluto Press 1999)<\/li>\n
World Network 1997)<\/li>\n
Impoverished the Many and Endangered the Planet<\/i> – Richard Douthewaite
(2nd edition, Green Books 1999)<\/li>\n
University Press; 1988) – Yoshihara Kunio.<\/li>\n
Harper & Row 1987.)<\/li>\n
be abolished<\/i> (Resistance Books, 2000)<\/li>\n
Britain’s Oldest Socialist Party – <\/i>David A. Perrin (Bridge Books 2000)<\/li>\n
Richard M. Auty, (Edward Arnold 1995). <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
\n
critique of global capitalism<\/p>\n
\n