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Why
they dropped the bombs
Richard
Headicar concludes his analysis of the reasons why the US dropped
atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in
August 1945. Part One 
Why
they dropped the bombs
Understandably
Allied servicemen involved in the Pacific war, many of whom
experienced the unspeakable horrors of Japanese prisoner of war
camps, welcomed the atomic bombs as a “miracle of deliverance”.
With a few notable exceptions, even those historians who conclude
that dropping the bombs was not necessary to obtain Allied victory –
that it would not even have been necessary to invade \\Japan –
generally accept that using the bombs probably shortened the war.
Even if only by a few weeks. In the grim reality of war, the life of
a single comrade saved is worth a thousand enemy slain.
But
what would such men think if they knew that, far from shortening the
war, the atomic bombs actually prolonged it? That for all the
crocodile tears shed about the “terrible plight” of the captives;
for all hollow praise heaped upon the “heroic sacrifices” of the
armed forces they were, after all, merely expendable pawns in the
unrelenting hostilities of power politics? That “bringing our boys
back as soon as possible”, was not actually the first order of
business?
Did
the US want Russian intervention?
By
the time the atom bombs were dropped, Allied victory through
overwhelming military superiority was virtually assured. Also, at
Potsdam in July 1945, Stalin had confirmed his intention to enter the
war on 15 August. As President Truman, writing in his private
journal, noted at the time: “Fini Japs when that comes about”. In
fact Russia declared war on Japan on 8 August and the following day –
just hours later in Far East time – Russian troops attacked in
Manchuria and Korea. The rapidity with which they penetrated against
the cream of the Japanese army is convincing evidence for many
commentators that Japanese surrender would have swiftly followed.
Surely such a potentially decisive intervention would have been
welcomed by those pledged to “bringing our boys back as soon as
possible”? Surely every effort would have been made to encourage
the speediest possible participation of the Russian military as a
matter of utmost urgency? Not so!
The
attitude of the US policy makers regarding Russian intervention, even
though initially positive, was never entirely free from fear-fuelled
ambivalence. And, corresponding with increasingly encouraging reports
from the Manhattan project, that attitude eventually hardened to
become actively negative. Well-founded mutual suspicion governed
every move; trickery and deception concerning their respective
intentions was extensively employed by both sides. And, once again,
American Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, unashamedly declared
his hand. He thought that it would be “regrettable” if Russia
became involved in the war. He was desperately worried that if Stalin
knew about the awesome power of the atomic bomb (he did) he might
“immediately enter the war”. So Byrnes sought to delay Russian
entry. That his attempts were unsuccessful is largely irrelevant and
hardly the point, which is that the US leaders did not want
Russian intervention. Firstly, because they were intent on using
their atomic bombs before the war in the Pacific ended and, secondly,
they were reluctant to share their prospective economic and political
influence in the Far East with anyone else, friend or foe.
Although
Stalin had no qualms about rescinding the Neutrality Pact with Japan,
the likelihood of Russia entering the Pacific War any earlier than it
did, even had it been urged to do so by America, was extremely
remote. Yet there were two other avenues through which the US
administration, had it had the slightest inclination to pursue them,
could almost certainly have succeeded in shortening the conflict.
Instead, to serve their own agenda, they approached these avenues
with sufficient circumspection to frustrate every overture; each
manoeuvre calculated to obstruct the least chance of any kind of
rapprochement.
Was
Japan really suing for peace?
The
evidence that it was is overwhelming. Astonishingly, Japanese
diplomats initiated peace feelers as early as late summer 1944. They
continued to do so - through Sweden, Switzerland, Russia and even the
Vatican. Particular efforts were made via Moscow in the (mistaken)
belief that the Neutrality Pact that existed between Japan and Russia
made it the most viable channel. Despite the fact that Stalin had
previously declined to renew the pact, Japanese fears were somewhat
mollified (but by no means quelled) by his assurance that it would
continue to inform his decisions until its expiry in April 1946. But
by the end of 1943 he had already made known to Allied leaders his
intention to enter the war against Japan and signed an agreement
confirming it, at Yalta in February 1945.
