Why
they dropped the bombs
Last
month saw the 60th anniversary of the dropping of atomic
bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The media
mostly contented itself with repeating the myth that this was the
lesser evil to continuing the war by conventional means. In a
two-part article Richard Headicar uncovers the real reason for the
bombings: to test the destructive power of a new weapon for use in
future wars.
Continued from page
10. Link back to 10 
Were
they military targets?
“The
world will note that the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima,
a military base. That was because we wished in the first instance to
avoid, in so far as possible, the killing of civilians”. President
Harry S. Truman (9 August 1945).
All
of the cities on the target list (like most reasonably sized cities
in time of war) were of some military significance. Five of them,
with the agreement of the Air Force, were to be spared any further
aerial bombardment from May 1945 onwards. These were Hiroshima,
Kyoto, Yokohama, Kokura Arsenal and Niigata. On the express orders of
the Secretary of War, Stimson, Kyoto –
considered to be the cultural centre of Japan and a beautiful city
that Stimson had once visited – was
removed from the list and Nagasaki took its place. The truth is, of
course, that the US Air Force could have destroyed any military
target that it chose to. Japanese air defences were practically
non-existent and of Japan’s sixty-six largest cities, fifty-nine
had been destroyed; the seven remaining partly so. By the summer of
1945 only two cities with populations exceeding a quarter of a
million had not been assailed by incendiary raids.
Since
Hiroshima was designated as a major port and home of Regional Army
Headquarters and the northern sectors of Nagasaki contained the
Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works, why did they remain largely
untouched (Hiroshima hardly damaged at all and Nagasaki comparatively
unscathed)? The answer is provided by the proposals of the Target
Committee, 27 April 1945:
“To
enable us to assess accurately the effects of the bomb, the targets
should not have been previously damaged by air raids.”
Nagasaki
had been bombed to some extent but it was only a late addition to the
target list and was not first choice even on the day the bomb was
dropped on it – that had been Kokura
Arsenal.
Further
recommendations made by the committee were that “ . . . the first
target be of such size that the damage would be confined within it,
so that we could more definitely determine the power of the bomb”.
Then from a further meeting on 10 and 11 May came the clear (and
fortunately documented) instruction: “ . . . to neglect location of
industrial areas as pin point target . . . [and] . . . to endeavour
to place first gadget in center of selected city; that is, not to
allow for later 1 or 2 gadgets for complete destruction.”
To
erase any lingering doubts a subsequent Bombing Survey Report stated:
“Hiroshima and Nagasaki were chosen as targets because of their
concentration of activities and population”.
Was
it necessary to drop the bombs?
One
of the most commonly accepted beliefs is that, horrific though it
was, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki saved millions of lives –
Japanese as well as American – by
bringing about a swift end to the war and forestalling a bloody
invasion. We are reminded about the massive casualties already
suffered by both sides in the Pacific War. Particularly about the
fanatical defence by the Japanese of Iwo Jima, Luzon and Okinawa. But
although there were plans for an invasion they were contingency
plans.
The
first stage – “Olympic” –
was to land at the island of Kyushu on 1 November 1945. No assault on
the main island, Honshu, – “Coronet” – was scheduled until 1
March 1946. In
the light of what we now know, it seems doubtful that the need for
any kind of invasion would ever have arisen. Japan was certainly not
defenceless. It still had an army of more than two million troops,
many prepared to fight to the death for their Emperor. Also, as well
as conventional planes, there were thousands of kamikaze, mines,
beach fortifications, etc, and the remnants of the navy. Their
problem was one of deployment. But as the US Strategic Bombing Survey
concluded, less than a year after the bomb had been dropped:
“Certainly
before 31 December 1945 and in all probability before 1 November 1945,
Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bomb had not
been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no
invasion had been planned or contemplated.”
Some
historians argue that the bombs were unnecessary precisely because
Russia intended to enter the war, so the conclusion of the Strategic
Bombing Survey was all the more remarkable. Less so, however, when
the reality of the Japanese military situation is properly examined.
Their navy was virtually finished; their army was described by Hanson
W. Baldwin as consisting of “Green conscripts and second rate
troops”; communication lines were in disarray; fuel was in
extremely short supply; roads were in a poor state of repair;
transport and transportation could be bombed at will; ports were
becoming paralysed; food was scarce; illness through malnutrition was
an increasing problem and (not surprisingly) public morale was
diminishing by the day. In marked contrast to this, the US armed
might remained immensely powerful.
All
of this was known to the US administration and military and the
ludicrous estimates of projected invasion casualties –
ranging from “hundreds of thousands” to “millions” –
were post-war exaggerations designed to contribute to the successful
establishment of a public justification for the dropping of the
bombs. Major General Curtis E. LeMay expressed the truth quite
bluntly a few weeks after formal surrender of the Japanese Emperor.
“The atomic bomb,” he stated, “had nothing to do with the end
of the war”.
But
the reasons were not merely military ones.
(To
be concluded next month)
RICHARD
HEADICAR
A
list of the sources of the quotes in this article or further
information on particular points can be obtained on request to:
Socialist Standard, 52 Clapham High St, London SW4 7UN.
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