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How they decided
to have (and keep)
the Bomb
"Skybolt. It was an absolute
pile of junk" continued from previous page
17
What independent deterrent?
In the same month, Cabinet minutes recorded a lengthy debate on the
future role of the UK in NATO following the possible provision of
Polaris missiles, which reveal a wonderful confusion over the precise
meaning of a typically ambiguous passage contained in a draft agreement
compiled at Nassau : "Again, the latest draft included a new provision
that our strategic nuclear forces would be used for ‘the international
defence of the Western Alliance in all circumstances except where Her
Majesty's Government may decide that the supreme national interests are
at stake’. The Prime Minister had particularly directed attention (in
telegram Code 24) to these words, which had the effect of giving us
sole right of decision on the use of our strategic nuclear forces and
had asked whether . . . these words could be publicly defended as
maintaining an independent United Kingdom contribution to the nuclear
deterrent.".
In accordance with the Prime Minister's request, the Cabinet examined
the text closely and discovered that the meaning was rather less
explicit than it had appeared to be at first glance. As the minutes
explain with commendable clarity:
"There was some doubt whether, as it stood, the exception would be
generally interpreted as allowing Her Majesty's Government to use
United Kingdom strategic forces in circumstances not involving the
defence of the Western Alliance, or whether it would be taken to mean
only that the Government could decline to use those forces in
particular circumstances involving the interests of the Alliance.".
It quickly became apparent that this prime example of legal sophistry
(of a kind almost invariably present in any political agreement) needed
urgent clarification, without which serious reservations could arise
concerning the credibility of the Government’s declared nuclear policy.
The crucial point was minuted in a masterpiece of understatement: "We
might easily suffer from the growth of a suspicion that our military
independence was, or might be, less secure than, for example, that of
the French.".
The whole theory of "deterrence" is, of course, a game of bluff and
double bluff. While it was, and is, important for successive UK
governments to publicly trumpet the idea of an "independent deterrent",
it is hard to imagine that many politicians actually believed in it.
Telling revelations identifying such doubts appear throughout the book,
via minority reports and admissions made to the author personally.
Discussing nuclear policy with Hennessy in a radio interview in 1985,
Harold Wilson confessed: "I never believed we had a really independent
deterrent."
In the 1967 Burke Trend report, under the heading "The Case against
retention and Improvement" we read : "The Treasury and the DEA do not
find it possible to believe that the United Kingdom could or would
confront the USSR with our nuclear capability independently of the
USA. . . .The Soviet Union would not believe that we would be
willing to contemplate the total annihilation which would be the result
of using our nuclear weapon against them . . . since we have already
decided that we shall not develop or acquire a successor to Polaris
[professed Labour Party policy at the time, lest we forget] (thereby
setting a term to our participation in strategic nuclear deterrence)
the right course is to abandon the whole of our nuclear capability as
soon as possible."
Again, in July 1968, dissenting from the Kings Norton Working Party's
recommendation that Polaris should continue, Lord Rothschild raises a
further powerful point : "The Committee has been told that Polaris or
Polaris-type missiles do not have Union Jacks or Stars and Stripes on
them. How then, would Russia react if a missile were fired by the USA,
for example, at Moscow? . . .Whatever the United States may say
or believe about the acceptability of megadeaths in the USA, the
effective elimination of the United Kingdom by a small number of
H-bombs must raise serious doubts about the desirability of us having
Polaris missiles at all."
Later, in a report commissioned by Lord Carrington (Edward Heath's
Defence Secretary) another minority opinion is chillingly expressed by
Chief of General Staff, Field Marshall Lord Carver: "He also doubted
(the minutes continue) the credibility of an independent nuclear
deterrent, either in our own or Soviet minds . . . If it were to be
used when Europe was attacked it would represent the voice of suicide;
if used when Europe had been overrun or we ourselves were under attack,
it would be a voice from the grave."
A seat at the table
The story told by the documents that Peter Hennessy has assembled is
one of secrecy, deception and power motivated expediency. The elaborate
charade of nuclear deterrence has at its heart, not the necessary
defence of the UK population but perceived political grandeur.
Ego-driven politicians playing a dangerous game of power posturing –
fuelled by the pathetic belief that "Britain" has some divine right to
sit at the nuclear table for reasons of national prestige. This, from a
1962 Cabinet meeting presided over by Harold Macmillan : "Finally, if
this country abandoned the attempt to maintain an independent nuclear
deterrent it would be unable to exercise any effective influence in the
attempts . . . to achieve some international agreement to limit nuclear
armaments."
Similarly, in a December 1967 minute from Wilson's Cabinet: "We should
lose the ability to influence nuclear policy." Yet again, from a June
1974 report to Harold Wilson from Sir John Hunt: “But quite apart from
the military consequences, it would severely affect our political
influence and standing . . ." Nevertheless, four months later the
Labour Party manifesto boldly declared: "We have no intention of moving
towards a new generation of strategic nuclear weapons." Throughout the
book, whenever disputes arise over the preferred direction of nuclear
policy, we see the trump card of "influence" triumphantly played. From
Bevin's "Bloody Union Jack" intervention to Blair ensuring a UK nuclear
commitment through to 2050, the underlying purpose remains the
vainglorious and consuming desire to perpetuate the dangerous illusion
of "British prestige."
Similarly, General De Gaulle famously stated that his foremost
consideration in reaching the decision to produce a "French" bomb, was
that it would enable him to take part in nuclear disarmament talks.
This provided fresh ammunition for the British nuclear weapons
apologists. A minute of the meeting of the Ministerial Committee on
Nuclear Policy (5 December 1967) puts it bluntly: "very serious
political consequences would be involved in abandoning Polaris. It
would leave France as the only nuclear power in Western Europe at a
time she was moving further away from the NATO Alliance and planning to
develop an inter-ballistic missile." Honestly, the damn cheek of those
French . . .
Although many papers still remain locked away (it's called
"Democracy"), this excellent collection offers a chance to understand
in greater detail, the Machiavellian manipulations practised by
successive UK governments. It has only been possible, in this article,
to touch upon some of the political expediencies, policy reversals and
downright deceptions awaiting the reader of this book. Made all the
more compelling by their official status.
At last it is possible to more fully comprehend the desperate nature of
the futile, but extravagantly expensive, attempts to "keep up" in the
nuclear arms race. To follow the gradual unravelling of the staggering
costs of the Chevaline development, which Callaghan for so long kept
secret from Parliament. There are interesting reports on the nuclear
resources of the Soviet Union and numerous enlightening insights into
the UK's supposed "special relationship" with the United States.
What exactly was the "Moscow Criterion"? What was "Option M" in
relation to Polaris? What assistance did the London Zoo provide? The
answer to all these questions and many more can be found within these
pages.
This book deserves to be in every library, but a word of warning must
be sounded. The detached and occasionally even elegant manner in which
the various Cabinet debates are recorded, may lead some to conclude
that we are all in safe hands. We should beware, however, of regarding
any discussion as rational when it is manifestly based upon a lunatic
and possibly fatal assumption.
RICHARD HEADICAR
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