On
the day following the collapse of Okinawa (21 June 1945), Emperor
Hirohito told the Supreme Council for the Direction of War to reverse
their “Basic Policy”, urging them to seek peace by diplomatic
means: “You will consider the question of ending the war as soon as
possible”. It was the specific mission of the new cabinet of Prime
Minister, Baron Kantaro Suzuki (appointed 7 April 1945), to seek
peace. But neither the US nor Russia were interested in Japan’s
efforts for peace; the US wanted to wait until it could drop the atom
bombs and Russia until it was ready to declare war. Not one of the
messages imparted to Moscow by the Japanese ambassador was passed on
to America. This made little difference, however, since all Japanese
codes - diplomatic (“Magic”) and operational (“ultra”) had
long been broken. An extract from “Magic” Nº 1205 (13 July
1945) deciphering a cable from Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador
Sato reads: “His Majesty the Emperor, mindful of the fact that the
present war daily brings greater evil and sacrifice upon the peoples
of all belligerent powers, desires from his heart that it may be
quickly terminated”. The same transcript further states: “It is
the Emperor’s private intention to send Prince Konoye to Moscow as
a Special Envoy . . .” And so he did, but Moscow would not receive
him. Later President Truman “thanked” Marshal Stalin.
Stephen
Harper, in his book Miracle of Deliverance, subtitled ‘The
Case for the Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki”, write, with
commendable honesty: “Ways could have been found to explore the
Japanese peace moves had there been any desire to do so, but it seems
clear that the doctrine of unconditional surrender . . . had become
compulsive thinking - an Allied blindspot”.
Was
it unconditional surrender?
On
21 July an ultimatum – the Potsdam Declaration – was given to the
Japanese government. It was issued on behalf of the President of the
United States, the President of Nationalist China and the Prime
Minister of Great Britain; but not Russia. Its language was
uncompromising as these extracts show:
“Following
are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no
alternatives. We shall brook no delay.
“There
must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those
who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on
world conquest . . . We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim
the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces . . .”
Despite
the inclusion of phrases such as : “We do not intend that the
Japanese shall be enslaved . . .”, “Freedom of speech, of
religion and of thought . . .”, “. . . fundamental human rights
shall be established” – the single non-negotiable concession,
repeatedly demanded by Japan, was noticeably absent: a guarantee of
the Emperor’s position. A crucial paragraph offering just such a
guarantee was deleted by the US Secretary of State James F. Byrnes.
Consequently, the Declaration was deemed unacceptable by Japan –
just as the US hoped it would be.
Much
discussion has ensued concerning the nature of the Japanese response.
Some analysts consider it to be an outright rejection; others no more
than a pause for breath. Confusion was sown by the use of the
Japanese term “mokusatsu”, which can mean: “take no notice of”;
“treat with silent contempt” or (most probably) “withhold
comment”. Some writers have emphasised the jingoistic and defiant
statements trumpeted in the Japanese media, but these were obviously
face-saving propaganda exercises designed to boost national morale.
Other compelling evidence makes it abundantly clear that, so far as
Japan was concerned, negotiations were still very much ongoing. And
that the US was aware of it.
“Magic”
intercept Nº 1218 (26 July 1945) revealed the text of another
message sent from Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador Sato. This was
a reaction to a broadcast made to the Japanese on 21 July, on behalf
of the US. The broadcast was made by Captain (later Rear Admiral)
Ellis M. Zacharias, later to write an article for Look
magazine (6 June 1950) entitled “How We Bungled the Japanese
Surrender”. Part of the “Magic” summary stated: “It is
impossible for us to accept unconditional surrender, no matter in
what guise, but . . . there is no objection to the restoration of
peace on the basis of the Atlantic Charter”. But once again Byrnes
intervened and claimed that it was best to refrain from designating
the broadcast as “official”.
