{"id":460,"date":"2019-01-21T16:01:50","date_gmt":"2019-01-21T16:01:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/wsm.prolerat.org\/?page_id=460"},"modified":"2019-01-21T16:01:50","modified_gmt":"2019-01-21T16:01:50","slug":"co-operation-makes-sense","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.worldsocialism.org\/wsm\/co-operation-makes-sense\/","title":{"rendered":"Co-operation makes sense"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

This article has been reproduced from the Socialist Standard<\/em> (November 1986),\n\nthe monthly journal of The Socialist Party of Great Britain <\/p>\n\n\n\n

For ease of viewing with most web browsers, the British pound sterling symbol has been\n\nchanged to the “$” symbol. The sense of the original article is not changed. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n

By the title of his book, it seems that, for Dawkins, it was a foregone conclusion that\n\nnatural selection would tend to favour, above all, behaviour that was nasty and ruthlessly\n\ncompetitive. As he says himself: <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The selfish gene view follows logically from the accepted assumptions of neo-Darwinism.\n\n It is easy to misunderstand but, once understood, it is hard to doubt its fundamental\n\n truth. Most of the organisms that have ever lived failed to become ancestors We that exist\n\n are, without exception, descended from that minority within every earlier generation that\n\n were successful in becoming ancestors. Since all we animals inherit our genes from\n\n ancestors rather than from non-ancestors, we tend to possess the qualities that make for\n\n success in becoming an ancestor rather than the qualities that make for failure.\n\n Successful qualities are such things as fleetness of foot, sharpness of eye, perfection of\n\n camouflage, and – there seems no getting away from it – ruthless selfishness. Nice guys\n\n don’t become ancestors. Therefore living organisms don’t inherit the qualities of nice\n\n guys (The Listener<\/em>, 17 April 1986). <\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Yet Dawkins is at pains to disassociate himself from the rather pessimistic\n\nimplications of such views for society. Interestingly, in the Horizon programme on\n\ntelevision (on which the above article is based) called Nice Guys Finish First he related\n\nhow, after the publication of his book, he was wooed by various people of right wing\n\npersuasion who saw his book as a vindication of their belief in a system of cut-throat\n\ncompetition. Conversely, he found himself under attack from the left, one critic going so\n\nfar as to suggest that the impact of The Selfish Gene<\/em> was partly to blame for the\n\nsubsequent election of the Thatcher government. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

But Dawkins insists that both sides had misunderstood the point he was trying to make.\n\nParadoxically, the pursuit of self interest is not necessarily incompatible with being\n\n“nice” – that is, co-operative. This is what is confusingly referred to in\n\nsocio-biological circles as “reciprocal altruism”. Since altruism implies the\n\ngenuinely intended sacrifice of one’s interests, it is difficult to see how this fits in\n\nwith the idea conveyed by the term “reciprocal altruism”, that if you scratch my\n\nback I will scratch yours and both will benefit as a result. It would be more accurate to\n\ncall this “enlightened self interest” no “sacrifice” is involved. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nevertheless, to show how this might operate, Dawkins refers to game theory – in\n\nparticular a game called The Prisoner’s Dilemma: <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the simplest version of this game, two players have each to choose between two\n\n moves, Co-operate and Defect (hereafter C and D). Unlike in chess or ping pong, the\n\n players don’t move alternately but simultaneously, in ignorance of the other’s\n\n simultaneous move. If you and I both play C we get more (say $3) than if we both play D\n\n (say $2). If one of us plays C and simultaneously the other plays D, the D player gets the\n\n highest possible score (say $4) and the C player gets the “sucker’s payoff” (say\n\n $1). So, from my point of view, the best outcome is that I play D and you play C. But if I\n\n calculate this, and play D accordingly, you are just as capable of working out the same\n\n thing and playing D yourself In this case we both only get the low payoff. If only we’d\n\n both played C, we’d both have got the comparatively high payoff of $3. But, if I work this\n\n out and play C you do even better if you choose D. Therefore, rational players will always\n\n play D and will always obtain the low payoff of $2. But – here is the paradox and\n\n maddening dilemma – each rational player simultaneously knows that, if only he and his\n\n opponent could somehow manage to enter into a binding contract to play C, both would do\n\n better (ibid).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Here Dawkins provides an example of how this situation could arise in real life. Take a\n\ngroup of friends who like to eat out at a restaurant and split the cost of the meal\n\nequally between them. There will always be the temptation for any one of them to order a\n\nlittle more than the others, knowing that the extra cost will be equally shared.\n\nConversely, any one of them will realise that if they do not order as much as the others\n\nthey will be subsidising their friends. Therefore, there will be a built-in tendency for\n\neach of them to order as much as they can get away with. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The worst that can happen in such a situation is that some of them will benefit at the\n\nexpense of the others and perhaps as a consequence they will fall out with each other.\n\nCome what may, there will be both winners and losers. But it is possible to imagine a\n\nsituation – even to point to real life examples such as the destruction of the herring\n\nindustry through over-fishing in the early part of this century – in which this same\n\ncompetitive logic can result in everyone losing out. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In such a situation, no-one actually intends that as a consequence of each of them\n\ncompeting against one another they should eventually all lose out. Yet they are obliged,\n\neven in full knowledge of the fate that could await them, to continue with the very\n\nactions that will make that fate a reality. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This situation has been described by the American biologist, Garrett Hardin, as the\n\nTragedy of the Commons (Science<\/em> vol 162, 13 December 1968). As he puts it: <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all. It is\n\n to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the\n\n commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because\n\n tribal wars, poaching and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the\n\n carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the\n\n day when the long desired goal of social stability becomes a reality At this point, the\n\n inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy. <\/p>

