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The Abolition of Britain. By Peter Hitchens. Quarter Books.
It certainly is according to rabid right-wing Daily Express columnist Peter Hitchens. Hitchens, who is critical of Mrs Thatcher and regards Michael Portillo as being too liberal, has set out his stall in a book which argues that the post-war period (especially since the 60s) has seen the gradual erosion of everything that once characterised Britain as a great independent Empire nation.
According to Hitchens, Britain's political, economic and social institutions have been taken over by "cultural revolutionaries" whose clear aim has been the abolition of Britain by stealth. This has resulted in some of the following: the decline of religion, morality and family life; the ruination of a perfectly good education system with comprehensive schooling; the legalisation of homosexuality and the rise of permissive sexual practice, and the abolition of corporal and capital punishment. Underpinning all of the above has been the general decline in respect for authority and patriotism. For Hitchens, this has led to a Britain which is no longer at ease with itself and one which has closed its eyes to its own history which is held in contempt.
Needless to say, with the arrival of Tony Blair and New Labour on 1 May 1997 the final nail in Britain's coffin was hammered home:
"1st May 1997 really was the start of a new era. The new Prime Minister's triumphal progress to Buckingham palace and Downing Street was filmed from the air by sycophantic broadcasters as if a dull cortege of motor cars were a rebel army finally emerging from the sierras to occupy a conquered city."
And we are all aware of what has subsequently followed. Devolution for Wales and Scotland, House of Lords reform and of course plans to join the single European currency and merge Britain into a federal European super-state. For Hitchens, all this is tantamount to treachery.
For socialists, Hitchens's entire concept of "Britain" is wrong. All capitalist societies are divided along class lines—capitalist and worker—therefore any talk of "nation" or patriotism is palpable nonsense. Capitalists and workers do not share a common identity nor do they share any interests in common.
Given this, it would be easy to dismiss Hitchens's views as the ramblings of a mad reactionary "golden-age" theorist who presupposes that the 1950s represented the last bastions of a perfect society. Hitchens, however, has identified certain negative trends in society but has drawn the wrong, reactionary conclusions.
The real materialist backdrop to Hitchens's entire argument is Britain's comparative economic decline as a world power and the profound social and political changes that this has undoubtedly brought about. However, Britain's decline started way before the second world war (as far back as at least the latter part of the 19th century) so there is a historical qualification to Hitchens's argument. His basic error lies in his uncritical support for Britain's imperial past whilst at the same time condemning Britain's rivals for having similar ambitions. His understanding of the nature of capitalism is clearly inadequate.
Clearly there is much wrong with modern society but it is not the result of the so-called "Liberal Revolution" of the 1960s. It is due to the decline of capitalism and the subsequent social havoc which has been created. Of course, Hitchens is really on a Christian/moral crusade against homosexuality and the rise of sexual freedoms which has threatened the sanctity of the traditional nuclear family as society's cornerstone.
It may be argued that Hitchens's obsession with morality is a cover for the increasing gap between rich and poor with the obvious social consequences: poverty, frustration, alienation, family breakdown and violence. However, Hitchens is slightly more sophisticated than this. He decries not only both main political parties for presiding over Britain's moral downfall but also the legacy of Thatcher:
"The apparent rebirth of Conservatism in 1979 was a false dawn because the Thatcherite movement was not interested in morals or culture. It believed mainly in the cleansing power of the market, which has much to be said for it but which has no answers to many fundamental questions—and which cannot operate properly unless honesty and stability are enforced through both ethics and law. Worse, the Thatcher government unwittingly helped to destroy many of the things Conservatism once stood for. In eighteen years of power, an immense time, the Thatcher-Major government was unable to reverse a single part of the cultural revolution, not least because it barely tried, and did not understand it."
There is always a certain irony when a staunch defender of capitalism starts to invoke a moral code for human behaviour but in a way it is quite refreshing. At the very least, Hitchens believes that humans are capable of behaving decently (although some of Hitchens's views can hardly be described as decent). However, he is likely to be disappointed because a social system based upon production-for-profit instead of production-for-need is almost by definition anti-social and amoral.
DAVE FLYNN
Labour in crisis. The second Labour government, 1929-31. By Neil Riddell. Manchester University Press.
The Labour Party, they used to say, was a broad church. Tony Blair, though he has sanctimoniousness in buckets, has spent much of the last five years trying to narrow it down a little. But he has not always found this easy. The strength of Riddell's book is to show clearly just how much of a compromise the Labour Party always was.
First the facts of the second Labour government. It was elected as a minority in 1929 under the clouds of the impending crash. It imploded in 1931 amid squabbles over a cut in the dole, and after the desertion of Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald to form the National Government (a Tory-dominated coalition).
This much is well known. What Riddell does that is new is to trace relationships between different sections of the Labour movement (the part, that is, which constituted the Labour Party) as capitalism's latest crisis left the politicians gasping. Except "relationships" isn't always the right word. "Hatreds" might sometimes be better. Senior trade unionists (who Sidney Webb called "pigs") and politicians came close to blows at least once. A broad church maybe, but saintly it was not.
What were the aims of different parts of the movement, which Riddell maintains never could have been reconciled? The TUC wanted a government answerable to them, committed to removing the anti-union laws passed after the general strike. MacDonald, of course, had no intention of giving it them.