That
the issue of “unconditional surrender” was the primary stumbling
block to the achievement of a peace settlement had been recognised
long before. A Joint Intelligence Committee in March 1940 commented:
“The crux of the political situation will lie in the all-important
status of the Japanese Emperor”. After the war was over, both
Secretary of War Stimson and the President recorded their
conclusions. “[H]istory might find that the United States, by its
delay in stating its position [on the surrender terms] had prolonged
the war” wrote Stimson in his memoirs. Or as Truman succinctly
remarked during the compiling of his: “It was because of the
unconditional surrender policy against Japan that Hiroshima and
Nagasaki were wiped out”.
Two
days after the Potsdam Declaration, Prince Konoye was still making
frantic efforts to make contact with Russian diplomats, contradicting
the generally accepted notion that the Declaration had been dismissed
out of hand by Japan. In any event, the decision to drop the bomb had
already been taken: finally confirmed on the same day as the
Declaration.
On 10 August, the morning after the second
bomb was dropped, an offer
of surrender from Japan was received in Washington. Once more it
stipulated that any agreement should “ . . . not compromise any
demand which prejudiced the prerogatives of His Majesty as a
Sovereign Ruler”. Stimson favoured its acceptance; Secretary of the
Navy James Forrestal suggested a compromise; Byrnes opposed it. For
once, Byrnes had to give way but, nevertheless, he was the one who
drafted the reply, the key phrase of which permitted that vital
Japanese proviso: “From the moment of surrender the authority of
the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be
subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers”. It was
enough. The bombs, apparently, had not persuaded Japan to drop its
proviso concerning the Emperor.
Byrnes’s
reluctance to bend, even at this juncture, is hard to fathom
precisely. What is seldom mentioned in popular accounts of the
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, however, is that a third bomb
would have been delivered and ready to drop by 17 August 1945.
Why
were the bombs dropped?
A
complex labyrinth of reasons lay behind the decision to drop the
atomic bombs. Once the vastly expensive machinery of production had
commenced, and the original purpose of its instigation forgotten,
sufficient resolve not to use it ceased to exist. The
astronomical investment of public funds needed to be justified; the
widespread public antipathy of the American population towards the
Japanese following the Pearl Harbour attack, demanded revenge – a
mood of which the American leadership was acutely aware. As Secretary
for War Stimson subsequently observed: “No man, in our position and
subject to our responsibilities, holding in his hands a weapon of
such possibilities could have failed to use it and afterwards look
his countrymen in the face”.
A
number of ‘revisionist’ historians confidently assert that the
primary motive was to gain diplomatic advantage: a powerful political
lever allowing the US to dominate future negotiations with the Soviet
Union. They make a powerful case and undoubtedly this was a major
consideration in the formulation of atomic policy. But this could
have been accomplished with just a single bomb and, surely, not
necessarily on a heavily-populated city.
The
fact that two bombs were dropped, however – without warning – on
specifically targeted and crowded locations which had been spared
aerial bombardment; the fact that each bomb had different technology
(one uranium-explosion; one plutonium-implosion), each with different
yields, dropped at different heights but both resulting in prolonged
and deadly after-effects of which little was understood, suggests the
conclusion that the primary motives might have been the seldom
mentioned (almost unmentionable) one of “scientific”
experimentation. A conclusion that seems to be confirmed by the grim
recommendations of both the Interim and Target committees detailed in
the first part of this article (last
month).
The
terrible war in the Pacific, in common with all wars between
capitalist states, had its origins in the protection and expansion of
economic interests. There seems to be no limit to the degradation and
cruelty utilised to protect those interests. Anyone visiting the
Hiroshima museum would be able to view the leaflets that were dropped
warning of an atomic attack. In an act of macabre cynicism that
almost defies belief, those leaflets were not dropped until 9 August
- three days after the bombing. Things improved for Nagasaki - they
were only one day late.
RICHARD
HEADICAR
A
list of the sources of the quotes in this article or further
information on particular points can be obtained on request to:
Socialist Standard, 52 Clapham High St, London SW4 7UN.
To Part One
To Contents Page10
Socialist Party
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