As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximise his gain. Explicitly or\n\n implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks “What is the utility to me<\/em> of\n\n adding one more animal to my herd?” This utility has one negative and one positive\n\n component. <\/p>

1. The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since the\n\n herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive\n\n utility is nearly +1. <\/p>

2. The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one\n\n more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen,\n\n the negative utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is only a fraction of -1.\n\n <\/p>

Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that\n\n the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And\n\n another; and another … But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational\n\n herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that\n\n compels him to increase his herd without limit – in a world that is limited. Ruin is the\n\n destination towards which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society\n\n that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in the commons bring ruin to all. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Hardin’s solution to this tragedy of the commons is “mutual coercion”. An\n\nappeal to conscience, he argues, is altogether futile. Mutual coercion can be effected\n\nthrough, as it were, enclosing the commons and instituting a system of private property\n\nwhich will enforce a sense of responsibility among herdsmen as to the appropriate number\n\nof cattle their land can provide for without resulting in overgrazing. Since they cannot\n\nencroach on land owned by other herdsmen, the consequences of keeping too many cattle will\n\nbe exclusively borne by them. This knowledge will therefore deter them from acting\n\nirresponsibly in the first place. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The problem here is that Hardin has quite obviously got hold of the wrong end of the\n\nstick. It is not the “inherent logic of the commons” which “remorselessly\n\ngenerates tragedy”. The “commons” simply provides the setting in which this\n\ntragedy is played out. It does not embody the cause of the tragedy itself – that is, the\n\novergrazing of the land by too many cattle. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

That cause lies elsewhere, in the dynamism of competition which compels each herdsman\n\nto increase his herd beyond the carrying capacity of the land since his own livelihood is\n\ndirectly dependent on the number of cattle at his disposal. Had the cattle, like the land,\n\nbeen the communal possession of the herdsmen then it would have been possible to make a\n\nrational decision about the total number of cattle. In that case, the livelihood of each\n\nherdsman would be directly dependent on their collective wellbeing, which in turn would\n\nrest on securing an optimum ratio of cattle to land. As it was, each was obliged to make\n\nwhat was the only rational decision open to him within an irrational framework of\n\ndecision-making, with inevitably tragic consequences. So much for the view expounded by\n\nAdam Smith in The Wealth of Nations<\/em> that the individual who “intends only his\n\nown gain” is “led by an invisible hand to promote the public interest”. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

“In a reverse way”, argues Hardin, “the tragedy of the commons\n\nre-appears in problems of pollution. Here it is not a question of taking something out of\n\nthe commons but of putting something in”. Just as in the case of the herdsman, a\n\nfactory owner will be “locked into a system” that will ensure that the commons\n\nare treated as a convenient cesspool for the disposal of waste products. The owner will\n\nsee that it will pay to avoid the costs of purifying the pollutants by simply dumping them\n\nin the environment because the saving this represents far exceeds the environmental cost\n\nthe factory may have to bear though others bear it as well. Rational self interest will\n\ntherefore demand pollution. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Following Hardin’s suggestion let us assume that the commons have been enclosed. In\n\ntheory, this would mean that anyone could prevent their neighbour from polluting their\n\nland just as the herdsmen could prevent their neighbour’s cattle from straying onto their\n\nland. Anyone who chose not to purify their pollutants would be obliged to contain them\n\nwithin their own property and bear the total costs such pollution entailed. But what\n\nsounds fine in theory will prove quite unworkable in practice since what we mean by the\n\n“commons” embraces not just the land but the air and water surrounding us.\n\nThese, as Hardin concedes, “cannot readily be fenced”. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

A simple example will make this clearer. Suppose my neighbour decided to build a\n\nfactory alongside a stream into which were pumped the factory’s effluents. Suppose I\n\ndelighted in fishing but now with all the fish killed I could no longer pursue my\n\ninterest. What could I then do? I could of course purchase the right of ownership of that\n\nsection of the stream that flowed past my back door but my neighbour, upstream of me,\n\ncould do the same and argue plausibly for the right to use that section of the stream as\n\nthey chose. Of course, the consequence of my neighbour’s decision to site a factory on\n\ntheir property need not be confined to this. Its visual impact on the neighbourhood could\n\ndepress the price of residential properties all around. The constant noise might disturb\n\nmy sleep. The lorries carrying the raw materials it processed may congest the roads making\n\ncommuting to work a hazardous slog. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