Local Labour parties with union backing agreed with the TUC. The rest, always broke because of union resistance to pooled funds, just tried to stay afloat. Union-sponsored MPs generally went along with the TUC line too. Other MPs split, some supporting the Independent Labour Party (ILP) in its quest for "a living wage". This was proposed first as a remedy for under-consumption, later as a "transitional demand" by which capitalism would be bankrupted. Some for a while were sympathetic to Mosley. Most could only hope that their seats would be safe when the fiasco ended.
Riddell devotes much space to what he calls "the intellectuals". Looking at what they supported, now and later, this is surely to flatter them. Generally, they plumped for some sort of nationalisation as the way ahead.
Different again was MacDonald himself, a keen proponent of "the inevitability of gradualness". He believed that meaningful change could come about through piecemeal reforms of capitalism. Snowden, his chancellor, was firmly committed to balanced budgets, free trade and the gold standard. Both craved respectability. (Sound familiar, anyone?).
No wonder R. H. Tawney could call their 1929 manifesto "a glittering forest of Christmas trees, with presents for everyone". And it was undeliverable. As for the alternative, propagated in the pages of this paper then as now, there was not a whisper from anyone.
Disappointments were inevitable, and MacDonald's non-spin doctored public relations only made things worse for him. What really knocked the apple from the tree though was capitalism's slump. When the government did crash, it was spectacular.
The movement, of course, resolved that such a thing must never happen again. Webb went off to look for a different dream, and found it in the USSR. (Soviet Communism: a new civilisation? was published in 1935, but reprinted two years later without the question mark). Generally, the party took up a different brand of reformism in the 1930s and 1940s, looking ever more to nationalisation, finance controls and management by "experts" working through a benign state. "Gradualism" was too slow; and the next Labour government was quicker off the mark.
But what difference would it make? It wasn't just Macdonald's leadership which was found wanting in 1931. It was the whole idea that capitalism could be reformed into something kindly and user-friendly. It couldn't and it can't. Blair is the face of a Labour Party that accepts this basic truth.
T. CROBY
Top
Tory chickens come home to roost
Explaining Labour's Landslide. By Robert Worcester & Roger Mortimore. Politico's.
Opinion polling has been a feature of British political life since 1938. (57 percent of people were satisfied with Neville Chamberlain's performance as Prime Minister). By the last general election, however, the pollsters were on trial as never before. They had, horror of horrors, got the result of the 1992 election wrong.
In the end, their predictions of Labour's victory in May 1997 turned out to be creditably close to the mark. The Tories lost 177 seats. Labour won its highest ever number of MPs, and had a majority of 179. Worcester, who founded the MORI agency in 1969 and has been closely involved with political polling ever since, and Mortimore tell the story of that election through the data the polls provided.
The Tories were doomed long before the campaign began, they argue, because of problems almost entirely of their own making. To any socialist, this is deeply uninteresting stuff. The high point of this part of the book, as it was of the campaign, is the man the Tories paid to dress up as a chicken and follow Blair around. Which of them talked more sense is still hotly debated.
And yet, this is not a boring book. It argues strongly from a position of hard facts supplied by the polls that bias in the press does swing votes. During the 1979 election, two thirds of Sun readers didn't know its political allegiance. (Its front page on polling day consisted of two words: "VOTE TORY"). By 1997, "the print media did . . . have significant influence on the voting behaviour of their readers". In this case at least, greater political awareness seems to be a handicap.
The authors are suitably cutting about the cynical and meaningless astrological "predictions" spouted by several papers. The Express, for example, claimed that "a Tory victory is written in the stars . . . Tony Blair is doomed due to the poor positioning of something called the planet Rahu". Shelley von Strunckel in the Evening Standard was cleverer, taking a whole page to hint at a hung parliament without actually committing herself to anything at all. This under the headline "Forget polls, the result is in the stars".
Most interesting for socialists though, is the section What is public opinion? Clearly for anyone concerned to see a huge shift in human consciousness, this is an important area. The book gives much food for thought. "Public opinion", it maintains, comprises three things. There are "opinions: the ripples on the surface of the public's consciousness, shallow and easily changed; attitudes: the currents below the surface . . . and values: the deep tides of public mood, slow to change, but powerful". Political convictions generally (we are told) come from this third element. To dump our upbringing for capitalism frequently entails a shift in these deep values. It is possible, as the existence of the membership of the World Socialist Movement proves. But it may not always be easy.
The book of course was not written to give us ideas about how to speed up this process of human change. But what is the alternative? A man dressed as a chicken, pecking at the heels of another man who would soon be sending bombers round the world to serve British capital's interests. Pathetic, maybe; but nine out of ten people think it was childish too—the chicken bit, at least.
T. CROBY
Socialism and Cornmunication: Reflections on language and left politics. By Omar Swartz, Avebury, 1999.
This short book, by an American self-styled communication professional, will prove both encouraging and frustrating to socialists. On the positive side, Swartz says a number of things that we say, or at least with which we don't disagree. But on the negative side he says much that represents confusion about what socialism is as opposed to capitalism, much that is calculated to deter the growth of socialism rather than promote it.
The good news first. In the order in which they appear in the book, Swartz makes the following statements:
The basic trouble with Swartz's position, and those who think like him, is that they are desperate to be part of a big movement, and are willing to sacrifice any long-term goals they may have for the sake of short-term expediency. The divisiveness that Swartz deplores is not between groups that share the same goal and differ only about how to achieve it. It is between a presently small group of convinced socialists who are organised to achieve their goal and a presently much larger group, some of whom pay lip service to the socialist movement and all of whom prevent the growth of that movement by supporting various reforms of capitalism.
STAN PARKER
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