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Why
they dropped the bombs
Last
month saw the 60th anniversary of the dropping of atomic
bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The media
mostly contented itself with repeating the myth that this was the
lesser evil to continuing the war by conventional means.
In a
two-part article Richard Headicar uncovers the real reason for the
bombings: to test the destructive power of a new weapon
for use in
future wars.
A
common charge levelled at those who challenge the (still largely
believed) established myth concerning the dropping of the atomic
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is that they do so from the
comfortable perspective of hindsight. This view was most elegantly
formulated by Albert R. Hunt, writing in the Wall Street Journal
on 3 August 1995: “The critics view the situation through the prism
of today and side-step both how the situation looked to
decision-makers in 1945 and the political realities facing them”.
At
first glance a not unreasonable observation but one which, upon
closer examination, is revealed as somewhat disingenuous. Firstly,
because, given that such a vast amount of crucial and enlightening
information was for many years kept secret (much still is), anything
other than hindsight concerning many areas of knowledge would have
been pure speculation. Secondly, because there existed a number of
contemporary critics. Many of these were closely involved in the
production of the bomb, others from the military and some, even,
close to the president.
Before
proceeding to disentangle the web of lies and deception surrounding
this subject, it is important to emphasise that, whatever the reasons
for the decision to drop the bombs, it was a consequence of a brutal
and ruthless conflict between warring capitalist states. A British
First Sea Lord once put it: “Moderation in war is imbecility”.
Today there are few military ‘conventions’ and any that remain
are almost sure to be violated. Rest assured, had any one of the main
protagonists in the Second World War obtained an atomic bomb before
the United States, they would almost certainly have used it with a
similar alacrity and disdain for human life.
Who
took the decision to drop the bomb?
Although,
of course, it was President Harry Truman who had to give final
approval (British consent, a formality required by agreement, was
readily granted) he was the new boy on the block relying heavily on
his advisors. General Leslie Groves, director of the Manhattan
Project to manufacture the bomb, famously described Truman as “a
little boy on a toboggan”. Once the decision had been made to
produce the atomic bomb and the process of manufacturing it had
begun, it was always assumed by the military and politicians that it
would be used. In that sense no actual decision was ever a real
necessity.
Nevertheless,
formalities and procedures were prudently followed and, in order to
work out the practical details and make suitable recommendations,
various committees were established. The two most important of these
were the Interim Committee (political, plus a co-opted scientific
panel) and the Target Committee (military and scientific). General
Groves headed the Target Committee and although not a member of the
Interim Committee, was always present at its meetings. He was an
unswerving advocate for deployment of the bomb. As he bluntly
explained: “It would not have looked well if I had been appointed
to serve on a committee of civilians. But I was present at all
meetings and I always considered it my duty to recommend that the
bomb be dropped.”
The
chairman of the Interim Committee was the Secretary of War Henry L.
Stimson. On 3 May 1945, he proposed a further member who was to have
a most significant influence on events: James F. Byrne, soon to
become the Secretary of State to President Truman. His views on the
dropping of the bomb were as rampantly in favour of those of Groves
and together they formed the irresistible force that, more than any
other, led to the final cataclysmic devastation of those two unlucky
Japanese cities. As the physicist Arthur H. Compton put it: “The
Scientific Panel was not called to decide the question of whether the
bomb should be used, but only how it should be used . . . it . . .
seemed to be a forgone conclusion.”
Minutes
taken at the meeting of the Interim Committee on 1 June 1945
recorded:
“Mr
Byrnes recommended and the committee agreed, that . . . the bomb
should be used against Japan as soon as possible; that it be used on
a war plant surrounded by workers’ homes; and that it be used
without prior warning.”
On
25 July 1945 a directive approved by the Secretary of War, but which
had been previously composed by Groves, manifested US intentions and
confirmed previous assumptions in its first two sections:
“(1)
The 509 Composite Group, 20th Air Force will deliver its
first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing
after 3 August 1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura,
Niigata and Nagasaki . . .
“(2)
Additional bombs will be delivered on the above targets as soon as
made ready by the project staff . . . “
Whether
or not that directive constituted a decision and whether Stimson and
Truman or Byrnes and Groves bore most responsibility for it remains a
matter of some debate. The theory of the “forgone conclusion”
gains some credibility from the response given to Groves when, in
January 1945, he suggested to his immediate superior, Army Chief of
Staff General George Marshall, that detailed plans should be drawn up
for the employment of the bomb in war. He was told “see to it
yourself”.
Continued Page 11 
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