If I were to grant my neighbour the absolute right to dispose of their property as they\n\nchose, it would be inconsistent of me to complain of the consequences. If, on the other\n\nhand, I sought to restrict the ways in which my neighbour could use their property then I\n\nwould be asserting the need to retain the “commons” as an entity in one or other\n\nrespect – the tranquility of the neighbourhood or the right to fish in an unpolluted\n\nstream. We cannot live in a cocoon. Even capitalism itself, the most competitive and\n\natomistic form of society that has ever evolved, cannot afford not to make some concession\n\nto this stark fact. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

We see this in the way conventional thinking approaches the problem of pollution.\n\nHardin himself points out that while (according to him), “our particular concept of\n\nprivate property deters us from exhausting the positive resources of the earth” it\n\nactually “favours pollution”. The solution which he and many others suggest is\n\nthe direct intervention of the state in the form of legislation to temper the excesses of\n\ncompetition committed by private citizens. “Mutual coercion”, apparently, will\n\nnot suffice. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The weaknesses in this approach are twofold. It does not strike at the root cause of\n\nthe problem – at the competitive advantage to be gained by minimising costs – in this\n\ncase, the costs of purifying and disposing of pollutants in an ecologically acceptable\n\nmanner – incurred by capitalist enterprises. It blandly assumes that the state is a more\n\nor less autonomous institution which presides over society and legislates in the interests\n\nof the whole community. But in fact the state is a class institution, financed through\n\ntaxation by the very enterprises whose activities it seeks to regulate. Legislation is a\n\nmatter of finely balancing the losses and gains that accrue to the capitalists themselves.\n\nToo lenient an approach might be politically unacceptable and excessively ruinous to the\n\nhealth of the workers who create the profits for the businesses that employ them. Too\n\npunitive an approach, on the other hand, can erode profit margins and drive investment\n\ninto other parts of the world where regulations are more lax. And all the time, the\n\ndividing line between what is acceptable and what is not shifts as the economic climate\n\nitself changes the more desperate the plight of business, the more lenient does the law\n\nbecome. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This brings us back to Richard Dawkins. What does he think is the way forward?\n\nPolitical scientists tend to see so much of life as a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Many would argue\n\nthat we therefore need to have some authority to take more of the decisions out of our\n\nhands rather like the way the state supposedly denies the option to a capitalist\n\nenterprise to release its toxic wastes into the environment by declaring this illegal. But\n\nas we have seen things don’t happen that way. The state, too, is enmeshed in the\n\nirrational framework that is capitalist competition. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dawkins would set rather more store by the Law of the Jungle than the Law of the State\n\nas a model for encouraging co-operative behaviour. Suggesting that we have a lot to learn\n\nfrom the animal world around us, he gives the example of gulls which need to groom\n\nthemselves in order to remove parasitic ticks. The difficulty arises in grooming their\n\nheads; which requires the co-operation of another gull. Gulls that cheated on other gulls\n\nwould soon drive the suckers into extinction. But cheats themselves would eventually\n\nfollow the suckers since there would be no gulls left willing to groom them. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

What are the implications of this for society? Dawkins argues that we saw evidence of a\n\ntit-for-tat strategy developing in the trenches of the First World War. Soldiers would\n\ndeliberately fire above the heads of their “enemies” to signal their desire to\n\ncooperate in minimising the mutual damage they could inflict upon one another. Their\n\nalleged enemies would respond in kind. Such was the extent to which the “disease of\n\npeace” took hold that after two years of this, the generals were eventually forced to\n\ncompletely re-write their battle plans turning instead to surprise tactics which served to\n\ndestroy the unspoken trust that had been built up on both sides. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Though the insights that game theory has to offer are valuable, their possible\n\napplication in the sort of society we have today – as the above example makes clear – is\n\nlimited. We live in a world in which the means of living are monopolised by a small\n\nminority. Just as the hierarchical structure of an army invests a general with the power\n\nto command his troops so capitalist society itself can only ever be run in the interests\n\nof that capitalist minority. But the great majority of the population, the working people,\n\nwhose interests are constantly thwarted by the dictates of capital, cannot do much to\n\nredress the balance within a social system which requires that we remain compelled to\n\nprostitute our working abilities for capitalist exploitation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Real co-operation can only flourish on the foundations of social equality. Until then,\n\nfor the great majority at least, we remain suckers with good reason to bear a grudge. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Author: R. Cox <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

Please email your comments about this article to feedback@worldsocialism.org<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

To the ‘Dream On’ Index<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

Back to the World Socialist Movement home page<\/a> <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

This article has been reproduced from the Socialist Standard (November 1986), the monthly journal of The Socialist Party of Great Britain For ease of viewing with most web browsers, the British pound sterling symbol has been changed to the “$” symbol. The sense of the original article is not changed. By the title of his…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"magazine_newspaper_sidebar_layout":"","footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-460","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.worldsocialism.org\/wsm\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/460","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.worldsocialism.org\/wsm\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.worldsocialism.org\/wsm\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.worldsocialism.org\/wsm\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.worldsocialism.org\/wsm\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=460"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.worldsocialism.org\/wsm\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/460\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.worldsocialism.org\/wsm\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=460"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}